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Abstract 
Small and regional airports often have insufficient revenues to cover their costs due 
to limited traffic and given minimum fixed infrastructure requirements. The question 
is how such airports could be efficiently structured and managed and financially 
supported in order to survive. Some airports are operated individually and receive 
direct subsidies from the local and federal governments. Others, mainly those 
belonging to national public corporations such as AENA in Spain, Avinor in 
Norway and DHMI in Turkey, which operate the majority of airports in the country, 
survive through cross-subsidizations. Furthermore, subsidization of air services 
through Public Service Obligation (PSO) in order to assure the mobility of people to 
and from remote areas also includes a subsidy element for the airports in term of 
landing fees, which they otherwise would not receive. 
This dissertation first deals with the efficiency of 85 small regional European 
airports for the years 2002-2009 by applying a bounded measure of data 
envelopment analysis. Estimates show the potential savings and revenue 
opportunities to be in the order of 50% and 25% respectively. It is also noted that 
belonging to an airport system reduces efficiency by about 5%. The average break-
even passenger throughput over the last decade more than doubled to 464 thousand 
passengers. However airports behaving efficiently could have covered their annual 
operating budget with a mere 166 thousand passengers annually. 
The second part of the dissertation addresses the comparison of airports belonging to 
two airport groups AENA and DHMI for the years between 2009 and 2011. The 
majority of airports operate under increasing returns to scale. After presenting the 
similarities and differences of two institutions, a Russell measure of data 
envelopment analysis is implemented. Our results indicate higher average efficiency 
levels at Spanish airports, but recent private involvement enhances efficiency at 
Turkish ones. Certain policy options including the application of airport-specific 
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aeronautical charges, a greater decentralization of airport management and the 
restructuring of the airport network (by closing some inefficient airports) should be 
considered to increase the airport system’s efficiency in both countries. 
In the final part of the dissertation, we have studied how the airport specific 
characteristics drive the unit costs. In order to capture the spatial interdependence of 
airport costs, a spatial regression methodology is applied. Two separate datasets of 
subsidized French and Norwegian airports are used to test various hypotheses. The 
results show a negative effect of subsidies on airport cost efficiency. Furthermore, 
the significance of scale economies is illustrated. 
 
Keywords 
Small and Regional Airports; Airport Groups; Data Envelopment Analysis; Spatial 
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Zusammenfassung 
Kleine regionale Flughäfen leiden oft unter begrenzter Nachfrage sodass sie 
angesichts der minimalen fixen Infrastruktur Anforderungen und unzureichenden 
Erlöse nicht ihre Kosten decken können. Die Frage ist ob solche Flughäfen zum 
Überleben effizient strukturiert, bewirtschaftet und möglicherweise finanziell 
unterstützt werden können und ob die Art der Subventionierung die Effizienz des 
Flughafenbetriebs beeinflusst. Viele solcher Flughäfen werden einzeln betrieben und 
erhalten direkte lokale oder nationale Subventionen, während andere von den 
Quersubventionen nationaler Flughafenunternehmen leben, die den Großteil der 
Flughäfen eines Landes betreiben (wie zum Beispiel AENA in Spanien, Avinor in 
Norwegen und DHMI in der Türkei). Zudem gibt es auf unrentable Strecken die 
Subventionierung des innergemeinschaftlichen Flugverkehrs, um die Mobilität von 
Menschen in und aus entlegenen Regionen zu gewährleisten. Solche Flüge werden 
als Public Service Obligation (PSO) auf solchen Strecken deklariert. Von den 
dadurch zusätzlich entstandenen Landegebühren profitieren die regionalen 
Flughäfen ebenfalls. 
Die Dissertation befasst sich zuerst mit der Abschätzung der Effizienz von 85 
regionalen europäischen Flughäfen zwischen den Jahren 2002 und 2009 durch 
Anwendung einer „bounded measure“ der „Data Envelopment Analysis“. Unsere 
Schätzungen zeigen, dass die potenziellen Einsparungen 50 % und gesteigerten 
Einnahmemöglichkeiten 25 % betragen. Die Zugehörigkeit zu einem 
Flughafensystem reduziert die Effizienz in der Größenordnung von 5 %. Das 
durchschnittliche Break-Even Passagieraufkommen hat sich im letzten Jahrzehnt mit 
464.000 Passagiere mehr als verdoppelt. Die Flughäfen hätten ihre Kosten mit allein 
166.000 Passagiere decken können, wären sie effizient betrieben worden. 
Der zweite Teil der Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit einem Vergleich der zwei 
nationalen Flughäfengruppen AENA und DHM für die Jahre zwischen 2009 und 
2011. Die Mehrheit der Flughäfen arbeitet unter zunehmenden Skalenerträge. Nach 
der Vorstellung der Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede der beiden Institutionen 
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wird eine „Russell measure“ der „Data Envelopment Analyse“ durchgeführt. Die 
Ergebnisse zeigen höhere durchschnittliche Effizienz der spanischen Flughäfen. 
Aber ein in jüngster Zeit verstärkte privates Engagement steigert die Effizienz in den 
türkischen Flughäfen. Wir schlagen verschiedene wirtschaftspolitische Optionen vor 
um die Effizienz zu verbessern, wie zum Beispiel die Anwendung von 
flughafenspezifischen Flughafengebühren, die Dezentralisierung von Flughafen-
Management und die Verbesserung des Flughafennetzes durch die Schließung 
ineffizienter Flughäfen. 
Im letzten Teil werden die spezifischen Eigenschaften der Flughäfen untersucht, um 
zu erklären, wie diese die durchschnittlichen Kosten beeinflussen. Durch eine 
räumliche Regressionsmethode konnten wir die räumliche Abhängigkeit der Kosten 
erfassen. Zwei separate Datensätze von subventionierten französischen und 
norwegischen Flughäfen wurden verwendet um verschiedene Hypothesen zu testen. 
Die Ergebnisse zeigen eine negative Auswirkung von Subventionen auf 
Kosteneffizienz der Flughäfen. Darüber hinaus wird die Bedeutung von 
Skaleneffekten veranschaulicht. 
 
Schlagwörter 
Kleine und Regionale Flughäfen; Flughafen Gruppen; Data Envelopment Analysis; 
Räumliche Regression; Effizienz; Kosten; Subventionen 
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Preface 
My first visit to an airport was in Istanbul, when I was six years old. I felt privileged, 
because I was able to enter some areas of the airports, where the ordinary passengers 
cannot. My parents were both working for a ground handling company and I had the 
possibility to have regular visits to the airport for around ten years. The ground 
handling company was then privatized and my parents acquired their prior work 
positions at other public institutions according to the privatization law in Turkey. 
My parents did not believe that privatization was a good idea, perhaps because they 
lost their jobs, which they wanted to retain. When I think about this story nowadays, 
I can imagine that the privatized ground handling company was looking for cost 
saving opportunities starting with the employees in order to operate in a more cost 
efficient manner. 
Then, I was then a regular airline passenger until 2007, using the airports for travel 
purposes until I became a member of German Airport Performance (GAP) Project at 
Berlin School of Economics and Law. One of the first research articles I read dealt 
with airport benchmarking and had a peculiar and challenging title: “Apples and 
oranges: Can benchmarking provide accurate and consistent measures of airport 
productivity and efficiency?” (Morrison, 2007).1 He delivered an elaborated critique 
of airport benchmarking by frequently citing the ATRS (Air Transport Research 
Society) global benchmarking report. He argued that benchmarking of airports is not 
a comparison of apples to apples and the results should be interpreted with caution 
because of the sensitivity of results due to variables, assumptions and methodology. 
Adler et al. (2008)2 published a response to this article, in which they provided 
explanations of their benchmarking analysis, as well as for airport benchmarking in 
general.3 Having read both sides of the discussion, I believed that benchmarking 
                                                          
1 Morrison, W.G., 2007. Apples and oranges: Can benchmarking provide accurate and consistent 
measures of airport productivity and efficiency?, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada. 
2 As the members of the ATRS Global Airport Performance Benchmarking Task Force 
3 Adler, N., Oum, T.H., Yu, C., 2009. A response to 'Understanding the complexities and challenges 
of airport performance benchmarking'. Journal of airport management 3 (2), 159–163. 
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delivers decent and valuable results, but also accepted the challenges mentioned by 
Morrison.  
More importantly, during my research on airports, I realized that two aspects play a 
very important role to enhance the contribution of the research. First one is a very 
detailed understanding of the data as well as the ability of collecting all relevant 
additional information on airports, so that the results have applicable managerial 
implications when running the airports. Second one is the link between the results of 
the analysis and economic policy, so that they can be evaluated from a total welfare 
perspective for the whole society and contribute to the overall well-being. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
“Regional airports provide their catchment areas with access to major cities and 
other major regional centres. This facilitates out-bound and in-bound tourism, 
personal and business travel, personal and business freight and importantly 
facilitates access to community services not available in the regions such as 
education and health services.”  (Hudson Howells, 2012) 
Thus, factors other than economic considerations play an important role in the 
provision of airport infrastructure as far as the regional policies are concerned. 
These facilities contribute to the well-being of society from a number of aspects 
such as social, cultural, educational activities or quality of healthcare. Further, 
airports enhance the economic situation of the region by providing opportunities for 
various activities such as tourism, business or freight. 
On the other hand, these airports frequently suffer from limited traffic, fixed 
infrastructure requirements and insufficient revenues to cover their costs. Thus, 
financing small regional airports is an important topic, which requires an in-depth 
analysis with all merits and limitations. Financial support is frequently necessary in 
order to ensure sustainable operations at these airports. Moreover, the organizational 
structures and management strategies of small airports differ from those of large 
airports and hubs. Considering the governance structure, various options exist and 
are applied differently in different countries. Public ownership remains dominant for 
small regional airports across Europe, due to the limitations in profitability levels. 
Yet, public ownership takes different forms including the federal, regional and local 
governments or local authorities such as Chamber of Commerce. Moreover the level 
of private involvement differs as well. On the one hand a public-private partnership 
(PPP) between the government and the private firm is implemented, where joint 
ownership and management of the airport describes the governance structure. On the 
other hand, entire ownership and management rights are delivered to the private firm 
with no public sector involvement remaining. Beyond that, whether strategic and 
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managerial decisions are made centrally for a group of airports or individually for 
each airport describe the organizational structure in a country. The decision how 
airports are managed also determines the approach to cover the financial losses via 
subsidies. 
This dissertation deals with the following aspects in order to provide 
recommendations to airport managers, airport operators, civil aviation authorities 
and governments in terms of key managerial and strategic decisions: 
 Estimating relative efficiencies of regional airports across Europe 
 Determining the similarities and differences of airport groups 
 Analyzing efficiency changes over time 
 Examining reasons for poor performance 
 Determining the break-even point of airports 
 Defining the cost structure of small airports 
 Finding the effects of subsidies 
1.1 Methodology 
1.1.1 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
Since the introduction of the CCR-DEA model by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 
1978, a large number of various specifications of the DEA has been developed and 
frequently applied. One of the most important reasons behind its popularity is its 
ability to calculate the relative efficiency of DMUs without determining a-priori 
functional relationship of the production process. Moreover, the DEA makes it 
possible to utilize multiple inputs and multiple outputs. Application of the DEA has 
included a wide range of areas from private firms to public sector companies or even 
to cities or countries. 
DEA is a non-parametric linear programming approach, which determines the 
relative efficiency of decision making units (DMUs) through an analysis of multiple 
variables defined either as inputs or outputs. DMUs are assessed on the basis of a 
weighted sum of multiple outputs divided by a weighted sum of multiple inputs, 
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without describing the production function directly. This non-parametric approach 
solves a mathematical model per DMU with the weights assigned to each linear 
aggregation producing the solution to the model. The fractional programming of the 
CCR-Model, which evaluates the DMUo is formulated as: 
max 
u,v     θ =   u1y1o + u2y2o + ⋯+ usysov1x1o + v2x2o + ⋯+ vmxmo 
s.t.       
u1y1j+u2y2j+⋯+usysj
v1x1j+v2x2j+⋯+vmxmj
 ≤ 1,        j = 1, … , n              u1, u2, … , us  ≥ 0              v1, v2, … , vm  ≥ 0 
(1.1) 
 
 
 
where θ is the objective function, u1, u2, … , us are the output weights, v1, v2, … , vm 
are the input weights, s is the number of outputs and m is the number of inputs.  
Setting the denominator of the objective function equal to one leads to the following 
linear programming (LP): max
µ,τ     θ =  µ1y1o + µ2y2o + ⋯+ µsyso 
s.t.       τ1x1o + τ2x2o + ⋯+ τmxmo = 1              µ1y1j + ⋯+ µsysj  ≤ τ1x1j + ⋯+ τmxmj , j = 1, … , n               µ1, µ2, … , µs  ≥ 0            τ1,τ2, … , τm  ≥ 0 
(1.2) 
 
 
 
 
Represented in vector-matrix form, Equation (1.2) can be written as: 
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max
v,u     uyo 
s.t.       vxo = 1 
           −vX + uY ≤ 0             v ≥ 0             u ≥ 0 
(1.3) 
Finally, dual form of the LP in Equation (1.3) corresponds to: min
θ,λ     θ 
s.t.      θxo − Xλ ≥ 0              Yλ ≥ yo              λ ≥ 0 
(1.4) 
In the CCR-DEA model formulated, constant returns to scale production set is 
assumed. The variable returns to scale production set in the DEA was introduced by 
Banker, Charnes and Cooper in 1984, by including the convexity condition  
∑ λj
n
j=1 = 1 (written as eλ=1 in vector-form, with unity row vector e and column 
vector λ to be included in Equation (1.4)). 
The improvements for the inefficient DMUs occur by a radial projection to the 
efficient frontier in the CCR and BCC DEA models. A DMU on the efficient 
frontier (i.e. θ = 1) also needs to satisfy the condition that there are no additional 
slacks in order to be CCR or BCC efficient. The idea of non-zero slacks is illustrated 
in Figure 1.1, which represents an input-oriented model aiming to minimize the 
inputs given the outputs. In this illustration, DMU A is relatively inefficient. The 
radial projection of this DMU is point B, when the inputs are proportionally 
improved. However, Input 2 can be further decreased to reach point C, where the 
Pareto-optimality condition is satisfied. 
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Figure 1.1: Input-oriented DEA model 
 
Source: own compilation based on Cooper et al. (2007) 
In order to overcome this methodological drawback that stems from the possible 
existence of additional input or output slacks, non-radial additive models have been 
developed. These models directly address the possible improvements of inputs and 
outputs and enable non-proportional input reductions or output increases. Following 
Cooper et al. (2007), a basic additive DEA model can be represented as following: max
λ,s−,s+     z = es− + es+ 
s.t.         Xλ +  s− = xo                Yλ −  s+ = yo                𝒆𝒆 = 1                𝒆 ≥ 0, s− ≥ 0, s+ ≥ 0 
(1.5) 
where s− is the input slacks and s+ is the output slacks. Hence, the basic additive 
model maximizes the sum of input and output slacks for each DMU in order to 
calculate the efficiency levels. Nevertheless, the value of the objective function z is 
not scale-invariant, i.e. the efficiency scores of DMUs are dependent on the 
magnitude of input and output values. This hinders a rational comparison of the 
results. Various specifications of the additive model have been introduced since then 
to introduce a scale-invariant property. These include the Russell measure- RM 
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(Färe and Lovell, 1978), the slack-based measure- SBM (Tone, 2001), the range 
adjusted measure- RAM (Cooper et al., 1999) and the bounded adjusted measure- 
BAM (Cooper et al., 2011). In this dissertation, the BAM model and the RM model 
are implemented in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, respectively. 
1.1.2 Spatial Regression 
Spatial econometrics deals with regression models, which incorporate the spatial 
dependence of observations used in the analysis as well as the spatial structure of the 
model applied. Anselin (1988) describes this field of econometrics as follows: 
„The collection of techniques that deal with the peculiarities caused by space in the 
statistical analysis of regional science models” 
Two aspects describe the nature of spatial econometrics. The first aspect focuses on 
the spatial dependence, when observations at the host location are dependent on the 
observations at other neighboring locations. The distance between two points on 
space plays an important role regarding the magnitude of the dependence. Tobler’s 
(1970) first law of geography explains this fact as follows: 
“Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than 
distant things.” 
Second aspect is the spatial heterogeneity, which arises from varying model 
parameters or disturbances when moving from one location to another. Thus, the 
assumption of constant variance over observations is violated. Spatial regression 
models have been developed to account for these two aspects, namely spatial 
dependence and spatial heterogeneity, so that the models deliver unbiased estimates. 
According to Anselin (1988) and LeSage and Pace (2009), following formulation of 
spatial regression models, namely spatial lag, spatial error and cross-regressive 
model can be considered:4 
                                                          
4 Their combinations result in a possibility for seven different specifications of the model.  
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𝑦 = 𝜌 · 𝑊 · 𝑦 +  𝑋 · 𝛽 +  𝛶 · 𝑊 · 𝑋 +  𝑢      
                                                     
𝑢 = 𝜆 · 𝑊 · 𝑢 +  𝜀                                                                                              
   
with 𝜀 ~ N (0, 𝜎𝜀2𝐼𝑛) 
 
(1.6) 
W is an n x n spatial weights matrix which is crucial for incorporating the spatial 
effects into the regression model.5 It specifies which spatial unit affects the other 
ones as well as in which way the interaction takes place (Anselin, 2001; Elhorst, 
2013; LeSage and Pace, 2009). In the simplest case, one considers the binary 
weights with the elements of W-matrix 𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 1, when 𝑖 and 𝑗 are neighbors, and 
𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 0 otherwise. Another common way to model spatial interaction is to use a 
smooth or continuous distance decay function so that 𝑤𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑑𝑖𝑖) where 𝑑𝑖𝑖  is the 
distance between the unit 𝑖 and 𝑗 (Anselin, 2001 and 2002; Anselin et al.,2008; 
Elhorst, 2013). 
When 𝜌 = 𝛶 = 𝜆 = 0 and 𝛽 ≠ 0, it delivers a standard regression model, which 
reveals no spatial interaction. When 𝜌 ≠ 0,  𝛽 ≠ 0 and 𝛶 = 𝜆 = 0, it is a spatial lag 
model, which presents the spatial impact of the dependent variable in the host region 
on the dependent variable in the surrounding regions. The coefficient 𝜌 measures the 
intensity of the spatial effects. The higher the absolute value of 𝜌 is, the stronger the 
spatial lag of the dependent variable 𝑦 influences the calculation of the predicted 
value of 𝑦�. In most cases, the weights matrix is row-standardized for better 
interpretation so that 𝑊 · 𝑦  is the term of the form such that it presents a weighted 
average of the value of 𝑦 in the neighboring locations called spatial lag.  If 𝜌 = 0, 
𝛽 ≠ 0, 𝛶 = 0 and 𝜆 ≠ 0, it is a spatial error model, which reports the spatial effects 
in the errors. If 𝜌 = 0, 𝛽 ≠ 0, 𝛶 ≠ 0 and 𝜆 = 0, it represents a cross regressive 
model, which presents the spatial impact of the explanatory variables in the host 
                                                          
5 n presents the number of spatial statistical units considered in the analysis, which refers to the 
number of airports in this research. 
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region on the dependent variable in the surrounding regions. Last but not least, one 
can consider a combination of those models as well, e.g. spatial lag-spatial error 
model or spatial lag-cross regressive model with the corresponding formal 
representation. 
A spatial lag regression model is used in this dissertation in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 2 - Small regional airport sustainability: 
Lessons from benchmarking6 
 joint with Nicole Adler7 and Ekaterina Yazhemsky8 
published in Journal of Air Transport Management, 33, (2013), 22-31 
Abstract 
Small and regional airports frequently suffer from limited traffic given minimum 
fixed infrastructure requirements and insufficient revenues to cover their costs. The 
question is whether such airports could be structured, managed and possibly 
financially supported in order to survive efficiently. Efficient operations contribute 
to decreasing the financial dependency of airports on subsidies or the likelihood of 
foreclosure. This chapter applies data envelopment analysis in order to estimate the 
relative efficiencies of a set of 85 European regional airports over the last decade. 
We estimate the potential savings and revenue opportunities to be in the order of 
50% and 25% respectively because cost increases were in excess of any changes in 
demand over the timeframe. Using second stage regressions we examine the reasons 
for poor performance, which include discretionary variables such as the failure to 
search for commercial opportunities or to produce ground-handling and fueling 
activities in-house. We also note that belonging to an airport system reduces 
efficiency in the order of 5%. Finally, the break-even passenger throughput over the 
last decade more than doubled to 464 thousand, however airports behaving 
efficiently could have covered their annual operating budget with a mere 166 
thousand passengers annually.  
Keywords: Air Transport; Airports; Benchmarking; Data Envelopment Analysis; 
Regional Policy 
  
                                                          
6 doi:10.1016/j.jairtraman.2013.06.007 
7 Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. E-Mail: msnic@huji.ac.il 
8 Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. E-Mail: katy.y@mail.huji.ac.il 
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Chapter 3 - An empirical analysis of group 
airports: A case of AENA and DHMI 
Abstract 
Financing small regional airports has been a central topic in Europe. On one hand, 
some airports are operated individually and receive direct subsidies from the local 
and federal governments. On the other hand, several public corporations including 
AENA in Spain and DHMI in Turkey, which operate a vast majority of airports in 
the country, make use of cross-subsidizations. Due to their airport authority 
character, there are many similarities of two groups, but they also present many 
differences with respect to management strategies. Turkish DHMI introduced 
private involvement in airport operations via Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model 
and concession agreements. In contrast, management and operations of all airports 
in Spain –with a few exceptions- have remained in AENA. Although these two 
aviation markets play an important role in Europe due to their high traffic levels, 
airport groups have attracted little attention in the airport benchmarking literature as 
far as the international comparison is concerned. This chapter utilizes a data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) to measure the relative efficiency of airports within 
AENA and DHMI. Based on the results it further identifies the reasons of 
inefficiencies resulting from various management strategies and other external 
factors. 
Results indicate higher average efficiency levels at Spanish airports, but private 
involvement enhances efficiency at Turkish ones. Majority of airports operate under 
increasing returns to scale. Certain policy options including the application of 
airport-specific aeronautical charges, decentralization of airport management and 
improvement of the airport network by closing some inefficient airports should be 
considered to increase the airport efficiency in both countries. 
Keywords: Airport Groups; Public-private Partnership; Airport Efficiency; Data 
Envelopment Analysis 
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3.1 Introduction 
Although the transfer of airport ownership and management responsibilities to the 
private sector accelerated in the last decades, a significant amount of public control 
is still present around the world. One of the main reasons for the ongoing dominance 
of government involvement in airport operations is the public good characteristic of 
airport services, whose existence and financing should be based on social and 
demographical considerations rather than a pure profit orientation. Furthermore 
organizing the airport network through joint decision-making processes might 
simplify the technical challenges of operating airports in the country. For these 
reasons, especially the airports with low international scope attract little interest 
from private companies. In terms of airport ownership and management, this leads 
to the important role of state involvement with a few possibilities.  Airports in a 
country can either be operated from a central perspective by a national airport 
authority, or the airport management is left to local and regional bodies such as the 
local government or Chamber of Commerce. Finavia (Finland), Hellenic Civil 
Aviation Authority (Greece), Israel Airport Authority (Israel), Avinor (Norway), 
ULC (Poland), ANA (Portugal), AENA (Spain),  LFV Group (Sweden) and DHMI 
(Turkey) are the major airport networks in Europe (ACI Europe, 2010).9 Non-
privatized airports in Austria, France, Germany and Italy are subject to individual 
management.  
3.1.1 Motivation 
The previous chapter presents the significant negative effect of belonging to an 
airport group on efficiency and discuss the lack of correct incentives for cost 
minimization due to the cross subsidies. Moreover, motivation for commercial 
strategies to create additional revenues at group airports seems to be low in 
comparison to individual airports (Halpern and Pagliari, 2007). Notwithstanding, 
efficiency of airports operated as a group has attracted little attention in airport 
                                                          
9 It should be noted though that there are differences regarding a complete coverage of airports in a 
country and whether these networks represent a corporatized organization or a civil body as a part of 
the administration. 
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benchmarking literature and little focus has been given to the fact that they are a part 
of an airport authority, group, network or system; but rather their individual 
performances were evaluated in detail. Spanish airports (Murillo-Melchor, 1999; 
Martin and Roman, 2001, 2006; Tapiador et al., 2008) have been popular for 
efficiency studies and some research has been conducted on Greek (Tsekeris, 2011; 
Psaraki-Kalouptsidi and Kalakou, 2011), Norwegian (Merkert and Mangia, 2012), 
Portuguese (Barros and Sampaio, 2004; Barros, 2007) as well as Turkish airports 
(Kiyildi and Karasahin, 2006; Peker and Baki, 2009)10. But, mainly due to 
availability or comparability problems of data, inclusion of such airports in 
international benchmarking analyses has been very limited and a number of research 
has called for international analysis of such airports to get a more detailed insight 
about the level of efficiencies (Lozano and Gutierrez, 2011a; Ar, 2012). 
Some similarities between Spain and Turkey regarding the aviation industry are 
important motivating factors behind this research. First, airports in Spain are 
managed by AENA (Aeropuertos Españoles y Navegación Aérea) and in Turkey by 
DHMI (Devlet Hava Meydanları İşletmesi). Both institutions are state enterprises 
and are responsible for the management of the whole airport network11 in the 
country as well as air navigation services. Second, both countries have a similar 
number of commercial airports. AENA currently operates 46 airports and 2 
heliports, DHMI, on the other hand, 52 airports12. Nevertheless, airport density in 
Spain is higher in terms of both per capita and per area, because the former has a 
population and area of approximately 47 million and 500 thousand square meters 
respectively and the latter 76 million and 780 thousand square meters. Third, 
airports within both networks are subject to cross-subsidization, in which profits of 
financially sound airports cover the costs of loss making airports. Financial data 
from 2011 show that 19 airports in Spain and only 6 in Turkey were able to cover 
the operating costs and documented operational profits in terms of “earnings before 
                                                          
10 For a detailed overview and main findings of efficiency studies on Spanish and Turkish airports, 
see “Literature Review” section  
11 There are only a few examples such as Lleida–Alguaire airport in Spain and Istanbul-Sabiha 
Gökcen airport in Turkey. 
12 By May 2014 
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interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization” (EBITDA). Fourth, the relative 
importance of both markets in Europe is worth mentioning. In 2012, Spain was the 
third largest air transport market in Europe in terms of passengers13 following the 
United Kingdom and Germany. On the other hand, since 2001 the demand for air 
traffic in Turkey showed a 26 percent annual increase in terms of number of 
passengers, reaching 131 million passengers in 2012, making it the sixth most 
important market in Europe. Figure 3.1 shows number of air traffic passengers in 
both countries in comparison to the other markets in Europe and Figure 3.2 presents 
the yearly development of air traffic in both countries between 2001 and 2012. 
Figure 3.1: Number of air traffic passengers in selected European countries, 2012 
 
(Source: Own compilation by using data from CAA, ADV, AENA, DGAC, 
Assaeroporti, DHMI, Eurostat) 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Spain served approximately 195 million passengers 
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Figure 3.2: Number of air traffic passengers in Spain and Turkey, 2001-2012 
 
(Source: Own compilation by using data from AENA and DHMI) 
 
Although the air transport sector in Turkey was liberalized in 1983, which prepared 
the ground for market entry and privatization process of various companies in the 
aviation value chain, the practical implementation has been limited. Subsequently 
there have been several re-regulations, which especially influenced the domestic 
market. For a detailed overview of regulations in aviation industry in Turkey, see 
Gerede (2010). 2003 can be seen as one of the milestones in Turkish air transport 
history, when all the barriers for entry in the domestic market were removed. In 
addition, tax advantages to airline companies were introduced and airport charges 
were reduced. As a result of this deregulation process, a number of private airlines 
introduced new domestic routes breaking the monopoly of the flag carrier Turkish 
Airlines, which led to a drastic increase in the number of domestic passengers. 
Figure 3.3 shows the development of air passenger traffic in domestic and 
international markets for Turkey after the deregulation in 2003. In addition, the 
privatization process of Turkish Airlines in 2004 and their focus strategy on transfer 
flights by using Istanbul-Atatürk airport as hub boosted the demand for international 
traffic. On top of that, an annual GDP growth amounting to approximately 5 percent 
in Turkey from 2003 to 2012 should be also mentioned as another explaining factor 
behind the increasing demand for flights. 
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Figure 3.3: Number of air traffic passengers in Turkey, 2003-2012 
 
        (Source: DHMI) 
Last but not least, both countries attract a very high number of tourists, especially in 
summer months due to their good weather as well as cultural and historical richness. 
Particularly on the Canary and Baleraic islands in Spain and in the western and 
southern parts of Turkey, airports play an important role for the international and 
domestic tourists by providing the necessary infrastructure. Seasonal variations at 
some of the airports show similarities and are investigated in detail in the next 
sections. 
Although AENA and DHMI are responsible for both airport operations and air 
navigation services, AENA separated the airport business by founding “AENA 
Aeropuortos S.A.” in June 2011 as a 100 percent subsidiary, whereas such a 
separation within DHMI does not exist. Another difference between AENA and 
DHMI can be observed in their international presence regarding airport 
management. While the former “participates directly or indirectly in the 
management of 15 more airports worldwide” 14, the latter has only focused on the 
management of airports in the country. Countries where Aena Desarrollo 
Internacional S.A., which runs AENA’s international airport management activities, 
                                                          
14 http://www.aena-aeropuertos.es/csee/Satellite/conocenos/es/Page/1237548071568// last visited on 
27.05.2014 
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is active include Mexico, Colombia, United Kingdom, United States, Bolivia15, 
Sweden, Cuba and Angola16. 
A main difference between the two airport systems has been the way of overcoming 
the capacity problems at major airports. Even though airport privatization has been 
in the agenda of the government in Spain, AENA and AENA Aeropuortos have 
remained in public ownership so far. Hence, the necessary expansions at Spanish 
airports have been undertaken by public resources. On the other hand, DHMI has 
chosen public-private partnerships (PPP) via build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts 
followed by concession agreements for the constructions and operations of airport 
terminals at various airports in Turkey. 
3.1.2 Privatization Process in Spain 
Specifically at Madrid-Barajas (MAD) and Barcelona-El Prat (BCN) airports in 
Spain, capacity limitations were a major problem at the end of 1990s (Fageda and 
Fernandez-Villadangos, 2009). A major expansion project “Barajas Plan” at MAD 
was put into effect in 2000 and two new runways and a new terminal were opened in 
2006. BCN received a third runway in 2004 and various capacity expansions were 
made until 2009 including a new terminal. Other busy airports have also been 
subject to capacity expansions. Some examples include the opening of a new 
terminal in 2010, a new runway in 2012 at Malaga (AGP) and new terminal area in 
2011 at Alicante (ALC) (AENA annual reports, various years). 
Due to increasing public debt, the Spanish government decided to privatize the two 
airports MAD and BCN, as well as to sell stakes of the company in order to raise 
funds after the economic crisis. The privatization of two airports was supposed to 
take the form of “20-year-concession agreements” with estimated values of 5.2 
billion USD for MAD and 2.3 billion USD for BCN. Nevertheless, these plans were 
                                                          
15 In February 2013, the Bolivian government nationalized the three airports leaving AENA out of 
management.  
16 2011 Annual Report, AENA 
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cancelled by the new government in 2012 stating that “The decline in value could 
not be recovered”17. 
3.1.3 Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in Turkey 
Some of the Turkish airports under the management of DHMI have been subject to 
private involvement thus far. Like in Spain, capacities of major airports in Turkey 
did not meet the demand starting in the early ‘90s, especially regarding the 
bottlenecks at terminals. Furthermore, quality of service at these terminals was a 
major concern particularly in terms of the international reputation as these airports 
attracted many foreign tourists. As a result, terminal expansions became inevitable. 
To date, terminal capacity expansions have been realized at 6 airports through BOT 
projects starting with the main touristic airport of the country, Antalya (AYT), in 
1994. Figure 3.4 summarizes this methodology used by DHMI in those 6 airports.  
Stage 1: Contractual design 
The design of the new terminal, total investment amount, revenue sources for the 
operating company as well as the revenue share agreements between the DHMI and 
the private companies are documented during the contractual design period. Further, 
DHMI has offered a guaranteed number of annual passengers in most of the cases. 
Stage 2: Selection of an operator and contract execution 
Concessionaires bid for the shortest operating period of the terminal with the given 
parameters from Stage 1. The length of the terminal operations varied from 3 years 
and 5 months in Terminal 2 at AYT to 15 years and 8 months in Ankara-Esenboga 
(ESB) airport. After the auction, the concessionaire operates the terminals and 
DHMI is responsible for the operations of the airside during the execution period. 
Hence, in addition to being a managerial PPP, the BOT procedure of DHMI can be 
considered as an operational PPP as well. 
Stage 3: Long-term leasing and contract execution 
                                                          
17 http://www.airportsinternational.com/2012/01/spanish-privatisation-failure , last visited on 
27.05.2014 
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Upon the expiration of BOT period, DHMI applied long-term leasing agreements 
via auctions at those airports instead of using the “transfer” option, mainly due to 
efficiency considerations and opportunity of raising funds. At three airports, 
operational rights of the terminals have already been transferred to private firms for 
a long-term concession varying from 15 years and 3 months at AYT to 20 years at 
Izmir-Adnan Menderes (ADB).   
Figure 3.4: PPP process in Turkey 
 
 
Moreover, BOT methodology has also been used for three Greenfield projects. One 
of these projects – Zafer Airport (KZR) has been completed and airport operations 
started in 2012 and another one is under construction. The third application is the 
new airport in Istanbul, which will replace the main airport IST upon completion. It 
was tendered on May 3, 2013 and acquired by a consortium bidding approximately 
22 billion euro for an operation period of 25 years. 
Finally, DHMI also applied rental agreements in addition to “BOT approach with a 
second stage concession” and “Greenfield BOT projects” mentioned above. At three 
airports, operational rights have been transferred to private firms for a period of 25 
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years. A detailed overview of the PPPs realized hitherto in Turkey can be found in 
the Appendix. 
3.2 Literature Review 
Efficiency levels of Spanish airports have been examined extensively, whereas 
Turkish airports have not attracted much attention so far. However, international 
comparison of airports from these two networks with airports from other countries 
has been very rare and these comparisons have not included the whole network, but 
rather a limited number of airports. Furthermore, timespan evaluated has not 
included the years after 2007 in Spain. 
Murillo-Melchor (1999) investigates the scale efficiency and technological changes 
in 33 Spanish airports for the years between 1992 and 1994 by implementing an 
input-oriented DEA, complemented with a Malmquist index. Her findings show that 
there are only 2 scale efficient airports in the sample and another 2 airports operate 
under decreasing returns to scale. Rest of the airports in the sample is subject to 
increasing returns to scale. Furthermore Malmquist index shows that the total 
productivity decreases from 1992 to 1994. Martin and Roman (2001) apply an 
output-oriented DEA to 37 Spanish airports for 1997, which also delivers results 
about scale economies. 11 airports lie on the efficient frontier and 9 airports operate 
under decreasing returns to scale. The difference in the number of airports in the 
increasing returns to scale range from the previous article may imply that the 
demand increased between 1994 and 1997. Two airports are reported as extremely 
scale inefficient, namely Cordoba and Salamanca. Martin-Cejas (2002) measures the 
productivity of 40 Spanish airports for the years 1996 and 1997 by estimating a 
parametric translog joint cost function. Airports with moderate traffic present higher 
efficiency levels than those with few or large passenger throughput, implying that 
the capacity plays an important role in the efficiency. He points out the problematic 
relationship between the capacity increase and airport charges and criticizes 
AENA’s single charging scheme that hinders efficient pricing. Martin and Roman 
(2006) use data from 34 Spanish airports for 1997 in order to compare 5 efficiency 
23 
 
ranking methodologies. The methodological findings show that the rankings of 
different models are highly consistent. The authors’ policy recommendations include 
the investigation of the option to close down some airports such as San Sebastian, 
Santander or Vitoria by concentrating the traffic on the main airport in a province18; 
however they also point out the difficulty of such an action due to political reasons. 
Barros et al. (2008) utilize various hazard models to find out the determinants of 
flight delays at 39 Spanish airports for the years between 2005 and 2007. The results 
show that the delays are caused by higher traffic levels, population in the area of the 
airport and the hub characteristic of an airport. On the other hand, capacity and the 
income in the area of the airport contribute to decreasing the delays at the airports. 
Tapiador et al. (2008) develops a different framework and evaluates the efficiency of 
29 Spanish airports in 2006 in terms of geographical characteristics rather than 
focusing on technical efficiency. The inputs used in a modified DEA are specific to 
geography, such as population, economic activity and tourism activity. 9 out of 29 
airports prove efficient according to the DEA results and for a substantial amount of 
airports significant improvements in scale are possible. It is concluded that the 
market lacks competition and individual strategies for each airport due to differences 
in regional limitations are recommended. Martin et al. (2009) implement a 
parametric approach to estimate the efficiency and the marginal costs of 37 Spanish 
airports between 1991 and 1997. Their specification rejects constant returns to scale 
operations at airports and shows an 83 percent overall efficiency level, with 
potential improvement in both technical and allocative efficiency. Regarding the 
airport size, their findings show that on average the larger airports are more efficient 
than smaller counterparts, possibly because of the pressure to cross-subsidize the 
smaller, non-profitable airports. Furthermore a clear negative relationship between 
the marginal costs and airport size is presented. As Martin-Cejas (2002) they also 
argue the unsuitability of AENA’s rigid charging scheme. 
Tovar and Martin-Cejas (2009) apply an input oriented stochastic translog distance 
function to 26 Spanish airports for the years between 1993 and 1999, followed by a 
                                                          
18 In this case Bilbao 
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second stage regression in order to examine the effects of outsourcing and 
commercial activities on airport efficiency. They define outsourcing as contracting 
any services out to third parties as a complement to labor and capital employed by 
airport itself and use the share of soft costs in total costs as a proxy for the level of 
outsourcing at a particular airport. Their main result is that the higher the 
outsourcing level and share of non-aeronautical revenues at an airport are, the higher 
the level of efficiency is. Tovar and Martin-Cejas (2010) specify a parametric 
translog input distance function, which allows for a decomposition of changes in 
productivity into efficiency and technical changes for the years between 1993 and 
1999 for 26 Spanish airports, without having to use input and output prices. Results 
present an increase in overall productivity, which was driven by a smooth positive 
technical change. The authors explain this result with the increasing amount of 
investment throughout this period, which led to modernization at airports. 
Furthermore, airports in the northern part of the country prove to be more efficient 
than those in the south. This result leads the authors to postulate that each airport has 
a distinct potential in terms of privatization and decentralization considerations of 
AENA. Lozano and Gutierrez (2011a) proposes a target setting methodology in 
order to measure the efficiency of 41 Spanish airports in 2006 and compare these 
results with the results of a variable returns to scale, output oriented, non-radial 
Russell measure of technical efficiency. Their main result indicates that almost all 
airports produce with increasing returns to scale. Hence, the authors suggest 
investing in relatively smaller airports with growth potential as well as lowering the 
number of airports in operation and call for international benchmarking to assess the 
efficiency better. Lozano and Gutierrez (2011b) include the undesired outputs 
regarding delays at 39 Spanish airports for 2006 and 2007 by implementing a slack-
based DEA, which aims to minimize the ratio of average input reduction to average 
output increase. A non-oriented, non-radial, variable returns to scale methodology is 
chosen. With the help of undesired outputs the congestion problem at airports is 
identified, which may ease the decisions of using other airports. Furthermore, many 
airports operate technically efficient, however the inefficiency levels of inefficient 
airports are very large. Martin et al. (2011) investigate the scale economies and 
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marginal costs of 36 Spanish airports for the years between 1991 and 1997 by 
estimating various short and long run translog cost functions with single or multiple 
output specifications. Main findings of various estimations include a technological 
process at airports from 1991 on, very limited possibilities for input substitution, 
existence of important increasing returns to scale in production as well as minimum 
efficient scale with 25.6 million work load units (WLU). Similar to previous 
research, authors conclude that the single price policy of AENA does not allow for 
cost coverage and question how much capital cost is currently and should be 
reflected in landing charges. Moreover, they suggest strategies to boost the demand 
because it would decrease the average costs as scare capacity exists and argue that a 
single airport in one geographical area could be more cost efficient. Lozano et al. 
(2013) combine the network DEA methodology with the undesired outputs 
regarding delays on data from 39 Spanish airports from 2008 and argue that the 
results of network DEA methodology are sounder than a conventional single stage 
DEA, because it considers the production as a multi-step process. 
On Turkish airports, the literature on efficiency has been limited to DEA so far. To 
the author’s knowledge, no other methodology has been applied to determine the 
efficiency of Turkish airports. Furthermore, an international comparison of airports 
in Turkey can be found in two articles (Voltes-Dorta and Pagliari, 2012; Martin et 
al., 2013), but these papers analyze data only from 8 international airports and 
ignore a vast majority of the airports operated by DHMI. In addition, detailed 
investigation of the reasons behind inefficiencies at airports in Turkey is missing in 
the existing literature. Following review of literature shows the main findings of 
efficiency studies on the airports in Turkey. 
Kiyildi and Karasahin (2006) utilize an input-oriented CCR DEA with a focus on 
the influence of infrastructure at 32 small airports in Turkey for the years between 
1996 and 2002. 7 out of 32 airports prove to operate on the efficient frontier. Ulutas 
and Ulutas (2009) use data from 31 Turkish airports for the years 2004 and 2005 by 
implementing a CCR DEA as well. On average, the airports which have been 
subject to BOT concessions are relatively efficient. They discuss the possibility of 
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privatizing or closing the inefficient regional airports. Peker and Baki (2009) also 
use an input oriented DEA, additionally they compare the results of CCR and BCC 
models for 37 Turkish airports in 2007. In a separate analysis, they implement a t-
test to investigate the efficiency differences between large and small airports and 
find out that the large airports are more efficient than the small ones and suggest that 
airport managers should be in close contact with airlines to increase the demand. 
Furthermore, they mention the role of government in increasing the demand with 
particular incentives such as decreasing the tax levels. Finally, they propound the 
need for an international benchmarking for a more detailed analysis of airport 
efficiency in Turkey. Kirankabes and Arikan (2011) use data from 2009 for 36 
Turkish airports to implement the CCR and BCC DEA. Their findings show that 
most of the airports are technically efficient but suffer from scale inefficiencies. 
Their policy conclusion includes not increasing the capacity at a particular airport as 
long as the current scale is not fully utilized. Kocak (2011) applies both the CCR 
and BCC types of DEA to a set of 40 Turkish airports from 2008. Similar to 
previous research, existence of scale inefficiencies is identified. Ar (2012) is the first 
research on the efficiency of Turkish airports, which investigates the dynamic 
changes over time by constructing a Malmquist Index following a DEA. 31 Turkish 
airports for the years between 2007 and 2011 are subject to this analysis and the 
average total factor productivity change in 5 years amounts to 13 percent, which is 
mainly driven by the technical efficiency change. He mentions the success of DHMI 
in managing the airports and underlines the weakness of the analysis due to 
inexistence of financial data as well as a missing international comparison. 
On the light of the institutional settings in both airport systems, which showed many 
similarities and striking differences in the first section as well as the literature 
reviewed, Table 3.1 summarizes the background that motivates the current research 
in comparing the efficiency levels of Spanish and Turkish airports. The analysis in 
this chapter fills the gap in research by offering an international comparison of 
efficiency levels for the majority of airports in both countries. Furthermore, a more 
up to date dataset from Spain is being investigated and the reasons behind the 
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inefficiencies are evaluated. In addition, a detailed review of PPP methodologies in 
Turkey is presented, which includes all the applications to date. 
 
Table 3.1: Motivating factors of the research 
 
 AENA  DHMI 
SIMILARITIES  
 
 
 
State enterprise  ✔  ✔ 
Number of airports  46 airports (+2 heliports)  50 airports 
ATC provider  ✔  ✔ 
Cross-subsidization  ✔  ✔ 
Existence of touristic airports  ✔  ✔ 
DIFFERENCES  
 
 
 
Number of self-sufficient airports19  19  6 
Worldwide involvement in airport management  ✔  x 
Airports as a separate business unit  ✔  x 
Private involvement  x  ✔  
LITERATURE TO DATE     
International coverage  x  Very limited 
Recent data used  x (until 2007)  ✔ (until 2011) 
 
                                                          
19 Based on the data from 2011 and in terms of EBITDA 
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3.3 Methodology and Data 
3.3.1 Input-oriented, Variable Returns to Scale, Russell Measure of Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
Additive models aim at maximizing the total input or output slacks, or both, 
according to the selected orientation (input, output or non-oriented) to calculate the 
technical efficiency. A basic input-oriented additive model is specified as in 
Equation (3.1).  
 
(3.1) 
The major problem with the basic additive models is that scale differences are not 
taken into consideration as depicted in the objective function S in the equation. In 
the input-oriented additive models, for instance, solely non-weighted sum of input 
slacks are maximized irrespective of the magnitude of differences in input variables 
across the decision making units (DMUs)20. For this reason, it is not straightforward 
how to interpret the DEA results when comparing the efficiency levels of various 
DMUs. In order to overcome this problem, a scale-invariant additive measure, called 
as Russell measure, was introduced by Färe and Lovell (1978). In input (output) 
oriented Russell models, the slacks of inputs are weighted by the corresponding 
number of inputs (outputs) as well as the values of observation in the objective 
function, hence delivering the maximum of averaged sum of possible improvements. 
                                                          
20 Each DMU refers to a single airport in a single year in this research. 
s,     r          S                    
m,     i          S                    
n,     j           λ                    
s,     r   ySλy          
m,     i    xSλxs.t.     
S SMax
r
i
j
rorj
n
j
rj
ioij
n
j
ij
m
i
i
...,10
...,10
...,10
...,1
...,1
1
1
1
=∀≥
=∀≥
=∀≥
=∀≥−
=∀=+
=
+
−
+
=
−
=
=
−
∑
∑
∑
29 
 
A Russell measure of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is used in this chapter in 
order to measure the relative technical efficiency levels of 41 Spanish and 32 
Turkish airports. Due to the differences in scale of the airports in the sample, 
variable returns to scale specification is implemented. Furthermore an input oriented 
model is chosen, where the airports are required to minimize their inputs by keeping 
the output levels constant. Last but not least, the variables which cannot be 
controlled by the managers in the short-run are considered as non-discretionary. 
Based on Färe and Lovell (1978), Ray (2004) and Cooper et al. (2007), “the input-
oriented variable returns to scale Russell measure” utilized in this chapter can be 
described as follows: 
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(3.2) 
In Equation (3.2), 𝑥 represents the inputs, 𝑦 stands for the outputs, 𝑚 is the number 
of discretionary inputs, 𝑙 is the number of non-discretionary inputs, 𝑠 is the number 
of discretionary outputs, 𝑞 is the number of non-discretionary outputs, 𝜃 is the 
weighted input slacks and is the intensity variable. The results were obtained by 
the EMS Software. 
jλ
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3.3.2 Scale Efficiency 
Previous literature on airport benchmarking has given a great attention on the scale 
of airport operations and generally assumed that the airports operate under variable 
returns to scale (VRS) rather than under constant returns to scale (CRS), due to the 
fact that the airports are not flexible in the short-run considering the choice of input 
levels. Thus, very small or very large airports are treated in an unbiased way when 
calculating the DEA efficiency scores. Two questions emerge with respect to the 
scale. 
First one deals with the level of inefficiency, which results from not operating on the 
optimal size. Unless the efficiency scores from CRS-DEA and VRS-DEA are equal 
to each other, inefficiencies due to scale will exist and the level of scale efficiency 
for input-oriented models can be calculated by the ratio of distances attained from 
CRS-DEA and VRS-DEA, respectively. Due to the fact that the distances are the 
technical efficiency scores from CRS-DEA and VRS-DEA models, scale efficiency 
can be easily attained by the ratio of technical efficiency scores of two 
specifications. (Coelli, 2005; Färe et al., 1998) 
𝑆𝐸 = 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝑇𝑇𝑣𝑐𝑐
   (3.3) 
Second question, on the other hand, investigates whether the airports operate under 
decreasing, constant or increasing returns to scale (DRS, CRS and IRS, 
respectively). Literature on production of airport services shows that a vast majority 
of airports operate under IRS, mainly due to the large, indivisible fixed investments, 
which cannot be matched with an adequate traffic demand. For instance, Martin and 
Voltes-Dorta (2011) argues that even for large hubs, there is a potential advantage of 
expanding the size of operations. A Cobb-Douglas type long-run cost function 
applied to 41 airports from Australia, Asia, North America and Europe delivers 
these conclusions. Furthermore, Assaf (2010) estimates a Cobb-Douglas 
specification of cost function and the analysis delivers results that support increasing 
returns to scale production. 
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3.3.3 Data 
Initially, financial data from AENA and DHMI were collected for the years between 
2009 and 2011. Detailed analyses of the financial data together with traffic figures 
and additional information have led to restricting the dataset. For example, 2 
heliports Algeciras and Ceuta as well as the airports Madrid-Cuatro Vientos, 
Huesca-Pirineos, Sabadell and Son-Bonet in Spain have been removed from the 
sample due to their very low and volatile traffic and inconsistent financial situation. 
Regarding the Turkish airports some airports have not been included in the sample, 
because Agri, Balikesir, Siirt, Tokat and Balikesir-Körfez airports lack traffic in 
some years; Batman, Gökceada and Kocaeli airports were opened within the sample 
period and some variables needed for the second stage regression were not available 
for Canakkale and Sinop airports. 
Furthermore the two main hub airports in both countries, Madrid-Barajas and 
Istanbul-Atatürk have been excluded from the sample because of two reasons. First 
reason is their relative larger size in comparison to other airports and the second is 
their hub status with very high concentration of flag carriers Iberia and Turkish 
Airlines. It seems more reasonable to compare the efficiency levels of these airports 
with other international hub airports, because their characteristics are more similar 
and they compete for a high amount of transfer traffic. 
Consequently, the analyses in this chapter are based on 41 Spanish and 32 Turkish 
airports covering a three-year period from 2009 to 2011. For the Spanish airports, 
balanced data is available for the entire time period, whereas data for some years are 
missing for eight airports in Turkey. The reason behind the exclusion of these 
Turkish airports for some years is the closure of the airports for several months 
within the time period of study due to runway extensions and maintenance. By 
excluding those from the dataset, any distortion due to sudden changes in traffic 
levels can be avoided.  
Staff costs (StaffC), other operating costs (OtherC) and total runway area (RWY) 
are selected as the inputs. Depreciation is not included in the other operating costs, 
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because the capital base of the airports is measured by using the physical indicator 
RWY, due to possible differences in the accounting methods between the two 
countries21. Furthermore, taxes or financial expenditures are removed from the costs. 
Runway area is calculated as the length of a runway multiplied by the width over all 
available runways at an airport. In the sample, Barcelona and Antalya airports have 
3 runways, 7 airports from Spain and 8 airports from Turkey have 2 runways and the 
rest of the airports operate with a single runway. 
Outputs include the three traffic statistics number of passengers (PAX), air traffic 
movements (ATM) and the level of cargo (Cargo) as well as the total operating 
revenues (TotRev). Total operating revenues are calculated as the sum of 
aeronautical and non-aeronautical revenues. The high correlation between the 
aeronautical revenues and the three traffic outputs PAX, ATM and Cargo can be 
considered to be problematic and in the optimal case use of non-aeronautical 
revenues alone might be preferable. However a detailed disaggregation of data on 
revenues is not obtainable from both countries, which would allow for ensuring 
whole comparability of two revenue types with their corresponding sub-accounts. In 
order to avoid this possible distortion due to incomparability, “total operating 
revenues” is preferred to “non-aeronautical revenues” as one of the outputs used in 
the DEA. 
AENA reportedly clarified that the costs from the head-quarter are effectively 
allocated to the available data for each airport under the management of AENA 
according to a sophisticated methodology, which accounts for various cost centers 
within the organizational structure as well as the use of resources. On the other hand, 
DHMI reports the head-office costs separately without distributing them to the 
airports. For this reason, these costs are distributed by weighting according to the 
total costs of the individual airports, which delivers a more comparable cost data 
among airports from the two countries. Financial, traffic and technical data as well 
                                                          
21 A specification of the model, where “depreciation” is used as an input instead of “RWY”, has been 
applied to check the robustness of the model and it delivers very similar results. The detailed results 
are not presented in this dissertation, but they are available upon request. 
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as the entire data on second stage variables except population density have been 
gathered directly from AENA and DHMI. Population density (NUTS) data used in 
the second stage regression have been collected from the Eurostat webpage. All the 
financial variables are converted to euro by using the purchasing power parity and 
inflation indicators obtained from the OECD database, in order to account for the 
differences across two countries and across various years, respectively. 
It should be noted that the efficiency scores calculated are intended to be evaluated 
from the point of view of the two airport authorities AENA and DHMI. As there is 
no private involvement at Spanish airports it is not necessary to have any concerns 
about the results on AENA’s airports. On the other hand, the situation regarding 5 
Turkish airports22 in the sample is rather different, because these airports are jointly 
operated by DHMI and private firms. Private firms pay fees to DHMI for the 
operational rights and there are different agreements at each airport concerning how 
the revenues are shared between the two parties. Furthermore, the accounts of the 
private firms in Turkey, which jointly operate the airports, are not publicly available. 
Hence, the revenues of DHMI from these airports include the fees paid by the 
private firms for the operating rights of terminals either as a part of either BOT or 
concession agreement. Besides, the costs accrued to DHMI at these airports are 
lower than airports with similar size, mainly because DHMI employs much less 
employees at these airports. As a result, the outcomes of the analysis can be seen as 
the ability of the airport authority to generate profits while maintaining the airport 
services, either operating them by itself or delivering these rights or responsibilities 
to the private firms. 
3.4 Results 
Results of the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) from model specification in 
Equation (3.2) are presented in Figure 3.5 for the average values between 2009 and 
2011. A value equal to 1 represents an airport with zero slacks, i.e. the 
corresponding DMU lies on the efficient frontier. Only Málaga, Badajoz, Salamanca 
                                                          
22 These 5 airports are Ankara-Esenboga, Antalya, Izmir-Adnan Menderes, Mugla-Milas Bodrum and 
Mugla-Dalaman. 
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and Hierro airports are fully efficient in all three years of analysis. The average score 
for the Spanish airports is 0.84, whereas the average score for the Turkish airports is 
0.71. This indicates a higher average efficiency level for Spanish airports and is 
statistically tested in the second stage regression below as well. Individual efficiency 
scores for each airport and each year can be found in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 3.5: Average efficiency scores for Spanish and Turkish airports 
 
Figure 3.6 presents the levels of scale efficiency in 2011 and Table 3.2 additionally 
shows whether the airports operate under increasing or decreasing returns to scale 
for the year 2011. Although most of the airports represent high level of scale 
efficiency, there are a significant number of smaller airports that suffer from scale 
inefficiencies. A vast majority of airports operate under increasing returns to scale in 
2011. Only 4 airports in Spain and 3 airports in Turkey operate under decreasing 
returns to scale, which are relatively large airports by their traffic volumes with only 
one exception. 
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Figure 3.6: Scale efficiency at Spanish and Turkish airports, 2011 
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Table 3.2: Scale efficiency and returns to scale at Spanish and Turkish airports, 2011 
                     Spain                    Turkey 
IATA Scale 
Efficiency 
RTS  IATA Scale 
Efficiency 
RTS IATA Scale 
Efficiency 
RTS  IATA Scale 
Efficiency 
RTS 
ABC 0.419 irs ODB 0.782 irs ADA 0.995 irs MLX 0.861 irs 
ACE 0.946 irs  OVD 0.919 irs  ADB 0.811 drs  MSR 0.605 irs 
BIO 0.986 drs  PNA 0.893 irs  ASR 0.872 irs  NAV 0.732 irs 
BJZ 0.591 irs  REU 0.979 irs  BJV 0.942 irs  SZF 0.887 irs 
EAS 0.870 irs  RGS 0.631 irs  DIY 0.910 irs  TEQ 0.978 drs 
FUE 0.998 irs  RJL 0.624 irs  DLM 0.976 irs  TZX 0.941 irs 
GMZ 0.451 irs  SCQ 0.965 irs  DNZ 0.755 irs  USQ 0.471 irs 
GRO 0.965 irs  SDR 0.956 irs  ERC 0.729 irs  VAN 0.845 irs 
GRX 0.939 irs  SLM 0.971 irs  ERZ 0.891 irs  VAS 0.759 irs 
IBZ 0.998 drs  SPC 0.963 irs  ESB 0.716 drs  YEI 0.912 irs 
LCG 0.944 irs  SVQ 0.997 drs  EZS 0.758 irs   
LEI 0.973 irs  TFN 0.997 irs  GNY 0.817 irs     
LEN 0.715 irs  TFS 0.908 irs  GZT 0.941 irs     
LPA 0.923 drs  VDE 0.524 irs  HTY 0.795 irs   
MAH 0.998 irs  VGO 0.934 irs  KCM 0.555 irs    
MJV 0.923 irs  VLC 0.991 irs  KSY 0.737 irs     
MLN 0.830 irs  VLL 0.894 irs  KYA 0.849 irs     
 Average Spain: 0.865  Average Turkey: 0.816 
 
In order to explain the efficiency scores, a second stage OLS regression is conducted 
on eleven explanatory variables, two of which are yearly dummy variables. Because 
a higher score indicates a higher efficiency level for the airport, a positive sign of the 
independent variable from the second stage regression shows a positive effect of the 
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corresponding variable on the level of efficiency. The first four variables can be 
directly or indirectly controlled by the airport operators AENA and DHMI. 
Airports with high traffic both in Spain and Turkey, such as Gran Canaria, Malaga, 
Palma de Mallorca, Ankara, Antalya and Izmir, are open to operations 24 hours with 
or without restrictions on aircraft type. On the other hand, for smaller airports with 
low traffic, opening hours can be used as a strategy to adjust the costs to varying 
traffic. For instance, in the data sample used in this analysis, there are airports, 
which are open to service only for 4 hours daily. In order to control for the influence 
of this strategy on the level efficiency, total weekly operating hours of airports have 
been included in the second stage regression. The negative sign of the coefficient 
shows that airports with longer operational hours are statistically less efficient. A 
hundred percent increase in weekly opening hours would lead to 13 percent less 
efficiency levels. 
Different strategies regarding the private involvement on airport management have 
been explained in the first section. While AENA operates all the airports by itself, 
DHMI has handed in the operation responsibilities of a number of airports to the 
private sector via BOT or leasing agreements. Impact of this involvement has been 
investigated by including a dummy variable in the regression, which takes the value 
of 1 for those Turkish airports that include private sector involvement. According to 
the regression results, DHMI’s collaboration with the private firms on airport 
operations contributes to increasing the efficiency level. Those airports depict 16 
percent higher efficiency levels than their counterparts with no private involvement. 
Literature on airport benchmarking very often used the share of commercial 
revenues and the share of international traffic to explain the efficiency scores. 
However, in this research both variables prove to be statistically insignificant.  
Insignificance of the former can be explained with the high number of small airports 
in both systems, which have very limited potential for commercial activities and 
corresponding revenues. Such airports extensively rely on aeronautical fees. 
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Insignificant results for the second one, on the other hand, seem to be due to the 
importance of domestic traffic both in Spain and Turkey. 
Airport size, measured by work load unit (WLU), has a negligible but significant 
effect on the airport efficiency. Doubling the WLU served at the airport would lead 
to a 3 percent increase in the efficiency level. However, this result is especially of 
importance for very small airports, because with the help of various strategies a 
duplication of demand is feasible in comparison to larger airports. Furthermore, 
population density around the airports has been included in the regression in order to 
account for the catchment area and measured by using NUTS III level statistics from 
the Eurostat. Each country is divided into administrative units by Eurostat and this 
statistic is calculated by dividing the population of this unit to the corresponding 
surface area. The main drawback of this statistic is that there is no standardization 
for the surface area measure. For instance, the NUTS III administrative area at one 
location can be composed of a single city, whereas a very large geographical area 
can determine the administrative area in another location. Unfortunately, a better 
proxy or statistic is not available to account for the catchment area of the airports. 
The quality of data, together with the fact that inbound traffic plays an important 
role in both countries due to tourism, can explain the insignificance of the 
“population density” variable. 
Similar to the traffic variations within a day, which can be dealt with opening hour 
strategies, variations of traffic within a year is another challenge for the airports. 
Figure 3.7 shows the monthly passenger traffic at the 4 airports with the highest 
yearly variations in traffic in Spain and Turkey for 2011. These airports serve the 
summer touristic locations and reach up to 1.1 million passengers in a particular 
month in summer, while their traffic volume is very low (22 thousand in DLM in 
January, for example) in winter months. The analysis of monthly traffic also helped 
to determine the airports, which were excluded from the efficiency analysis due to 
insufficient or very volatile traffic in specific periods in order not to distort the 
analysis. In order to include the yearly variation of traffic in the second stage 
regression, the GINI coefficient has been calculated for each airport and each year 
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by using the monthly passenger traffic statistics. The GINI coefficient is a common 
statistic to measure such variations in the literature and has numerous specifications. 
Following Dixon et al. (1988), an unbiased estimator of GINI coefficient has been 
calculated as follows: 
𝐺 = � (2i−𝑛−1)𝑥𝑖′𝑛𝑖=1
𝑛µ(𝑛−1)    (3.4) 
where, n is the number of months (hence equals 12), 𝑥𝑖  is the passenger traffic for 
each month, µ represents the mean value of the passenger traffic in one year. A 
higher GINI coefficient indicates a higher level of seasonality. Nevertheless, the 
regression analysis delivers statistically insignificant results for this variable, 
indicating that there is statistically no difference regarding the efficiency levels of 
seasonal and non-seasonal airports. This insignificant result proves that the 
managers of seasonal Spanish and Turkish airports have been successful in 
developing strategies to match their inputs to the varying outputs throughout the 
year. 
 
Figure 3.7: Seasonality at selected airports in Spain and Turkey, 2011 
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Further, 12 airports in Spain and 13 airports in Turkey are open to joint military 
operations. In some of the cases such airports were built as air bases and later 
opened to civil aviation. A dummy variable accounts for these airports in the second 
stage regression. The results show that such airports are almost 10 percent more 
efficient than their counterparts that are only open to civil aviation. Sharing the costs 
of operations with the military possibly leads to the relative higher efficiency levels 
for such airports. Finally, a dummy variable with a value of 1 has been used for the 
airports in Spain in order to test for efficiency differences between two countries. On 
average, Spanish airports obtain a score that is approximately 18 percent higher than 
the Turkish airports indicating higher average efficiency levels. Last but not least, 
airports achieve higher efficiencies both in 2010 and 2011 than in 2009 due to the 
dummy variables included in the regression. Although this result can be interpreted 
as the recovery from the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, results are not 
statistically significant. Table 3.3 presents the coefficients and the t-statistics of the 
second stage OLS regressions. 
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Table 3.3: Results of the second stage OLS regression 
dependent variable: efficiency score 
explanatory variables coefficient t-statistic 
weekly opening hours -0.132 -2.66 
bot (ppp) partnership (dummy) 0.166 2.69 
share of commercial revenues 0.047 1.18 
percentage of international traffic -0.023 -1.62 
work load unit (airport size) 0.034 2.70 
population density 0.018 1.13 
seasonality measured by gini 0.026 1.06 
joint military-civil airport (dummy) 0.098 3.38 
spain (dummy) 0.178 4.79 
2010 (dummy) 0.019 0.63 
2011 (dummy) 0.006 0.21 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Airport networks in Spain and Turkey present similarities from different 
perspectives. Both airport networks are operated by a state enterprise (AENA and 
DHMI, respectively) and operate a similar number of airports in total. Both 
enterprises provide ATC services as well. In both networks cross-subsidization is an 
important property of the system, where the losses of smaller and unprofitable 
airports are covered by the profits of financially self-sustainable airports. On the 
other hand, AENA and DHMI have some differences. Whereas AENA has a 
worldwide involvement in airport management, DHMI only focuses on the 
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operations of airports in Turkey. Furthermore, AENA airports operate as a separate 
business unit. Finally, a number of Turkish airports are subject to private 
involvement via BOT and leasing agreements, but the privatization plans have been 
postponed in Spain thus far. 
These similarities and differences, together with the importance of both countries in 
air transport in Europe in terms of high number of traffic as well as recent growth, 
led to the analysis of comparative efficiency for Spanish and Turkish airports. In this 
chapter, an additive input-oriented, variable returns to scale Russell specification of 
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) with non-discretionary variables has been 
implemented by using data from 41 Spanish and 32 Turkish airports for the years 
between 2009 and 2011.  Results indicate a higher average efficiency level for 
Spanish airports. Only 4 airports lie on the efficient frontier for the whole period and 
these airports are all located in Spain. 
Different specifications have been used for the efficiency analysis in terms of input 
and output variables as well as the airports included in the dataset in order to check 
for robustness. First, depreciation has been used as an input instead of the runway 
area to account for the capital input. Second, airports in Turkey that are operated by 
private firms via BOT or leasing agreements have been excluded from the dataset, 
because they present different financial structures than the other airports in the 
sample. Finally, hub airports in both countries, Madrid-Barajas and Istanbul-
Atatürk, have been included in the sample. All these specifications delivered similar 
results and did not affect the main conclusions of this research. 
Although technical inefficiency constitutes the most important part of inefficiencies, 
not operating in optimal scale for a number of airports should not be ignored. Most 
of the airports operate under increasing returns to scale. Hence, airport managers 
should seek ways for increasing the demand by implementing various strategies. 
Applying different aeronautical fees at each Spanish airport is one possibility to 
overcome this problem (Martin-Cejas, 2002; Martin et al., 2009). In addition, 
decentralization of airport management by delivering the airport operations to local 
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governments or other local institutions including private firms in both countries 
seems to be another option to cope with such difficulties. Additionally, improving 
the airport network in both countries by closing a number of inefficient regional 
airports and concentrating the traffic on larger airports is another policy 
recommendation, which could increase the efficiency of the whole system in the 
long-run. These recommendations are consistent with those of Ulutas and Ulutas 
(2009) and Lozano and Gutierrez (2011a). 
The results of the second stage regression support the above mentioned 
recommendations. Implementing reduced opening hours for airports adjusted to the 
variation in daily traffic, especially for small regional airports, will result in lower 
operational costs and increase the efficiency. Although the Turkish airports are 
relatively less efficient than the Spanish counterparts, public-private partnership 
strategy applied at 5 airports in the sample, has contributed to the efficiency from 
DHMI’s point of view. Hence, DHMI should continue seeking such opportunities as 
long as there is private interest at a particular airport. It does not only increase the 
efficiency at the airport, but also provides the necessary financing for a more 
modern, new and high-quality airport infrastructure. The recent decision of DHMI 
about the second stage leasing tender upon ending the BOT period at Mugla-
Dalaman and Mugla-Milas Bodrum airports as well as the leasing tender for 
Samsun-Carsamba and Nevsehir-Kapadokya airports in the near future shows that 
the DHMI is going to continue with this successful strategy. 
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Appendix 
Table A3.1: Yearly efficiency scores for Spanish airports, 2009-2011 
Airport IATA 2009 2010 2011  Airport IATA 2009 2010 2011 
A Coruña LCG 0.70 0.69 0.69 Logroño RJL 0.78 0.71 0.75 
Albacete ABC 0.90 0.91 1.00  Málaga AGP 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Alicante ALC 0.98 1.00 1.00  Melilla MLN 0.68 0.70 0.73 
Almería LEI 0.61 0.64 0.65  Menorca MAH 0.62 0.68 0.66 
Asturias OVD 0.70 0.73 0.68  Murcia - San Javier MJV 0.90 0.79 0.74 
Badajoz BJZ 1.00 1.00 1.00  Palma de Mallorca PMI 0.98 1.00 1.00 
Barcelona BCN 0.95 1.00 1.00  Pamplona PNA 0.67 0.66 0.65 
Bilbao BIO 0.92 0.93 0.94  Reus REU 0.81 0.86 0.75 
Burgos RGS 0.89 0.85 1.00  Salamanca SLM 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Córdoba ODB 1.00 0.94 1.00  San Sebastián EAS 0.72 0.74 0.75 
Fuerteventura FUE 0.73 0.80 0.82  Santander SDR 0.83 0.77 0.84 
Girona GRO 1.00 1.00 0.76  Santiago SCQ 0.62 0.65 0.64 
Gran Canaria LPA 0.95 1.00 0.99  Sevilla SVQ 0.77 0.79 0.82 
Granada GRX 0.69 0.67 0.66  Tenerife-Norte TFN 1.00 1.00 0.96 
Hierro VDE 1.00 1.00 1.00  Tenerife-Sur TFS 0.73 0.80 0.90 
Ibiza IBZ 0.81 0.91 0.87  Valencia VLC 1.00 1.00 0.93 
Jerez de la Frontera XRY 0.93 0.84 1.00  Valladolid VLL 0.74 0.76 0.67 
La Gomera GMZ 0.85 0.85 1.00  Vigo VGO 0.69 0.66 0.59 
La Palma SPC 0.67 0.66 0.67  Vitoria VIT 0.79 0.80 1.00 
Lanzarote ACE 0.82 0.87 0.89  Zaragoza ZAZ 0.96 1.00 1.00 
León LEN 0.78 0.77 0.82  Average 0.83 0.84 0.85 
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Table A3.2: Yearly efficiency scores for Turkish airports, 2009-2011 
Airport IATA 2009 2010 2011  Airport IATA 2009 2010 2011 
Adana ADA 0.70 0.79 0.79 Kars KSY 0.68 0.68 0.65 
Adiyaman ADF 1.00 0.98 NA  Kayseri ASR 0.66 0.66 0.67 
Amasya-Merzifon MZH 0.92 0.83 NA  Konya KYA 0.64 0.68 0.64 
Ankara-Esenboga ESB 0.66 0.82 1.00  Malatya MLX 0.86 0.78 0.67 
Antalya AYT 0.95 1.00 1.00  Mardin MQM 0.86 0.76 NA 
Bursa-Yenisehir YEI 0.48 0.47 0.47  Mugla-Dalaman DLM 0.70 0.74 0.73 
Denizli-Cardak DNZ 0.57 NA 0.52  Mugla-Milas Bod. BJV 0.68 0.71 0.73 
Diyarbakir DIY 0.82 1.00 0.93  Mus MSR 0.82 0.80 0.77 
Elazig EZS 0.66 0.71 0.70  Nevsehir-Kapad. NAV 0.53 0.54 0.53 
Erzincan ERC 0.65 NA 0.56  Samsun-Carsamba SZF 0.58 0.58 0.61 
Erzurum ERZ 0.57 0.61 0.55  Sanliurfa-GAP GNY 0.47 0.48 0.47 
Gaziantep GZT 0.54 0.56 0.57  Sivas-Nuri D. VAS 0.73 0.60 0.54 
Hatay HTY 0.74 0.77 0.67  Tekirdag-Corlu TEQ 0.89 1.00 1.00 
Isparta-Süleyman D. ISE NA 0.59 NA  Trabzon TZX 0.62 0.65 0.66 
Izmir-Adnan M. ADB 0.65 0.92 1.00  Usak USQ NA NA 0.78 
Kahramanmaras KCM 0.89 NA 0.74  Van-Ferit Melen VAN 0.79 0.82 0.80 
      Average 0.71 0.73 0.71 
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Table A3.3a: PPPs via build-operate-transfer (BOT) arrangements in Turkey 
Airport Scope Year of Tender Winner 
Operation 
Start 
Operation 
Period 
Investment 
Period 
Investment 
Amount 
Antalya Terminal 1 1994 Fraport  (+Bayindir) 1998 9 y 2 y 
65,5 
million USD 
Istanbul-Atatürk International Terminal 1997 TAV 2000 3 y, 8 m 30 m 
306 million 
USD 
Mugla-Dalaman International Terminal 2003 ATM 2006 6 y, 5 m, 20 d 2 y 
72,4 
million USD 
Antalya Terminal 2 2003 Celebi- IC Ictas  NA 3 y, 5 m, 26 d NA 71,1 million USD 
Ankara-Esenboga 
Domestic and 
International 
Terminal, Car Park 
2004 TAV 2006 15 y, 8 m Plan:36 m Actual:24m 
188 million 
USD 
Izmir-Adnan 
Menderes 
International 
Terminal 2004 Havas-Bayindir 2006 7 y, 4 m, 26 d 2 y 
125 million 
USD 
Mugla-Milas 
Bodrum 
International 
Terminal 2006 
Teknotes-
Aerodrom 
Beograde 23 
2012 3 y, 9 m 14 months > 100 million USD 
 
 
Table A3.3b: PPPs via Greenfield arrangements in Turkey 
Airport 
Year of 
Tender 
Winner 
Operation 
Start 
Operation 
Period 
Investment 
Period 
Investment 
Amount 
Zafer 2010 IC Ictas 2012 29 y, 11 m 
Plan: 36 m 
Actual: 18 m 
50 million EURO 
Cukurova 2011 
S.L / Z.C.A.24 
 
Not started yet 9 y, 10 m, 10 d Plan: 36 m 357 million EURO 
Istanbul New 2013 
Limak-Kolin-
Cengiz-Mapa-
Kalyon 
Not started yet 25 y Plan: 42 m 
app. 10 billion 
EURO 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 Winning consortium did not start with construction due to financial problems. Astaldi took over the 
construction and also the operational rights upon completion. 
24 Consortium of Sky Line Transport Trade Corporation and Zonguldak Civil Aviation Industry and 
Trade Corporation 
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Table A3.3c: PPPs via leasing arrangements in Turkey 
Airport Scope 
Year of 
Tender 
Winner 
Operation 
Start 
Operation 
Period 
Investment 
Period 
Investment 
Amount 
Istanbul-
Atatürk 
International, 
Domestic, GA 
Terminals; Car-
parking 
2005 TAV 2005 15 y, 6 m 
No 
investment 
No 
investment 
Antalya T1+T2+Domestic+CIP 2007 
Fraport - IC 
Ictas 
2007 (T1+D)  
2009 (T2) 
17 y, 3 m, 17 
d and 15 y, 3 
m, 8 d 
No 
investment 
No 
investment 
Izmir-Adnan 
Menderes 
Building and 
Operating Domestic 
Terminal + 
Operating 
International 
Terminal + CIP 
Terminal 
2011 TAV 2012  NA  NA 
Domestic 
Terminal: 
250 million 
EUR 
Zonguldak 
Airside + Terminal 
Operations 
2006 Z.C.A. 2007 25 y     
Antalya-
Gazipasa 
Airside + Terminal 
Operations 
2007 TAV 2009 25 y     
Aydin-Cildir 
Airside + Terminal 
Operations 
2012 
Turkish 
Airlines  
2012 25 y 
No 
investment 
No 
investment 
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Chapter 4 - How scale and institutional setting 
explain the costs of small airports: An application 
of spatial regression analysis 
joint with Vahidin Jeleskovic25 and  Jürgen Müller26 
Abstract 
One of the main pillars of efficient airport operations is cost-minimization. Unit 
costs of operation with respect to the level of passengers served are a possible proxy 
to measure the cost efficiency of an airport. Airport cost functions should be able to 
explain the total costs with the main inputs labor, material and capital as well as by 
taking the airport specific characteristics into account. In this study, we focus on 
airport specific characteristics. We use a spatial regression methodology to explain 
how these drive the unit costs and analyze the spatial relationship among the 
dependent variables. Two separate data samples from Norwegian and French 
airports are used in this research to test various hypotheses. 
Because a large number of regional airports in both countries cannot reach financial 
break-even, our first research question deals with the effects of subsidies, which 
often follow regional and political considerations. One must therefore find an 
efficient way to maintain these airports without any distortions on the incentives. 
When evaluating the relationship between subsidies and unit costs, we find negative 
effect of subsidies on airport cost efficiency. Second, we evaluate the importance of 
economies of scale by focusing on the relationship between airport size and unit 
costs. Finally, the results of spatial regression show that a denser spatial distribution 
of airports results in higher unit costs as a consequence of lower capacity utilization, 
indicating the negative effect of spatial competition on airport unit costs within an 
airport network. 
Keywords: Airport Costs; Airport Subsidies; Spatial Regression; Scale Economies 
                                                          
25 University of Kassel, Germany. E-Mail: jeleskovic@uni-kassel.de 
26 Berlin School of Economics and Law. E-Mail: jmueller@hwr-berlin.de 
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4.1 Introduction 
The need for high output levels for airports in order to be able to achieve cost-
efficient operations has always been a challenging issue for airport managers and 
authorities, as well as the political decision makers. Airports serving a higher 
number of passengers are able to exploit the cost advantages of distributing the fixed 
costs over a larger output. Pels et al. (2003) find increasing returns to scale at 
European airports in terms of passenger traffic. Martin and Voltes-Dorta (2011a) 
show that, even for large major hubs around the world, advantages from increasing 
the scale of operations are still significant. For a large number of airports in Europe 
it is not possible to reach the minimum scale, for which the generated revenues 
would cover the fixed and operational costs. A small catchment area and insufficient 
inbound traffic at such airports can be considered as the most important reasons for 
such low output levels. This problem leads to a trade-offs: Either a cost efficient 
airport network can be sustained with a relatively lower number of airports, but then 
the quality of connectivity would suffer with a less dense airport network. Although 
competition is shown to increase the productive efficiency (Malighetti et al., 2008; 
Chi-Lok and Zhang, 2009) or financial efficiency (Starkie, 2008), airports within a 
network are generally not subject to competition. Instead they rely on joint 
operational planning with a need for direct or indirect subsidies for ongoing 
operations. Nonetheless, the negative effects of subsidies on the productive 
efficiency of firms should not be neglected.  
In Norway, for example, the state-owned limited company Avinor AS is responsible 
for the operations of 46 airports in the country since 2003. The network of airports is 
characterized by a cross-subsidization scheme, where a few large profitable airports 
cover the losses of smaller airports, which are also subsidized by the Norwegian 
Ministry of Transport and Communications through the support of PSO27 flights. 
These small airports serve a very low number of passengers (GAP-Project, 2012). 
                                                          
27 Public Service Obligation 
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In France, on the other hand, airports are subject to individual ownership and 
operation, but those airports with financial losses are also in need of financial aid. 
They rely on direct local or federal government subsidies. The Directorate General 
of Civil Aviation publishes data over 80 airports annually, 64 out of which serve less 
than 1 million passengers (DGAC, 2009). Both in Norway and France, airport 
density is above the European average.28 The extent of subsidies varies significantly 
across airports in both countries, with Norway spending a much greater sum. 
Maximum subsidy per passenger served amounts to approximately 30 euro in 
France and 185 euro in Norway. In terms of average values, the average subsidy per 
passenger served equals to 3 euro in France and 26 euro in Norway.29 
In this research we investigate the determinants of airport unit costs by applying a 
spatial regression model, which allows for testing the locational interdependence of 
airports within a country. Next section presents an overview of the literature on 
airport cost functions as well as on the effect of subsidies on efficiency. In section 3, 
the research methodology and data are described. The results are illustrated in 
section 4, followed in the last section by concluding remarks and directions for 
further research. 
4.2 Literature Review 
The study of airport cost functions has attracted less attention until the 2000s, 
mainly due to methodological complexities and the detailed data requirements. Cost 
functions took either a translog or a Cobb-Douglas form. While some research has 
focused only on short-run cost function, others have estimated long-run cost 
functions allowing for variations in the assumed inputs. In most of these studies, 
“number of passengers” (PAX), “number of air traffic movements” (ATM) and 
“freight” were used as the outputs produced by an airport in multiple-output models. 
Often one of these variables has been used as the only output, indicating a single-
output production technology. Labor, capital and material have mostly been used as 
                                                          
28 http://en.worldstat.info/Europe/List_of_countries_by_Number_of_airports_per_million_persons 
29 Although we do not have data on all subsidized airports in France, these summary figures enlighten 
the situation in comparing the two countries with respect to subsidy levels. 
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inputs of airports, but the proxies used for inputs have changed according to the data 
availability.  
In the literature we find that airport cost functions have been estimated to answer a 
wide range of questions concerning managerial, economic, social and political 
practices. Carlin and Park (1970) studies optimal pricing strategies to overcome the 
delay problem for LaGuardia airport. Keeler (1970) calculates the marginal costs of 
runway usage for 13 airport systems in the US and differentiates between capital and 
operational costs. According to Morrison (1983) cost functions should be estimated 
with a more sophisticated model that looks at capacity related usage, and the delay 
costs of the runways. Tolofari et al. (1990) estimate both short and long-run cost 
functions for 7 British airports, with PAX, ATM and freight as outputs; labor, 
equipment and capital stock as inputs as well as their prices and various operational 
attributes of airports. Carlsson (2002) estimates the marginal costs of 19 Swedish 
airports by using a log-log functional form with PAX as single output. Further, he 
compares the existing charging structure with marginal-cost prices derived from the 
analysis. Martin-Cejas (2002) determines the relative efficiency of 40 Spanish 
airports by estimating a translog cost function with a joint output of passengers and 
freight transported. The results show that the insufficient airport scale is the main 
reason behind efficiency differences observed. Craig et al. (2003) also estimate a 
cost function to compare the efficiency of authority-operated airports with their city-
operated counterparts for 53 US airports. The cost function is based on a unique 
output, namely the ATM and three inputs labor, capital and materials. Main et al. 
(2003) estimate Cobb-Douglas cost functions for the short and long-run in order to 
investigate the necessity of a new airport in central Scotland. They conclude that 
total welfare can be significantly increased in case of developing the existing two 
airports instead of building a new, larger airport. By using data from 94 US airports 
Jeong (2005) estimates a translog cost function, in which various operational 
characteristics are incorporated such as share of international traffic, delay and the 
level of outsourcing of important activities of the value chain. He finds out that the 
minimum efficient scale is reached by serving 2.5 million passengers a year. Low 
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and Tang (2006) show the degree of input substitutability at 9 Asian airports by 
estimating a translog cost function. A stochastic cost frontier in translog form is 
implemented by Barros (2008) to show the differences in efficiency levels of 27 
airports from the United Kingdom. Oum et al. (2008) apply a similar translog cost 
frontier model to 109 airports worldwide and show that mixed public/private 
ownership structures lead to the least efficient production structure. Link et al. 
(2009) estimate the marginal costs for Helsinki airport to show the linear 
relationship between the number of aircraft movements and the number of 
employees. McCarthy (2010) estimates a short-run translog cost function for 35 US 
airports and determines increasing returns to scale in terms of runway utilization. 
Assaf (2010) utilizes a Bayesian stochastic cost frontier approach by using a Cobb-
Douglas form to determine the level of cost efficiency for 13 Australian airports. 
The results show that none of the airports in the sample can attain the optimal scale. 
Pels et al. (2010) estimate various specifications of translog cost functions by using 
a dataset of 36 airports worldwide. Their results indicate the importance of 
economies of scale. The authors also discuss the infeasibility of marginal cost 
pricing. Barros (2011) deals with the heterogeneities between the airports in any 
sample and uses a latent class model to divide the airports into three clusters. After 
building the clusters, a translog cost function with PAX and ATM as outputs and 
labor, capital and capital-investment as inputs, is used to identify the efficiency 
levels for 17 airports in Africa. Martin et al. (2011) estimates various translog cost 
functions with single and multiple outputs by using data from 36 Spanish airports 
and conclude that the airports cannot achieve the minimum efficient scale and there 
exists limited possibility for input substitution. Martin and Voltes-Dorta (2011b) 
draws similar conclusions on minimum efficient scale with an enlarged dataset of 
161 airports worldwide. The same model is implemented by Voltes-Dorta and 
Pagliari (2012) for 194 airports worldwide to estimate a short-run cost frontier. The 
authors conclude that the average cost efficiency decreased by 6 percent during the 
crisis between 2007 and 2009. Martin et al. (2013) use the results of the previous 
work to implement a second stage regression to measure the cost flexibility of 
airports and show the disadvantage of higher outsourcing level during a recession. 
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A look at this literature shows us, that despite addressing similar questions the 
conclusion may vary depending on the methodology chosen and data implemented. 
For example, the relationship between costs and the scale of operations is one of the 
most investigated topics. There is a consensus that airports enjoy scale economies, 
however the number of passengers necessary to reach efficient scale differs 
significantly from one study to another.  
Furthermore, incorporating airport specific characteristics into cost functions helps 
to explain the differences in which inputs such as labor, capital and materials are 
allocated to the production. The literature shows us, that airport costs are driven by 
external factors, such as traffic structure (percentage of international passengers, 
percentage of business passengers, LCC share and share of cargo traffic), delays or 
the degree of competition between airports. The type of ownership and the level of 
outsourcing also matter. These last two points relate to the governance structure, an 
issue that we already noted in the study by Oum et al. (2008) concerning the 
negative effects of mixed ownership. How subsidies affect the operational 
performance or capital costs has however not been studied. For small airports with 
inadequate passenger throughput, subsidies play a very important role for their 
financial survival. Previous research on other industries (including transport sectors) 
very often point to the adverse effect of subsidies on the operational and capital 
costs. There has been an extensive research on urban public transport (transit) to find 
an answer to this question. 
Bly et al. (1980) investigate 59 urban public transport companies worldwide and 
conclude that higher subsidies are associated with higher unit costs and higher 
number of employees, notwithstanding the positive effects on fares and quality of 
service. Anderson (1983) explores the changes in governance structure of bus transit 
companies in the US in detail. By estimating supply and demand equations for the 
market, the author shows a 28 percent increase in unit operating costs resulting from 
the introduction of local, state or federal subsidies. Pucher et al. (1983) use multiple 
regressions to find out the determinants of unit operating costs of urban public 
transport in the US. Their results indicate that increase in costs accelerated and 
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productivity declines with higher subsidies. They recommend a better monitoring of 
operations as well as linking these subsidies to specific performance goals. In 
another paper, Pucher and Markstedt (1983) conduct a comparative analysis of unit 
costs over ten years for local US bus companies. They show that as the subsidies 
increased between 1970 and 1980, this led to higher unit costs. They argue that 
financial support by local governments rather than by the federal governments 
would enhance efficiency. Besides, performance based subsidies are necessary for 
better incentives. That, subsidies lead to an increase in unit costs as well as reduction 
in output per employee for transit companies is also shown by Bly and Oldfield 
(1986), who expand their study from 1980 to 117 cities. Further, with a time lagged 
regression they show that the rise in costs follows from a rise in subsidies. Karlaftis 
and McCarthy (1997) implement a factor analysis method, where they define the 
quality of transit system in Indiana with efficiency, effectiveness and overall 
performance. The adverse relationship between the subsidies and performance leads 
the authors to advocate a performance based subsidy system. In another study 
Karlaftis and McCarthy (1998) investigate the effects of subsidies and other 
governance characteristics on costs in transit industry by implementing a fixed effect 
regression. Their results show that subsidies coming from local, state or federal 
governments impact the costs differently. Furthermore, Granger causality exists 
between subsidies and performance. Nolan et al. (2001) estimate relative efficiency 
scores of transit companies in the US by using a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
followed by a second stage regression to determine the factors influencing 
efficiency. The regression results indicate that the local subsidies increase the 
efficiency, whereas the federal ones work in negative direction. 
How subsidies influence the costs has also been examined for other industries. For 
instance, Oum and Yu (1994) conduct a DEA for 19 railway companies from OECD 
countries and test the determinants of efficiency with a second stage tobit regression. 
According to their results, subsidized railways achieve lower efficiency scores than 
their unsubsidized counterparts. Cowie (2009) investigates British train operating 
companies. After the privatization, the government gradually decreased the 
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subsidies to these companies. A DEA Malmquist Index shows that the efficiency 
changes were positively influenced by the reductions in subsidies. Bergström (2000) 
analyzes a similar question on the relationship between capital subsidization and 
firm performance for manufacturing industry. By employing a statistical model with 
data from Swedish manufacturing companies he concludes that there is a little 
evidence for a positive effect of capital subsidies on the productivity. Tzelepis and 
Skuras (2004) use a regression analysis for Greek food and drink-manufacturing 
sector and show that regional capital subsidies positively influence growth, but have 
insignificant effects on efficiency and profitability.  
In the light of this literature on other industries, we expect to also find a positive 
relationship between subsidization and the level of costs for airports. Independent of 
the causality between those two variables with respect to the direction of the effect, 
i.e. whether higher costs lead to higher subsidies, or vice versa, it postulates that the 
incentives created by subsidies influence the costs in an undesirable course. 
Further, some Baker and Donnet (2012) propose to promote an overall policy for 
Australia, in which all the stakeholders including federal, state, local governments as 
well as industry groups jointly take place in strategic decisions. Cohen (2002) also 
shows that the airport spending rises/decreases proportionally as airport grants 
increase/decrease. 
The effects of the geographical proximity of airports to each other has been subject 
to various studies (Barrett, 2000; Pels et al., 2009; Fröhlich and Niemeier, 2011; 
Lian and Rønnevik, 2011). Yet, the main focus of these studies was to investigate 
the competition among airports. However, the spatial interdependence of airports 
relates also to broader topics such as the effects of network characteristics, airline-
airport relationship, cost levels and productive efficiency rather than just 
competition effects. Moreover, Huber (2009) shows that a spatial concentration 
exists in the European airport network and there is a gap in the airport literature 
regarding the influence of spatial interdependence on a number of issues. The 
application of spatial relatedness is therefore an approach which includes 
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geographical, cultural and economic factors in the analysis. First, the closeness 
between two airports means they are subject to similar geographical, climatic and 
natural characteristics. For example, airports lying on the oceanic coast in Norway 
mainly struggle with the frozen runways in winter compared to airports located on 
mountain ranges having to deal with snow, which leads to distinctly different cost 
characteristics. Second, spatial proximity also can be an expression of cultural 
similarities, as the behaviors of economic agents in the same regions of a country 
appear to be comparable. Last but not least, unique or very close economic 
conditions such as the GDP, growth rates and purchasing power of inhabitants in the 
same region make the economic environment, in which the airports work, also very 
close to each other. With the proposed regression specification we would therefore 
want to show the statistical significance of the spatial interaction of airports. From 
an econometric point of view, in addition, ignoring the spatial specifications when 
constructing the cost model could lead to biased estimates of the coefficients. For 
these reasons, one has to consider also the effects of the geographical distribution of 
airports and the spill-overs between them. (Pavlyuk, 2012) 
To our knowledge, Pavlyuk (2009) is the first application of spatial econometrics to 
the airport industry. He investigates the relationship between the competitive 
pressure on an airport and its efficiency by introducing a new definition of airport 
catchment area. Pavlyuk (2010) tests whether proximity leads to cooperation or 
competition among airports in Europe by constructing a stochastic frontier model 
that incorporates spatial econometrics. The results show that airports located within 
a distance of 550 km tend to cooperate, while competition starts dominating for 
airports located within 550 km to 880 km. The stochastic frontier model applied also 
implies that many airports operate below the production frontier and exhibit high 
inefficiency levels. In another paper, he makes an extensive review of airport 
benchmarking literature and shows how the competition among airports was 
included as an explanatory variable in these studies (Pavlyuk, 2012). Finally, 
Pavyluk (2013) utilizes various spatial stochastic frontier models by using data from 
122 European airports and estimates the production function of airports. A 
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comparison of results from these various models shows the necessity of including 
the spatial characteristics in the stochastic frontier models, so that the biases can be 
eliminated from the estimations. 
Following this review of the literature we first attempt to integrate the spatial 
interdependency of airports in the regression identifying the determinants of airport 
costs. By implementing a spatial regression model, we are able to include 
information about cost-relatedness between nearby airports resulting from 
geographical, cultural or economic resemblances.  Second, we investigate the effects 
of airport subsidies on cost efficiency, which have so far been ignored in the 
literature. Third, we evaluate the level of scale economies at airports. 
4.3 Methodology and Data 
We introduce the economic interaction between the airports (that is their spatial 
autocorrelation) and their spatial heterogeneity (i.e. spatial structure) by using the 
methods of spatial econometrics to explain the determinants of airport unit costs 
from the perspective of spatial interactions and spatial effects (see Paelinck and 
Klaassen, 1979; Anselin, 1980, 1988 and 2001; LeSage and Pace (2009) and the 
references therein). As explained in Chapter 1, a spatial lag, spatial error and cross-
regressive model can be formulated as follows: 
𝑦 = 𝜌 · 𝑊 · 𝑦 +  𝑋 · 𝛽 +  𝛶 · 𝑊 · 𝑋 +   𝑢         
                                                                                          
𝑢 = 𝜆 · 𝑊 · 𝑢 +  𝜀                                                                                    
         
with 𝜀 ~ N (0, 𝜎𝜀2𝐼𝑛) 
 
(4.1) 
In this research, we implement the specification with 𝜌 ≠ 0,  𝛽 ≠ 0 and 𝛶 = 𝜆 = 0, 
namely a spatial lag model, which presents the spatial impact of the dependent 
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variable in the host region on the dependent variable in the surrounding regions.30 
The extension from a spatial regression model to a spatial panel model is 
straightforward, as in the case of the extension from a classical regression model to a 
classical panel model, with the usual model specification of individual effects 𝛼𝑖 in 
fixed-effects model or of the error term 𝜀𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑖 in the random effects model 
(see e.g. Anselin, 2001; Elhorst, 2001 and 2003; Anselin et al., 2008; Jeleskovic and 
Schwanebeck, 2012). It is obvious that the choice of the ‘’best’’ specification of the 
panel model might not be a trivial task.31 Hence, we will consider here only the 
basic specification of the fixed effects model, namely the spatial lag fixed effects 
model. The estimation of this model was done with Matlab and the codes made by 
Elhorst (2010) which include already the bias correction procedure of Lee and Yu 
(2010).  
As already mentioned, the critical point of the spatial regression is the weight matrix 
which has to be assumed as an exogenous one (Anselin, 1980 and 1988). Using a 
distance matrix for spatial weights, one uses some smooth declining function for 
individual weights in most cases: 
𝑤 = 1
𝑑𝛼
  (4.2) 
 
where 𝑑 stands for the distance (e.g. in km) between two spatial units and 𝛼 is a 
smooth parameter usually an integer 𝛼 = [1,2] (Anselin, 1988 and 2002). 
However, in the sense of the spatial clustering one can assume that some first 
kilometers around an airport do not make a difference, and after these first 
kilometers the impact and catchment area are vanishing in a steep grade, and then 
kilometers far away do not make a big difference again.32 Thus, we use a non-linear 
weighted function of decaying distances which we construct by using a so-called 
                                                          
30 A region in this context means simply the statistical unit. Again, in our context it is an airport. 
31 Given several possibilities for different specifications for either fixed or random effects models. 
32  See a similar argumentation of Pavlyuk (2009). 
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sigma-shaped function between two airports 𝑖 and 𝑗 as depicted in the following 
equation: 
 
𝑊𝑖𝑖 = 1 − 11+𝑎 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑒 (−𝑏 ∗ 𝑑𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑖𝑖)   (4.3) 
 
where 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, 𝑎 > 0 and 𝑏 > 0 and 𝑑𝑖𝑖 is the distance between airports 𝑖 and 𝑗 
measured in km. Next, we deal with the question how to find out the optimal values 
of 𝑎 and 𝑏. Anselin (2002) points out that, model validation techniques, such as a 
comparison of goodness-of-fit, can be used to find out the best specification of the 
weight matrix or the parameter of distance decay function. We use the Akaike 
information criterion-AIC (Akaike, 1974) to solve the problem of best parameter 
values in our distance decay function.33  Hence, parameters 𝑎 and 𝑏 are calibrated 
due to the best value of AIC by estimating the regression model for each 
combination of 𝑎 and 𝑏 values. We apply a grid search algorithm over 𝑎 and 𝑏 in 
such a way that all distance decay functions in the parameter space of 𝑎 and 𝑏 are 
unique.34 Hence, we do not have the identification problem by the parameters 𝑎 and 
𝑏. Finally, we use the row-standardized weight matrix 𝑊, where the sum of each 
row is equal to one (Anselin, 1988 and 2002; LeSage and Pace, 2009). 
In this chapter we apply the second specification because of the assumption that the 
airport unit costs (dependent variable in our model) at nearby locations show 
similarities to each other because they use the same production technique. Hence, 
the regression model we use takes the following final specification: 
𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝑊𝑦𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖                  (4.4) 
                                                          
33 This is applied according to Fotheringham et al. (1998 and 2000) and Eckey et al. (2007). These 
authors provide for using the AIC to optimize the bandwidth parameter in the distance decay function 
in a geographically weighted regression approach, which is very similar to our econometric approach 
used in this research. 
34 We take over the assumptions of Anselin and Bera (1998) that the weights matrix is exogenously 
incorporated into the model. 
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where 𝑦 is the vector of dependent variable for airport 𝑖 in year 𝑡, 𝜌 is the spatial 
autoregressive parameter, 𝑊 is the weighted distance matrix, 𝑋 is a matrix of 𝑘 
independent variables, β is the vector of coefficients to be estimated, 𝛼 is the fixed 
effect parameter for each airport 𝑖 and 𝜀 is a vector of independent error terms. 
The dependent variable we use in the spatial regression is the unit costs of airport 
operations (costppax), calculated by dividing the total operational costs by the 
annual number of passengers served. Total operational costs include the labor costs, 
material costs and outsourcing costs but exclude the depreciation. Hence, the 
analysis ignores the investments undertaken at the airports and focuses merely on 
the operational level. The matrix of independent variables composes of 7 variables. 
A year dummy variable is introduced into matrix of independent variables in order 
to identify time trend of unit costs (year). As we utilize a panel dataset between 
2002 and 2010 for Norway and 2002 and 2009 for France, year dummy variable 
controls for the annual changes in average cost levels.  To examine how important 
the scale of operations at an airport for the unit costs is, work load unit (wlu) is used 
as an independent variable. wlu is a combination of number of passengers and 
amount of cargo served by the airport and is a good proxy for the cumulative output 
of the airport. Due to the fact that there are a lot of small sized airports in our 
dataset, we expect to find out significant economies of scale. In order to analyze the 
influence of subsidy levels on the cost efficiency, we follow the idea of Oum and Yu 
(1994) and calculate the ratio of subsidies to the operational costs (subs). This 
variable shows to what extent the losses are covered by either cross subsidies or 
direct financial installments. 
Although the share of commercial revenues increased on average in the last decade, 
the aeronautical revenues are the core revenue source of most airports, particularly 
the smaller regional airports that dominate our sample. These mainly include the 
fees paid by the airlines for using the airport infrastructure. Especially smaller 
airports with limited possibilities of generating commercial revenues rely mainly on 
the aeronautical revenues.  Hence, including aeronautical revenues per passenger 
(aerrev) delivers valuable results in interpreting the extent of cost coverage by 
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airport charges. This variable has occasionally been used as a proxy for the level 
airport charges in the literature (Bilotkach et al., 2012).  
In spite of the fact that our dataset comprises of commercial airports, these airports 
serve non-commercial flights as well. These flights are those which are not 
authorized for public transportation and include flights such as military, ambulance, 
school, instruction and general aviation. Non-commercial flights constitute a high 
share of the traffic at some airports in our dataset. For example for the airports in our 
dataset they make up one fifth of all the flights in Norway and two thirds of all 
flights in France in 2009. By including the share of non-commercial air traffic 
movements in total air traffic (noncommatm), we test how these flights drive the 
airport unit costs.  
Whether an airport serves any flights through public service obligation (pso) is 
included as another dummy variable.  
In addition investments in terms of either expansion or modernization will influence 
the operational costs by altering productivity. By having a capital-intensive 
production technology, airports can benefit from modernization investments in terms 
of efficiency. Furthermore, investments directly influence the level of capacity 
utilization at an airport. For these reasons, the total investments should be included 
in the regression function. However, the data on such investments are not fully 
available for the whole period of analysis. For this reason, we include the 
depreciation per passenger (depr) as a proxy of capital. 
For the spatial regression analysis two separate data samples, i.e. from Norwegian 
and French airports, are used: A balanced panel dataset of 41 airports in Norway for 
the years between 2002 and 2010 and a balanced panel dataset of 26 airports35 in 
France between 2002 and 2009. Table 4.1 and 4.2 present the descriptive statistics 
for the variables. 
 
                                                          
35 of which 4 are on the island of Corsica 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for Norwegian airports, 2002-2010 
 Variable costppax  wlu  subs aerrev noncommatm pso depr 
Minimum 3.42 5850 0 2.80 0.02 0 0.79 
Maximum 247.00 1,649,847 1.50 25.98 0.83 1 142.26 
Average 38.62 206,035 0.52 7.91 0.23 0.74 10.50 
Stan. Dev. 35.45 342,347 0.31 2.69 0.16 0.44 15.01 
 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for French airports, 2002-2009 
Variable costppax  wlu  subs aerrev noncommatm pso depr 
Minimum 8.25 14,441 0 4.50 0 0 0 
Maximum 66.46 7,295,964 0.70 22.15 0.96 1 18.66 
Average 16.67 826,325 0.15 8.45 0.66 0.53 3.21 
Stan. Dev. 8.89 1,274,584 0.16 1.90 0.26 0.50 2.70 
 
In Figure 4.1, the 41 Avinor airports used in the analysis are shown on the map. 
Especially on the northern part of the country, the density of the airports is very 
high. Topographical peculiarities of the country and their social policies towards 
better connectivity are responsible for such a high number of airports (Lian, 2010). 
But, on the other hand, total demand is distributed among airports instead of being 
concentrated at one key airport in a region. Hence, having a close competitor is 
decreasing the volume of total output at each airport, therefore driving up operating 
costs per movement. 
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Figure 4.1: Norwegian airports used in the regression analysis 
 
   Source: Avinor 
 
Figure 4.2 displays the 26 French airports used in the analysis on the map36.  
                                                          
36 It should be noted that the proportion of the airports, which we are able to include in the analysis, 
in comparison to the total number of airports is very low for France, while in Norway we could 
obtain data on almost all the airports. 
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Figure 4.2: French airports used in the regression analysis 
 
   Source: own compilation 
 
4.4 Results 
Table 4.3 displays the results of the spatial regression analysis from model (4.4) for 
the airports in Norway and France separately. To start with, we evaluate the results 
from the spatial perspective by interpreting the coefficient ρ and the corresponding t-
values. The coefficient is statistically significant for both countries. This indicates a 
significant spatial dependence among the airports, as far as the unit operating costs 
is concerned. Furthermore, the coefficients are positive. Hence, costs of one airport 
are positively influenced by the weighted average of costs of neighboring airports; 
that is by the spatial weights matrix  𝑊 calculated with the Equation (4.3). This, as 
well, leads to the interpretation that airports located close to each other seem to have 
similar cost structures. It should be noted that zero values on the diagonal of 𝑊 
matrix assures that the interaction of the same observation in the regression equation 
is excluded. The coefficient for Norway is significantly higher than that for France, 
which indicates that the positive correlation between costs of nearby airports in 
Norway is stronger than in France. It is not a surprising fact, not only because 
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Norwegian airports are centrally managed by the Avinor Headquarters, but also 
because Avinor has built four administrative sub-units37 of its local airports 
according to their geographical position. This evidently leads to similar management 
techniques for the airports in the same group. These local airports make up 28 of 41 
sample airports; the remaining 13 airports are grouped as national and regional 
airports. On the other hand, French airports in the sample are managed individually 
and have no administrative links to each other, which possibly enable them to 
introduce own strategies regarding the cost structures.38  
Table 4.3: Estimation results from the spatial regression 
Variable Norway France 
year 0.050* 
(9.23) 
0.026* 
(6.46) 
wlu -0.816* 
(-18.81) 
-0.443* 
(-10.46) 
subs 0.203* 
(3.87) 
0.219* 
(2.76) 
aerrev 0.113* 
(3.25) 
0.223* 
(4.39) 
noncommatm 0.229*** 
(1.65) 
-0.266* 
(-2.85) 
pso -0.018 
(-0.67) 
-0.046*** 
(-1.75) 
depr 0.032** 
(2.20) 
0.014*** 
(1.71) 
𝝆 0.685* 
(12.36) 
0.365* 
(3.55) 
𝐑𝟐 0.98 0.94 
Adjusted 𝐑𝟐 0.84 0.56 
Log-Likelihood 307.00 185.14 
1. Dependent variable is “costppax” (Operating costs per passenger) 
2. Independent variables “wlu”, aerrev” and “depr” are in natural logarithms. 
3. t-values are in parentheses 
4. * 1% significance;  ** 5% significance; *** 10% significance 
 
                                                          
37 These four sub-units are: Finnmark, Ofoten/Lofoten/Vesterålen, Helgeland/Namdalen and Southern 
Norway 
38 The private company Vinci has concession contracts for the management of Dinard, Rennes and 
Nantes airports. However this happened in 2010, after the timeframe of this analysis. 
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Figure 4.3 plots the interaction level as a function of distance from Equation (4.3) 
for our sample airports from Norway and France. According to these two figures, 
the interaction levels remain much higher in Norway, as the distance between 
airports increases. This leads to the implication that the presence and strength of 
links between airports in Norway is much higher than in France in our sample. 
 
Figure 4.3: Non-linear weighted functions of decayed distances 
 
 
The coefficients for the time trend for both countries are highly significant and have 
positive signs. It can be concluded that the unit operating costs have increased since 
2002. For the 41 Norwegian airports, we observe approximately 5 percent annual 
increase in average costs. On the other hand, the yearly increase in average costs 
amounts to 2.6 percent for 26 French airports in the sample39. 
How scale affects the unit operational costs are investigated by using the variable 
wlu. The negative sign of the coefficients for both countries indicates that the unit 
costs decrease with increasing output, i.e. airport size. One percent increase in the 
                                                          
39 GAP-Project (2012) finds out that security costs at small Norwegian airports increased more than 
proportionally between 2002 and 2010, which is a partial explanation of increasing overall costs. 
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level of wlu leads to approximately 0.82 percent decrease in the costs per passenger 
in Norway and approximately 0.44 percent decrease in France. Figure 4.4 visualizes 
the relation of unit costs with respect to the airport size, where the unit operating 
costs are shown against the number of work load units (in log scale). Due to the 
larger number of very small airports in the sample, Norwegian airports operate on a 
steeper curve. Especially those airports serving less than 50,000 annual work load 
units suffer from very high average costs. A detailed analysis of average costs in 
order to determine the minimum efficient scale of airport operations is beyond the 
scope of current work and is left for further research. 
 
Figure 4.4: Scale effect on unit operating costs 
 
 
The coefficient of the variable subs enables us to confirm the relationship between 
the level of cost coverage by the subsidies and the unit costs of airports. Having a 
positive coefficient in both countries indicates that higher subsidies lead to higher 
unit costs and this relationship is statistically significant. To our knowledge, this is 
the first attempt in the literature of airport economics, which statistically analyses 
the relationship between the two variables. The results suggest that if the subsidies 
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relative to costs increase by one percent, the unit costs increase by approximately 
0.2 percent both in Norway and France. It should be noted again that the ratio of 
subsidies to costs is used as the independent variable in the regression, because the 
absolute values of the subsidies are not relevant due to different scale of various 
airports.  
Next, it can be seen that the revenues from the aeronautical charges per passenger 
have a significant positive relationship with the unit operating costs by observing the 
results for the variable aerrev. Furthermore direct correlation between the unit costs 
and aeronautical revenues per passenger amounts to 0.25 in Norway and 0.28 in 
France. Despite the obtained significant and positive relationship, the coefficients 
and the correlation values are relatively small indicating that the aeronautical 
revenues are insufficient, given the operational costs. This raises concerns whether 
determination of airport charges follow calculations based on the costs. The 
challenge airport managers are facing is the question to what extent the airport fees 
can be increased, which are paid by the airline companies. Elasticity of demand for 
air travel increases as the travel length decreases. Normally for long-haul flights, we 
observe inelastic demand. However elastic demand can characterize the short-haul 
flights, because the airport charges constitute a higher proportion of total airline 
costs. Following this argument, if we assume a price elastic demand of airlines for 
airport services (Intervistas, 2007; Starkie and Yarrow, 2013), the aeronautical 
revenues will further decrease when the airport fees are increased and this leads to a 
vicious circle of whether the aeronautical revenues may be increased at all. The 
dataset implies no significant relationship between airport size and the share of 
aeronautical revenues in total revenues. This is driven by the fact that relatively 
small airports dominate the sample. Figure 4.5 shows that none of the airports in the 
sample was able to cover the operational costs by the aeronautical revenues on 
average over the time span. The average value amounts to 36 percent and to 58 
percent, for the 41 Norwegian and for the 26 French airports respectively. 
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Figure 4.5: Relationship between costs and aeronautical revenues, 2002-2009 or 
2010 
 
 
The variable noncommatm delivers different results for the two countries regarding 
the direction of the influence of non-commercial air traffic share on the unit costs. 
While unit costs increase in Norway with increasing share of non-commercial air 
traffic, they decrease in France. In order to explain the conflicting results, further 
analysis regarding the components of non-commercial air traffic is necessary. 
Despite not having detailed data, we assume that the general aviation traffic 
constitutes an important part of non-commercial activities at French airports, hence 
lowering the overall unit costs. In contrast, Norwegian airports serve mainly other 
type of non-commercial activities such as ambulance flights. 
Some airports benefit from the centrally-organized and government-subsidized PSO 
routes by increasing the number of passengers served. These services help airports 
improve the unfavorable situation of having too little traffic, which leads to higher 
average costs. Furthermore some airports entirely rely on PSO flights. Regression 
results deliver negative coefficients for the pso variable. In France, an airport with 
PSO flights operates with 4.6 percent less average costs than those airports without 
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any PSO flights. We observe the same, but weaker, relationship for Norway as well, 
however the coefficient is statistically insignificant. 
Finally, the coefficients of the variable depr are positive indicating that the value of 
depreciation per passenger influences the average costs in the same year positively. 
The interpretation of the positive coefficients is somewhat difficult, but intuitionally 
one can explain this with the lagged effect of investments on the unit costs. It is to 
say, some investments require a couple of years to be utilized effectively. 
Furthermore the lumpiness of airport investments such as runway or terminal 
expansions leads to lower capacity utilization in the time period following the 
investment. The higher unit costs might be associated with the low utilization of 
capacity at those airports, which undertook recent expansions. In addition, the 
coefficients of the depreciation variable are significant only at 5 and 10 percent 
levels for Norway and France respectively. It can be driven by the fact that that there 
is no differentiation in the depreciation data with regard to the lifetime of the 
investment made. Both small investments such as computers or office supplies and 
large investments such as for runways and terminals are included in the depreciation 
data. A further distortion to the depreciation data relates to the establishment of 
Avinor in 2003, which from then on was responsible for the whole airport 
infrastructure in the country. Upon establishment Avinor made an immense 
investment to improve the infrastructure at airports that where before operated by 
the communes or regional bodies. This led to a sudden jump in the data for 
depreciation40.  
4.5 Conclusion and Directions for Further Research 
Our study is based on two separate data samples that consisted of subsidized airports 
in Norway and France, with which a number of hypotheses could be tested. The 
spatial lag regression model indicated a significant level of spatial relatedness 
among airports, namely the spatial impact of the dependent variable (unit costs) at 
the host airport on the unit cost of the surrounding airports. We also studied the 
                                                          
40 Total depreciation for the 41 airports in the sample increased by approximately 53 percent between 
2002 and 2003. 
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relationship between subsidies and costs as well as the importance of scale 
economies. Furthermore, the annual changes in average cost levels, cost coverage 
via aeronautical revenues, importance of non-commercial air traffic movements, the 
effects from PSO routes and the level of investments were evaluated in this research. 
The unit costs of airports show a statistically significant level of spatial 
interdependencies which was estimated by the ρ variable in the regression 
specification. The spatial relationship in Norway is much stronger than in France. 
Thus, it can be concluded that once the airports are managed as a group, the 
interaction among them tend to be stronger mainly due to the organizational 
similarities. Although competition is assumed to improve the cost efficiency, one 
should treat this issue with special care and evaluate the spatial distance between 
airports in detail. In terms of overlapping catchment areas, where airports are located 
very close to each other with limited aggregate demand in the area, positive effects 
due to competition are offset by factors like insufficient exploitation of scale that 
lead to negative results in terms of the costs, or technical efficiency of airports. 
From a methodological point of view, the significance of the results of the spatial 
parameters indicates that the model specification enables us to avoid biased 
estimates. An F-test can be implemented to test the efficiency of the model in 
comparison to a non-spatial regression specification. However, in further research 
indirect effects should be introduced in order to improve the analysis. These include 
the secondary relationships between a host airport and a third airport, where the 
spatial dependence of unit costs is transited via an airport located between those two 
airports. Nonetheless it is believed that these effects would only lead to negligible 
changes in the results we have obtained. 
The significant positive relationship between the share of costs covered by the 
subsidies and the unit costs indicate that subsidies may provide distorted incentives. 
Thus policies regarding the subsidization of airports and routes should be re-
evaluated. Subsidization policies should include mechanisms, which will better align 
the incentives of the airports with the government rather than merely encouraging 
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non-market driven traffic as riskless financial support. Moreover, fiscal 
decentralization would enhance the way subsidies are allocated to the necessary 
nodal point, which should replace the centrally organized installments to cover any 
expenses accrued at an airport. For instance, the local governments can be endowed 
with a yearly sum of financial support and the allocation between different nodes of 
public good provision such as airports; ports; highways; rail or water, gas and 
electricity infrastructure should be undertaken according to the needs of the region. 
Another, but a similar option would be to decide the level of subsidy each airport 
will receive prospectively, rather than paying for the costs ex-post irrespective of the 
magnitude. We believe that the causality between the two should be investigated in 
more detail by applying a more in-depth regression analysis, in which time lagged 
variables can determine the direction of the causal links as well as a Granger-
causality test. 
Inadequate demand at the airports is the most important reason behind high unit 
costs. Some airports are not able to achieve a break-even point due to scale, although 
they might be technically efficient with regard to the input output combinations 
chosen. Hence, policies towards increasing the demand for the airport services on 
the one hand and closing very small airports on the other can help to overcome this 
problem. In most of the airports, traffic is considered to be an exogenous variable, 
on which the managers have no influence. Bel (2009) defines this situation for 
Spanish airports as “a hand tied behind back”, however presents the example of 
Girona, where local institutions express a great interest in the situation of the airport 
due to financial spillover effects in the region. In addition, airline-friendly policies 
are applied by the airport. These resulted in a tenfold increase in the number of 
passengers served. However, it should be kept in mind that such policies should be 
applied with a special care. Girona airport almost exclusively relied on the services 
by its main customer Ryanair, which constituted approximately 90 percent of the 
total traffic in 2007. Such a dependency on a single customer certainly leads to 
concerns about a sustainable business model. Nevertheless, Ryanair started reducing 
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the offers from or to Girona airport, reducing the total number of passengers at the 
airport continuously after 2009. 
In some other cases, traffic stimulation via PSO grants appears to be the only 
solution to increase the demand at the airports. However, our results show that the 
unit costs at PSO airports are not statistically different than those at other airports in 
Norway. This is in line with the results of Pita et al. (2014), who suggest that the 
PSO system in Norway can be enhanced. In France, on the other hand, PSO services 
seem to improve the airport unit costs. Airports with PSO share tend to operate with 
approximately 4.6 percent lower unit costs. Precise information about the PSO 
shares for the airports would further enhance the analysis. 
As regards scale economies, it should finally be noted that an estimation as to the 
minimum efficient scale of operations at the airports was not undertaken in this 
research, because based on previous literature it is assumed that the airports in the 
sample serve a very low number of passengers, so that the results of such an analysis 
could not be generalized to larger airports. 
Low capacity utilization accelerates the problems with respect to high unit costs, as 
shown with the depreciation variable in our regression specification. From this 
finding, it can be concluded that an optimal long-term strategy for small-sized 
airports should be not to increase the capacity unless a certain threshold for the 
utilization of current capacity is reached. 
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Data and Intermediate Calculations of the Analyses 
Appendix to Chapter 2 
Due to the confidentiality of data in this chapter the raw data cannot be published. However, the whole dataset is available on 
request with the condition of confidentiality. Please contact Tolga Ülkü (tolga.ulku@yahoo.com) and Prof. Dr. Hans-Martin 
Niemeier (Hans-Martin.Niemeier@hs-bremen.de) 
Appendix to Chapter 3 
Raw data for the Spanish airports are publicly available in the webpage of AENA (in Spanish language) and can be found under the 
following links41: 
http://www.aena-aeropuertos.es/csee/ccurl/674/66/Resultados%20Aeropuertos%202009.pdf 
http://www.aena-aeropuertos.es/csee/ccurl/572/645/Resultados%20Aeropuertos%202010.pdf 
http://www.aena-aeropuertos.es/csee/ccurl/227/259/CTA_RES_AEROPUERTOS_2011_OFICIALES_29JUNIO.pdf 
Raw data for the Turkish airports are updated every year in the webpage of DHMI under the following link: 
                                                          
41 In the dissertation, published provisional data for the year 2011 were used. There is a very small change in Algeciras-Heliport in the finalized dataset by AENA, however it 
does not affect the results, because the mentioned Heliport was not included in the analysis. 
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http://www.dhmi.gov.tr/finans.aspx#.VFe9afmImx042 
The historical raw data for the years 2009-2011 used in the dissertation can be found under the following link: 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/rsqivjd11fhewhe/AACxF20gVix6VDteMu8dncDea?dl=0 
 
Summary statistics 
   Country Staff costs 
(euro) 
Other costs 
(euro) 
Runway area 
(sqm) 
Total revenues 
(euro) 
Passengers Air traffic 
movements 
Cargo 
(tons) 
Average 
Spain 8,448,891 19,820,904 145,432 39,035,718 3,549,593 38,554 6,655 
Turkey 7,367,588 10,135,847 185,888 24,393,013 2,020,378 17,466 1,885 
Minimum 
Spain 707,847 1,084,499 37,500 141,569 7,852 937 0 
Turkey 1,008,317 1,645,538 69,000 120,206 15,267 419 0 
Maximum 
Spain 46,656,306 228,143,370 474,480 479,582,754 34,398,226 303,054 104,280 
Turkey 49,176,786 116,877,030 440,550 459,291,666 25,027,657 164,732 17,725 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
42 AENA and DHMI webpages containing the data were visited last on 27.11.2014 
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Input-output variables used in the DEA43 
DMU StaffC {I} OtherC {I} Rwy {IN} TotRev {O} PAX {ON} ATM {ON} Cargo {ON} 
ABC2009 1,050,252 1,438,389 162,000 182,653 15,127 1,419 0 
ABC2010 1,079,969 1,361,210 162,000 224,993 11,293 1,243 0 
ABC2011 882,086 1,241,455 162,000 141,569 8,415 937 0 
ACE2009 8,995,637 23,276,782 108,000 44,258,992 4,701,669 42,915 4,147 
ACE2010 9,134,735 21,171,885 108,000 45,527,427 4,938,343 46,669 3,787 
ACE2011 9,408,922 23,685,653 108,000 52,053,988 5,543,744 49,675 2,873 
AGP2009 24,806,497 70,686,530 144,000 139,398,130 11,622,429 103,539 3,405 
AGP2010 26,639,226 75,462,807 144,000 141,487,138 12,064,521 105,634 3,064 
AGP2011 26,974,420 80,814,360 144,000 165,919,363 12,823,117 107,397 2,992 
ALC2009 17,100,843 35,309,018 135,000 102,684,971 9,139,479 74,281 3,200 
ALC2010 18,078,225 31,319,090 135,000 104,363,217 9,382,931 74,476 3,113 
ALC2011 18,327,795 42,655,956 135,000 122,261,531 9,913,731 75,576 3,012 
BCN2009 46,656,306 213,634,969 474,480 353,398,405 27,421,682 278,981 89,815 
BCN2010 45,234,935 228,143,370 474,480 375,885,326 29,209,536 277,832 104,280 
BCN2011 45,258,655 224,648,894 474,480 479,582,754 34,398,226 303,054 96,573 
BIO2009 8,162,285 19,167,100 207,000 44,658,544 3,654,957 54,148 2,691 
BIO2010 8,695,997 17,436,993 207,000 47,259,877 3,888,955 54,119 2,548 
BIO2011 8,679,295 17,456,599 207,000 49,331,499 4,046,172 54,446 2,634 
BJZ2009 924,678 1,084,499 171,120 696,363 75,351 3,783 0 
BJZ2010 866,225 1,271,213 171,120 989,971 61,179 3,411 0 
BJZ2011 707,847 2,580,919 171,120 620,727 56,981 2,957 0 
                                                          
43 {I}: Input, {IN}: Non-discretionary input, {O}: Output, {ON}: Non-discretionary output 
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DMU StaffC {I} OtherC {I} Rwy {IN} TotRev {O} PAX {ON} ATM {ON} Cargo {ON} 
EAS2009 3,356,240 4,029,772 78,930 3,219,251 315,294 9,743 31 
EAS2010 3,273,655 3,566,146 78,930 3,037,412 286,077 9,581 19 
EAS2011 3,016,518 3,364,996 78,930 2,580,919 248,050 9,560 32 
FUE2009 8,436,264 20,126,026 249,570 36,918,643 3,738,492 36,429 1,913 
FUE2010 8,302,259 17,020,755 249,570 41,455,045 4,173,590 39,437 1,711 
FUE2011 8,570,395 20,189,978 249,570 50,768,973 4,948,018 44,549 1,558 
GMZ2009 1,198,657 3,892,782 45,000 593,621 34,605 1,917 11 
GMZ2010 1,304,962 3,352,403 45,000 641,231 32,488 1,776 9 
GMZ2011 1,088,996 2,395,790 45,000 631,617 32,713 1,769 8 
GRO2009 7,454,507 13,516,287 108,000 45,297,828 5,286,970 48,127 71 
GRO2010 7,346,037 11,418,418 108,000 42,310,020 4,863,954 43,291 63 
GRO2011 7,078,471 12,937,267 108,000 27,399,128 3,007,977 27,799 62 
GRX2009 5,102,855 7,557,249 130,500 11,004,815 1,187,813 16,300 41 
GRX2010 5,141,101 6,626,057 130,500 9,652,219 978,254 13,843 38 
GRX2011 4,813,360 6,403,294 130,500 8,396,156 872,752 13,142 34 
IBZ2009 11,233,131 20,993,626 126,000 39,019,147 4,572,819 53,552 3,144 
IBZ2010 11,384,669 16,953,257 126,000 41,758,786 5,040,800 56,988 2,996 
IBZ2011 11,576,023 23,239,165 126,000 51,934,198 5,643,180 61,768 2,755 
LCG2009 4,806,045 8,093,790 87,210 11,244,547 1,068,823 16,236 240 
LCG2010 5,197,349 8,909,741 87,210 11,474,667 1,101,208 17,378 245 
LCG2011 4,976,710 8,352,596 87,210 11,456,233 1,012,800 16,283 252 
LEI2009 5,879,128 7,854,059 144,000 10,068,721 791,837 15,391 16 
LEI2010 5,433,592 7,199,791 144,000 9,967,210 786,877 16,112 14 
LEI2011 4,835,140 7,220,041 144,000 9,060,443 780,853 14,946 10 
LEN2009 2,123,336 1,792,278 135,000 970,342 95,189 4,773 4 
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DMU StaffC {I} OtherC {I} Rwy {IN} TotRev {O} PAX {ON} ATM {ON} Cargo {ON} 
LEN2010 2,114,939 1,912,444 135,000 1,361,210 93,373 4,773 4 
LEN2011 1,862,182 1,720,613 135,000 1,252,345 85,725 4,461 7 
LPA2009 18,950,200 43,471,303 279,000 88,426,658 9,155,665 101,557 25,995 
LPA2010 19,979,419 34,761,490 279,000 89,682,394 9,486,035 103,093 24,528 
LPA2011 20,505,786 42,024,339 279,000 108,333,278 10,538,829 111,271 23,679 
MAH2009 10,182,879 17,009,517 209,250 22,100,957 2,433,666 28,189 2,621 
MAH2010 10,023,459 11,868,405 209,250 22,443,098 2,511,629 28,358 2,400 
MAH2011 9,757,400 14,450,971 209,250 25,700,295 2,576,200 28,042 2,071 
MJV2009 4,201,008 5,217,013 104,400 15,502,634 1,630,684 15,900 9 
MJV2010 4,308,625 6,029,825 104,400 13,420,860 1,349,579 13,477 3 
MJV2011 4,279,753 5,837,016 175,365 12,447,219 1,262,597 12,712 1 
MLN2009 3,299,161 5,742,139 61,695 1,986,346 293,695 9,245 351 
MLN2010 3,217,406 5,096,102 61,695 1,833,697 292,608 8,935 341 
MLN2011 2,994,738 4,780,690 61,695 1,764,173 286,701 9,119 266 
ODB2009 2,009,178 1,449,804 62,100 456,631 15,474 8,650 0 
ODB2010 2,159,937 1,732,450 62,100 809,976 7,852 7,095 0 
ODB2011 1,960,192 1,502,814 62,100 555,388 8,442 7,273 0 
OVD2009 5,742,139 7,557,249 99,000 13,607,614 1,316,212 16,033 113 
OVD2010 5,512,340 7,008,546 99,000 14,174,588 1,355,364 16,538 111 
OVD2011 5,728,117 8,319,926 99,000 13,568,885 1,339,010 15,348 137 
PMI2009 29,646,789 91,965,551 282,150 196,751,026 21,203,041 177,502 17,086 
PMI2010 29,924,130 72,639,139 282,150 192,909,394 21,117,417 174,635 17,292 
PMI2011 29,435,550 95,548,470 282,150 228,514,828 22,726,707 180,152 15,777 
PNA2009 3,995,524 4,657,640 99,000 3,401,903 335,612 11,690 45 
PNA2010 3,869,888 4,252,376 108,225 3,104,910 291,553 10,456 43 
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DMU StaffC {I} OtherC {I} Rwy {IN} TotRev {O} PAX {ON} ATM {ON} Cargo {ON} 
PNA2011 3,604,575 4,323,312 108,225 2,493,800 238,511 9,604 34 
REU2009 5,445,329 12,340,462 110,655 14,326,808 1,706,615 30,946 10 
REU2010 5,107,352 7,874,771 110,655 12,217,145 1,419,851 26,520 246 
REU2011 5,129,169 8,319,926 110,655 11,445,343 1,362,683 21,494 35 
RGS2009 1,084,499 2,579,967 94,500 285,395 27,716 3,571 0 
RGS2010 1,136,217 2,846,167 94,500 337,490 33,595 3,560 2 
RGS2011 860,306 2,286,891 94,500 250,469 35,447 3,961 0 
RJL2009 1,461,220 3,379,072 99,045 570,789 35,663 5,023 0 
RJL2010 1,496,207 3,937,386 99,045 416,238 24,527 3,638 0 
RJL2011 1,241,455 4,007,504 99,045 381,148 17,877 2,734 0 
SCQ2009 8,379,185 13,447,793 144,000 20,251,600 1,944,068 20,166 1,989 
SCQ2010 9,337,229 11,632,162 144,000 22,679,341 2,172,869 21,252 1,964 
SCQ2011 9,212,902 14,853,899 144,000 28,368,334 2,464,330 22,322 1,788 
SDR2009 4,554,898 5,057,192 104,400 8,322,106 958,157 18,756 11 
SDR2010 4,409,872 5,208,599 104,400 7,998,518 919,871 16,667 2 
SDR2011 4,312,422 4,552,001 104,400 9,060,443 1,116,398 17,072 1 
SLM2009 1,803,694 1,700,952 150,780 787,689 53,088 12,832 0 
SLM2010 1,799,948 1,541,205 150,780 753,728 43,179 12,244 0 
SLM2011 1,611,713 3,114,527 150,780 566,278 37,257 12,538 0 
SPC2009 5,970,455 9,669,168 99,000 7,648,575 1,043,274 19,742 1,084 
SPC2010 6,266,068 8,988,489 99,000 7,987,268 992,363 19,256 941 
SPC2011 5,336,078 10,835,506 99,000 8,221,916 1,067,431 19,455 852 
SVQ2009 12,420,372 24,578,182 151,290 46,450,822 4,051,392 55,601 4,983 
SVQ2010 12,678,382 21,250,632 151,290 46,641,144 4,224,718 54,499 5,467 
SVQ2011 12,828,368 20,712,696 151,290 52,957,854 4,959,359 56,021 5,127 
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DMU StaffC {I} OtherC {I} Rwy {IN} TotRev {O} PAX {ON} ATM {ON} Cargo {ON} 
TFN2009 9,543,595 18,562,064 142,695 31,267,831 4,054,147 62,776 18,305 
TFN2010 9,697,218 15,693,294 142,695 30,430,366 4,051,356 61,605 15,938 
TFN2011 9,909,860 18,926,743 142,695 33,911,322 4,095,103 62,604 15,745 
TFS2009 18,459,322 35,936,886 144,000 82,821,508 7,108,055 49,779 5,371 
TFS2010 18,843,202 27,302,957 144,000 84,912,532 7,358,986 51,858 4,294 
TFS2011 18,850,513 31,711,551 144,000 102,147,783 8,656,487 58,093 4,480 
VDE2009 2,146,167 4,977,282 37,500 1,016,005 183,891 4,341 154 
VDE2010 2,148,688 4,016,133 37,500 1,158,716 170,968 4,142 145 
VDE2011 1,840,402 4,257,973 37,500 1,012,766 170,225 4,674 135 
VGO2009 4,943,034 8,105,206 108,000 11,997,988 1,103,285 15,698 797 
VGO2010 5,219,848 8,606,000 108,000 11,722,159 1,093,576 14,941 901 
VGO2011 5,303,408 13,405,535 108,000 10,280,118 976,152 14,130 1,114 
VIT2009 7,454,507 7,397,428 157,500 3,458,982 39,933 9,490 27,388 
VIT2010 7,492,282 6,704,805 157,500 3,487,399 42,073 6,742 27,961 
VIT2011 6,926,012 5,902,356 157,500 3,288,767 28,211 7,582 34,692 
VLC2009 11,472,862 30,343,152 144,675 58,163,416 4,748,997 81,126 9,792 
VLC2010 11,632,162 23,376,821 144,675 58,464,551 4,934,268 77,806 11,428 
VLC2011 12,153,190 23,794,553 144,675 62,355,886 4,979,511 70,397 10,509 
VLL2009 3,447,567 2,796,867 135,225 3,653,051 365,720 9,236 75 
VLL2010 3,464,899 2,598,674 135,225 3,937,386 392,689 8,974 32 
VLL2011 3,277,877 4,573,781 135,225 3,691,695 462,504 9,079 46 
XRY2009 6,038,949 13,904,424 103,500 12,945,498 1,079,616 43,326 121 
XRY2010 5,737,333 11,485,916 103,500 12,723,380 1,043,163 33,395 128 
XRY2011 5,227,179 10,530,587 103,500 11,695,812 1,032,493 41,713 54 
ZAZ2009 4,920,203 4,817,461 303,750 7,340,349 528,313 12,750 36,890 
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DMU StaffC {I} OtherC {I} Rwy {IN} TotRev {O} PAX {ON} ATM {ON} Cargo {ON} 
ZAZ2010 4,724,863 5,152,350 303,750 7,694,776 605,912 12,714 42,543 
ZAZ2011 4,595,561 6,642,873 303,750 8,494,165 751,097 11,970 48,647 
ADA2009 11,432,377 10,395,630 123,750 17,847,825 2,482,402 26,242 5,559 
ADA2010 12,658,359 9,116,114 123,750 18,985,687 2,841,170 30,342 8,460 
ADA2011 14,243,492 9,494,745 123,750 22,299,005 3,240,967 34,966 5,661 
ADB2009 22,818,729 32,726,158 291,600 52,283,771 6,201,794 54,197 13,471 
ADB2010 24,590,365 21,855,302 291,600 59,540,492 7,485,098 63,178 17,725 
ADB2011 28,321,784 23,134,046 291,600 72,799,981 8,523,533 70,327 16,592 
ADF2009 1,606,321 1,645,538 75,000 263,914 85,112 880 50 
ADF2010 1,841,115 1,665,070 75,000 507,113 108,507 1,124 57 
ASR2009 2,963,584 8,955,617 135,000 7,367,018 778,639 7,281 277 
ASR2010 3,517,200 8,818,309 135,000 7,401,056 940,245 8,596 325 
ASR2011 4,297,103 9,003,083 135,000 8,824,926 1,223,760 10,991 354 
AYT2009 19,441,732 65,994,388 440,550 353,794,372 18,345,693 127,236 6,857 
AYT2010 21,702,749 67,609,539 440,550 408,300,104 22,013,027 148,821 8,900 
AYT2011 24,372,951 116,877,030 440,550 459,291,666 25,027,657 164,732 7,406 
BJV2009 9,245,770 17,491,535 135,000 56,160,899 2,780,944 23,471 238 
BJV2010 9,755,403 16,932,862 135,000 61,902,489 3,085,187 25,816 138 
BJV2011 11,192,169 16,669,645 135,000 69,330,888 3,388,335 27,963 125 
DIY2009 3,484,200 4,076,314 159,705 4,563,850 1,060,381 8,897 950 
DIY2010 3,800,468 3,869,045 159,705 4,867,671 1,404,590 11,335 1,010 
DIY2011 3,976,326 4,822,263 159,705 6,280,352 1,733,374 13,909 904 
DLM2009 11,910,700 13,472,593 270,000 45,639,376 3,347,996 24,014 502 
DLM2010 12,612,547 12,463,074 270,000 42,033,047 3,785,779 27,070 186 
DLM2011 14,047,539 12,188,679 270,000 42,344,222 3,732,374 27,865 201 
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DMU StaffC {I} OtherC {I} Rwy {IN} TotRev {O} PAX {ON} ATM {ON} Cargo {ON} 
DNZ2009 2,569,810 5,678,234 135,000 907,638 150,780 1,774 0 
DNZ2011 3,554,711 7,045,016 135,000 969,808 174,627 2,299 167 
ERC2009 2,041,028 3,651,417 135,000 490,446 127,030 1,667 6 
ERC2011 2,951,632 6,025,988 135,000 772,889 207,074 2,487 30 
ERZ2009 4,966,233 5,748,300 285,750 3,117,930 599,017 5,230 32 
ERZ2010 5,703,598 4,953,990 285,750 3,619,538 765,082 6,828 32 
ERZ2011 7,090,204 7,173,882 285,750 4,286,020 805,337 7,861 369 
ESB2009 38,240,231 27,863,017 393,750 38,690,163 6,084,404 62,620 13,441 
ESB2010 42,762,930 23,803,975 393,750 38,650,986 7,763,914 73,929 15,095 
ESB2011 49,176,786 25,835,466 378,000 47,920,482 8,485,467 82,965 15,215 
EZS2009 3,598,634 2,758,524 231,000 741,075 344,844 2,544 105 
EZS2010 4,143,935 2,935,663 135,000 1,345,548 470,049 4,260 187 
EZS2011 4,812,429 3,141,240 135,000 2,160,394 549,054 4,577 184 
GNY2009 3,584,527 10,251,653 180,000 780,312 181,155 1,914 27 
GNY2010 3,629,508 10,059,327 180,000 1,107,569 221,034 2,644 61 
GNY2011 4,146,557 9,860,494 180,000 1,206,121 231,323 2,474 72 
GZT2009 6,480,616 9,013,915 234,000 5,806,229 833,002 8,161 808 
GZT2010 6,994,523 9,506,239 234,000 6,929,099 1,039,972 10,418 918 
GZT2011 8,096,801 9,699,246 234,000 8,976,102 1,314,508 13,099 1,072 
HTY2009 1,763,437 4,272,586 135,000 1,188,124 325,307 3,102 29 
HTY2010 2,168,914 4,672,870 135,000 2,642,095 574,613 5,573 157 
HTY2011 3,204,752 6,018,267 135,000 4,775,707 689,586 6,343 64 
ISE2010 2,744,932 4,102,041 135,000 500,541 33,411 5,821 1 
KCM2009 2,056,565 1,959,573 69,000 150,750 81,420 1,133 26 
KCM2011 2,706,126 2,193,608 103,500 302,435 95,740 1,492 60 
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DMU StaffC {I} OtherC {I} Rwy {IN} TotRev {O} PAX {ON} ATM {ON} Cargo {ON} 
KSY2009 2,475,926 3,149,679 157,500 854,732 288,008 2,276 37 
KSY2010 2,832,319 2,973,347 157,500 1,080,707 332,286 2,798 36 
KSY2011 3,279,518 3,503,900 157,500 1,266,047 377,584 2,978 39 
KYA2009 3,120,631 2,934,935 301,500 1,492,394 301,724 4,050 0 
KYA2010 3,829,969 3,241,811 301,500 2,016,025 545,497 6,393 16 
KYA2011 4,917,883 3,716,816 301,500 3,180,035 600,871 6,520 101 
MLX2009 2,306,095 2,314,644 150,750 1,944,110 462,884 4,566 413 
MLX2010 2,970,734 2,789,523 150,750 2,295,314 520,457 5,961 302 
MLX2011 3,605,148 3,935,825 301,500 2,627,100 570,605 6,936 310 
MQM2009 1,332,071 3,615,380 90,000 448,563 233,288 2,098 0 
MQM2010 1,563,628 3,927,832 150,000 889,753 305,914 2,839 189 
MSR2009 1,265,205 1,921,281 159,750 460,360 115,795 1,111 13 
MSR2010 1,526,969 2,080,097 159,750 593,477 179,808 1,761 28 
MSR2011 1,839,512 2,078,596 159,750 706,440 196,546 1,804 53 
MZH2009 1,008,317 1,843,258 131,715 120,206 39,577 419 3 
MZH2010 1,421,708 1,894,533 131,715 255,932 64,393 654 4 
NAV2009 4,328,160 4,513,371 135,000 356,563 122,753 1,524 28 
NAV2010 4,563,460 4,027,003 135,000 709,707 137,909 1,753 0 
NAV2011 5,040,336 4,238,144 135,000 882,928 157,792 2,017 8 
SZF2009 6,178,745 7,676,896 135,000 5,249,997 866,862 7,856 61 
SZF2010 6,435,929 7,866,146 135,000 5,864,714 957,391 9,317 0 
SZF2011 6,920,074 7,948,063 135,000 6,410,712 1,155,158 10,614 336 
TEQ2009 2,716,110 4,476,815 135,000 1,123,490 40,778 17,481 1,315 
TEQ2010 3,061,898 4,057,521 135,000 2,655,680 74,404 20,252 3,340 
TEQ2011 3,808,624 4,788,665 135,000 2,932,822 43,120 23,207 1,854 
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DMU StaffC {I} OtherC {I} Rwy {IN} TotRev {O} PAX {ON} ATM {ON} Cargo {ON} 
TZX2009 7,077,781 11,410,732 118,800 11,641,699 1,596,905 14,892 1,446 
TZX2010 7,790,140 11,435,766 118,800 11,748,702 1,963,169 17,795 2,009 
TZX2011 9,051,921 11,931,991 118,800 13,277,571 2,280,017 19,554 2,858 
USQ2011 2,334,283 1,795,266 115,200 144,774 15,267 706 0 
VAN2009 3,052,029 3,995,127 123,750 2,320,156 745,493 6,720 491 
VAN2010 3,566,400 3,814,630 123,750 3,267,596 892,050 7,923 743 
VAN2011 4,333,554 4,453,022 123,750 3,980,584 1,057,132 10,270 1,272 
VAS2009 1,920,405 2,946,318 114,330 452,414 124,137 1,232 57 
VAS2010 2,281,492 3,266,979 171,495 669,909 111,457 1,281 58 
VAS2011 3,079,478 5,549,281 171,495 966,628 228,599 2,382 71 
YEI2009 3,898,748 6,168,764 224,475 463,993 73,496 2,228 385 
YEI2010 4,458,888 5,597,823 224,475 696,492 97,534 3,900 123 
YEI2011 5,396,040 6,301,926 224,475 1,083,106 111,550 5,565 35 
 
 
DEA Results (obtained by EMS Software) 
DMU Score StaffC {I}{V} OtherC {I}{V} Rwy {IN}{V} TotRev {O}{V} PAX {ON}{V} ATM {ON}{V} Cargo {ON}{V} 
ABC2009 0.90 0.33 0.33 0.46 0 0 0 0 
ABC2010 0.91 0.33 0.33 0.48 0 0 0 0 
ABC2011 1.00 2 1.1 2.02 0 0 0 0 
ACE2009 0.82 0.33 0.33 0.5 0.04 0.58 0 0.09 
ACE2010 0.87 0.33 0.33 0.59 0.01 0.6 0.11 0.1 
ACE2011 0.89 0.33 0.33 0.75 0.19 0.66 0.05 0.05 
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DMU Score StaffC {I}{V} OtherC {I}{V} Rwy {IN}{V} TotRev {O}{V} PAX {ON}{V} ATM {ON}{V} Cargo {ON}{V} 
AGP2009 1.00 0.7 1.29 3.57 0.02 0.29 4.67 0.01 
AGP2010 1.00 0.33 1.01 3.35 0 0.08 4.24 0 
AGP2011 1.00 0.7 0.38 1.6 1.58 0 0.81 0 
ALC2009 0.98 0.48 0.33 1.15 0.57 0 1.03 0.01 
ALC2010 1.00 0.42 0.73 1.03 0.28 1.6 0.03 0.01 
ALC2011 1.00 0.34 0.39 0.79 0.46 0.78 0.01 0.01 
BCN2009 0.95 0.33 0.33 0 0 0 0.54 0.13 
BCN2010 1.00 0.55 0.34 0.44 0.01 0.01 0.55 0.82 
BCN2011 1.00 2.65 0.41 0.43 0.1 1.7 0.82 0.81 
BIO2009 0.92 0.33 0.33 0 0.02 0.05 0.61 0 
BIO2010 0.93 0.33 0.33 0 0.03 0.04 0.61 0 
BIO2011 0.94 0.33 0.33 0 0.04 0.04 0.61 0 
BJZ2009 1.00 0.98 1.21 0.09 0.01 0.06 0.17 0 
BJZ2010 1.00 1.7 0.49 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.16 0 
BJZ2011 1.00 1.68 0.45 0.07 0.01 0.03 0 0 
EAS2009 0.72 0.33 0.33 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.05 0 
EAS2010 0.74 0.33 0.33 0.1 0.02 0.06 0.04 0 
EAS2011 0.75 0.33 0.33 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.05 0 
FUE2009 0.73 0.33 0.33 0 0.03 0.15 0.18 0.01 
FUE2010 0.80 0.33 0.33 0 0.04 0.18 0.21 0.01 
FUE2011 0.82 0.33 0.33 0 0.04 0.2 0.22 0.01 
GMZ2009 0.85 0.33 0.33 0.9 0 0 0.14 0 
GMZ2010 0.85 0.33 0.33 1.96 0.04 0 0 0 
GMZ2011 1.00 1.13 1.19 0.83 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 
GRO2009 1.00 1.85 1.46 0.22 0.02 2.51 0.54 0 
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DMU Score StaffC {I}{V} OtherC {I}{V} Rwy {IN}{V} TotRev {O}{V} PAX {ON}{V} ATM {ON}{V} Cargo {ON}{V} 
GRO2010 1.00 0.97 1.9 0.21 0.06 2.46 0.12 0 
GRO2011 0.76 0.33 0.33 0.04 0.05 0.21 0.09 0 
GRX2009 0.69 0.33 0.33 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.13 0 
GRX2010 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.12 0 
GRX2011 0.66 0.33 0.33 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.12 0 
IBZ2009 0.81 0.33 0.33 0 0.03 0.04 0.48 0 
IBZ2010 0.91 0.33 0.33 0.04 0 0.14 0.65 0 
IBZ2011 0.87 0.33 0.33 0.06 0 0.13 0.6 0 
LCG2009 0.70 0.33 0.33 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.14 0 
LCG2010 0.69 0.33 0.33 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.24 0 
LCG2011 0.69 0.33 0.33 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.22 0 
LEI2009 0.61 0.33 0.33 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.11 0 
LEI2010 0.64 0.33 0.33 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.13 0 
LEI2011 0.65 0.33 0.33 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.13 0 
LEN2009 0.78 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.02 0.04 0.01 0 
LEN2010 0.77 0.33 0.33 0.28 0.05 0 0.02 0 
LEN2011 0.82 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.05 0 0.02 0 
LPA2009 0.95 0.41 0.33 0 0 0 0.79 0.17 
LPA2010 1.00 0.36 1.49 0.03 0.02 0.67 1.32 0.27 
LPA2011 0.99 0.45 0.33 0 0.02 0 0.85 0.15 
MAH2009 0.62 0.33 0.33 0 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.01 
MAH2010 0.68 0.33 0.33 0 0.04 0.05 0.27 0.01 
MAH2011 0.66 0.33 0.33 0 0.03 0.11 0.14 0.01 
MJV2009 0.90 0.33 0.33 0.09 0.09 0.24 0.07 0 
MJV2010 0.79 0.33 0.33 0.08 0.06 0.17 0.07 0 
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MJV2011 0.74 0.33 0.33 0 0.02 0.27 0 0 
MLN2009 0.68 0.33 0.33 0.26 0 0.04 0.15 0.01 
MLN2010 0.70 0.33 0.33 0.3 0 0.05 0.15 0.01 
MLN2011 0.73 0.33 0.33 0.32 0 0.05 0.17 0.01 
ODB2009 1.00 0.62 1.35 0.95 0.01 0 0.14 0 
ODB2010 0.94 0.33 0.33 0.14 0.03 0 0.01 0 
ODB2011 1.00 1.58 1.65 0.87 0.11 0 0 0 
OVD2009 0.70 0.33 0.33 0.06 0.05 0.14 0.06 0 
OVD2010 0.73 0.33 0.33 0.07 0.05 0.15 0.06 0 
OVD2011 0.68 0.33 0.33 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.06 0 
PMI2009 0.98 0.38 0.33 2.11 0 0 2.64 0.06 
PMI2010 1.00 1.4 1.87 0.81 0.08 2.46 1.36 0.18 
PMI2011 1.00 0.65 0.35 0.6 0.12 1.21 0.13 0.06 
PNA2009 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.13 0 
PNA2010 0.66 0.33 0.33 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.12 0 
PNA2011 0.65 0.33 0.33 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.12 0 
REU2009 0.81 0.33 0.33 0.08 0 0.05 0.41 0 
REU2010 0.86 0.33 0.33 0.1 0 0.05 0.48 0 
REU2011 0.75 0.33 0.33 0.1 0 0.05 0.37 0 
RGS2009 0.89 0.33 0.33 0.17 0 0 0.01 0 
RGS2010 0.85 0.33 0.33 0.15 0 0 0.01 0 
RGS2011 1.00 2.13 1.08 1.13 0 0.02 0.39 0 
RJL2009 0.78 0.33 0.33 0.16 0.01 0 0.13 0 
RJL2010 0.71 0.33 0.33 0.13 0.01 0 0.02 0 
RJL2011 0.75 0.33 0.33 0.13 0.01 0 0 0 
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DMU Score StaffC {I}{V} OtherC {I}{V} Rwy {IN}{V} TotRev {O}{V} PAX {ON}{V} ATM {ON}{V} Cargo {ON}{V} 
SCQ2009 0.62 0.33 0.33 0.04 0.04 0.09 0.1 0.01 
SCQ2010 0.65 0.33 0.33 0.06 0.05 0.15 0.04 0.01 
SCQ2011 0.64 0.33 0.33 0.05 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.01 
SDR2009 0.83 0.33 0.33 0.12 0 0.04 0.47 0 
SDR2010 0.77 0.33 0.33 0.12 0 0.04 0.42 0 
SDR2011 0.84 0.33 0.33 0.06 0 0.18 0.19 0 
SLM2009 1.00 3.26 2.04 0.65 0.01 0.01 4.4 0 
SLM2010 1.00 1.05 1.62 0.36 0.02 0 1.88 0 
SLM2011 1.00 2.51 0.53 0.29 0 0 2.22 0 
SPC2009 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.07 0 0.03 0.29 0 
SPC2010 0.66 0.33 0.33 0.07 0 0.03 0.3 0 
SPC2011 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.07 0 0.04 0.28 0 
SVQ2009 0.77 0.33 0.33 0 0.02 0.03 0.44 0 
SVQ2010 0.79 0.33 0.33 0 0.05 0.02 0.4 0.01 
SVQ2011 0.82 0.33 0.33 0 0.04 0.03 0.47 0 
TFN2009 1.00 2.27 0.56 0.48 0.01 0.22 2.21 0.54 
TFN2010 1.00 0.79 1.45 0.22 0.01 0.4 1.71 0.24 
TFN2011 0.96 0.33 0.33 0.5 0.15 0 0.55 0.21 
TFS2009 0.73 0.33 0.33 0.39 0.12 0.44 0 0.07 
TFS2010 0.80 0.33 0.33 0.52 0.17 0.54 0 0.07 
TFS2011 0.90 0.33 0.33 0.62 0.24 0.67 0 0.05 
VDE2009 1.00 0.35 0.35 46.6 0.01 1.16 0.03 0.16 
VDE2010 1.00 0.34 1.15 2.8 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.01 
VDE2011 1.00 0.42 0.49 1.98 0 0.01 0.07 0 
VGO2009 0.69 0.33 0.33 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.01 
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DMU Score StaffC {I}{V} OtherC {I}{V} Rwy {IN}{V} TotRev {O}{V} PAX {ON}{V} ATM {ON}{V} Cargo {ON}{V} 
VGO2010 0.66 0.33 0.33 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.01 
VGO2011 0.59 0.33 0.33 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.11 0.01 
VIT2009 0.79 0.33 0.33 0.47 0 0 0.16 0.57 
VIT2010 0.80 0.33 0.33 0.38 0 0 0 0.57 
VIT2011 1.00 0.58 1.01 1 0.01 0 0 1.92 
VLC2009 1.00 1.27 0.34 0.11 0.02 0.01 1.78 0.07 
VLC2010 1.00 0.72 0.45 0.13 0.07 0.03 1.22 0.04 
VLC2011 0.93 0.33 0.33 0.44 0.21 0.05 0.49 0.11 
VLL2009 0.74 0.33 0.33 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.14 0 
VLL2010 0.76 0.33 0.33 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.14 0 
VLL2011 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.1 0 0.08 0.12 0 
XRY2009 0.93 0.33 0.33 1.49 0 0 1.5 0 
XRY2010 0.84 0.33 0.33 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.44 0 
XRY2011 1.00 1.35 0.84 0.22 0 0.05 2.1 0 
ZAZ2009 0.96 0.33 0.33 0 0.08 0 0.14 0.32 
ZAZ2010 1.00 0.67 1.16 0.38 0.04 0.09 0.01 1.75 
ZAZ2011 1.00 0.77 0.81 0.45 0.03 0.08 0 1.64 
ADA2009 0.70 0.33 0.33 0.03 0 0.17 0.12 0.03 
ADA2010 0.79 0.33 0.33 0.27 0 0.22 0.21 0.12 
ADA2011 0.79 0.33 0.33 0.05 0 0.12 0.31 0.03 
ADB2009 0.65 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.15 0.18 0.03 
ADB2010 0.92 0.33 1.34 0 0 1.01 0.72 0.21 
ADB2011 1.00 0.37 2.14 0 0.01 2.51 0.1 0.26 
ADF2009 1.00 2.14 3.38 1.83 0.01 0.34 0.01 0.01 
ADF2010 0.98 0.33 1.03 0.35 0 0.16 0 0 
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DMU Score StaffC {I}{V} OtherC {I}{V} Rwy {IN}{V} TotRev {O}{V} PAX {ON}{V} ATM {ON}{V} Cargo {ON}{V} 
ASR2009 0.66 0.33 0.33 0.08 0 0.17 0 0 
ASR2010 0.66 0.33 0.33 0.08 0 0.19 0 0 
ASR2011 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.07 0 0.22 0 0 
AYT2009 0.95 0.33 0.33 0 0.6 0 0 0 
AYT2010 1.00 0.92 2.16 0.16 2.57 0.57 0.01 0.01 
AYT2011 1.00 2.4 0.34 1.06 1.99 1.55 0.03 0.01 
BJV2009 0.68 0.33 0.33 0.04 0.24 0 0.06 0 
BJV2010 0.71 0.33 0.33 0.04 0.26 0 0.07 0 
BJV2011 0.73 0.33 0.33 0.04 0.29 0 0.06 0 
DIY2009 0.82 0.33 0.33 0.17 0 0.31 0 0.01 
DIY2010 1.00 0.34 3.39 0.21 0 2.76 0.01 0.06 
DIY2011 0.93 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.45 0 0.01 
DLM2009 0.70 0.33 0.33 0 0.05 0.27 0 0 
DLM2010 0.74 0.33 0.33 0 0.06 0.31 0 0 
DLM2011 0.73 0.33 0.33 0 0.06 0.29 0 0 
DNZ2009 0.57 0.33 0.33 0.12 0 0.04 0 0 
DNZ2011 0.52 0.33 0.33 0.09 0 0.04 0 0 
ERC2009 0.65 0.33 0.33 0.17 0 0.05 0 0 
ERC2011 0.56 0.33 0.33 0.11 0 0.05 0 0 
ERZ2009 0.57 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.13 0 0 
ERZ2010 0.61 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.17 0 0 
ERZ2011 0.55 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.13 0 0 
ESB2009 0.66 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.17 0.18 0.03 
ESB2010 0.82 0.33 0.86 0 0 0.61 0.51 0.11 
ESB2011 1.00 0.34 3.59 0.01 0 1.55 3.5 0 
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DMU Score StaffC {I}{V} OtherC {I}{V} Rwy {IN}{V} TotRev {O}{V} PAX {ON}{V} ATM {ON}{V} Cargo {ON}{V} 
EZS2009 0.66 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.13 0 0 
EZS2010 0.71 0.33 0.33 0.16 0 0.16 0 0 
EZS2011 0.70 0.33 0.33 0.14 0 0.17 0 0 
GNY2009 0.47 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.03 0 0 
GNY2010 0.48 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.04 0 0 
GNY2011 0.47 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.04 0 0 
GZT2009 0.54 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.12 0 0 
GZT2010 0.56 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.15 0 0.01 
GZT2011 0.57 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.17 0 0.01 
HTY2009 0.74 0.33 0.33 0.16 0 0.13 0 0 
HTY2010 0.77 0.33 0.33 0.14 0 0.2 0 0 
HTY2011 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.11 0 0.17 0 0 
ISE2010 0.59 0.33 0.33 0.11 0 0 0.09 0 
KCM2009 0.89 0.33 0.33 0.15 0 0.04 0.01 0 
KCM2011 0.74 0.33 0.33 0.18 0 0.05 0 0 
KSY2009 0.68 0.33 0.33 0.22 0 0.11 0 0 
KSY2010 0.68 0.33 0.33 0.23 0 0.13 0 0 
KSY2011 0.65 0.33 0.33 0.19 0 0.12 0 0 
KYA2009 0.64 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.12 0 0 
KYA2010 0.68 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.18 0 0 
KYA2011 0.64 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.17 0 0 
MLX2009 0.86 0.33 0.33 0.27 0 0.22 0 0.01 
MLX2010 0.78 0.33 0.33 0.22 0 0.2 0 0.01 
MLX2011 0.67 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.17 0 0 
MQM2009 0.86 0.33 0.33 0.13 0 0.12 0 0 
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DMU Score StaffC {I}{V} OtherC {I}{V} Rwy {IN}{V} TotRev {O}{V} PAX {ON}{V} ATM {ON}{V} Cargo {ON}{V} 
MQM2010 0.76 0.33 0.33 0.2 0 0.14 0 0 
MSR2009 0.82 0.33 0.33 0.38 0 0.08 0 0 
MSR2010 0.80 0.33 0.33 0.34 0 0.11 0 0 
MSR2011 0.77 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 0.11 0 0 
MZH2009 0.92 0.33 0.33 0.31 0 0 0 0 
MZH2010 0.83 0.33 0.33 0.31 0 0.04 0 0 
NAV2009 0.53 0.33 0.33 0.13 0 0.03 0 0 
NAV2010 0.54 0.33 0.33 0.13 0 0.04 0 0 
NAV2011 0.53 0.33 0.33 0.12 0 0.04 0 0 
SZF2009 0.58 0.33 0.33 0.08 0 0.14 0 0 
SZF2010 0.58 0.33 0.33 0.08 0 0.15 0 0 
SZF2011 0.61 0.33 0.33 0.07 0 0.17 0 0 
TEQ2009 0.89 0.33 0.33 0.23 0 0 0.6 0.02 
TEQ2010 1.00 2.65 2.67 1.63 0.02 0 5.51 0.44 
TEQ2011 1.00 0.34 5.75 1.8 0 0 8.23 0 
TZX2009 0.62 0.33 0.33 0.05 0 0.19 0 0.01 
TZX2010 0.65 0.33 0.33 0.05 0 0.23 0 0.01 
TZX2011 0.66 0.33 0.33 0.04 0 0.24 0 0.02 
USQ2011 0.78 0.33 0.33 0.24 0 0 0 0 
VAN2009 0.79 0.33 0.33 0.14 0 0.23 0 0.01 
VAN2010 0.82 0.33 0.33 0.14 0 0.27 0 0.01 
VAN2011 0.80 0.33 0.33 0.12 0 0.27 0 0.02 
VAS2009 0.73 0.33 0.33 0.18 0 0.06 0 0 
VAS2010 0.60 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.05 0 0 
VAS2011 0.54 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.06 0 0 
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DMU Score StaffC {I}{V} OtherC {I}{V} Rwy {IN}{V} TotRev {O}{V} PAX {ON}{V} ATM {ON}{V} Cargo {ON}{V} 
YEI2009 0.48 0.33 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 
YEI2010 0.47 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.02 0 0 
YEI2011 0.47 0.33 0.33 0 0 0.01 0.05 0 
 
 
DEA Results (obtained by EMS Software) (Cont’d) 
DMU Benchmarks 
ABC2009  3 (0.82)  19 (0.17)  30 (0.01)  
ABC2010  3 (0.85)  19 (0.14)  30 (0.01)  
ABC2011 5 
ACE2009  15 (0.02)  30 (0.14)  31 (0.76)  105 (0.03)  111 (0.06)  
ACE2010  15 (0.02)  31 (0.74)  68 (0.01)  97 (0.05)  105 (0.16)  111 (0.03)  
ACE2011  15 (0.02)  31 (0.64)  68 (0.06)  69 (0.01)  105 (0.27)  136 (0.00)  
AGP2009 1 
AGP2010 0 
AGP2011 1 
ALC2009  9 (0.01)  11 (0.72)  12 (0.10)  31 (0.10)  69 (0.04)  105 (0.03)  
ALC2010 2 
ALC2011 1 
BCN2009  15 (0.90)  97 (0.07)  123 (0.02)  
BCN2010 0 
BCN2011 7 
BIO2009  31 (0.14)  98 (0.26)  120 (0.54)  136 (0.06)  
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DMU Benchmarks 
BIO2010  31 (0.21)  98 (0.23)  120 (0.50)  136 (0.06)  
BIO2011  31 (0.24)  98 (0.22)  120 (0.48)  136 (0.06)  
BJZ2009 111 
BJZ2010 3 
BJZ2011 0 
EAS2009  19 (0.13)  30 (0.05)  32 (0.06)  61 (0.76)  123 (0.00)  136 (0.00)  
EAS2010  19 (0.14)  30 (0.04)  32 (0.05)  61 (0.78)  123 (0.00)  136 (0.00)  
EAS2011  19 (0.13)  30 (0.00)  32 (0.04)  61 (0.82)  123 (0.00)  136 (0.00)  
FUE2009  19 (0.09)  31 (0.61)  88 (0.25)  123 (0.03)  136 (0.02)  
FUE2010  19 (0.08)  31 (0.68)  88 (0.19)  123 (0.03)  136 (0.03)  
FUE2011  19 (0.08)  31 (0.77)  88 (0.09)  123 (0.02)  136 (0.04)  
GMZ2009  30 (0.96)  61 (0.01)  105 (0.02)  
GMZ2010  30 (1.00)  105 (0.00)  111 (0.00)  136 (0.00)  
GMZ2011 61 
GRO2009 36 
GRO2010 100 
GRO2011  19 (0.09)  30 (0.06)  32 (0.59)  78 (0.25)  136 (0.01)  
GRX2009  19 (0.30)  32 (0.23)  61 (0.20)  89 (0.27)  123 (0.00)  136 (0.00)  
GRX2010  19 (0.41)  32 (0.17)  61 (0.25)  89 (0.16)  136 (0.00)  
GRX2011  19 (0.41)  32 (0.16)  61 (0.26)  89 (0.17)  136 (0.00)  
IBZ2009  31 (0.52)  98 (0.39)  120 (0.08)  136 (0.01)  
IBZ2010  31 (0.57)  98 (0.28)  113 (0.14)  136 (0.01)  
IBZ2011  31 (0.63)  68 (0.03)  113 (0.34)  136 (0.00)  
LCG2009  19 (0.03)  32 (0.18)  61 (0.67)  89 (0.11)  123 (0.00)  136 (0.01)  
LCG2010  31 (0.16)  61 (0.66)  88 (0.15)  98 (0.01)  123 (0.00)  136 (0.01)  
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DMU Benchmarks 
LCG2011  31 (0.06)  32 (0.09)  61 (0.69)  88 (0.15)  123 (0.00)  136 (0.01)  
LEI2009  19 (0.14)  32 (0.09)  61 (0.11)  89 (0.64)  136 (0.01)  
LEI2010  19 (0.06)  32 (0.10)  61 (0.09)  89 (0.74)  136 (0.01)  
LEI2011  19 (0.19)  32 (0.11)  61 (0.10)  89 (0.59)  136 (0.01)  
LEN2009  19 (0.65)  32 (0.00)  61 (0.22)  130 (0.12)  136 (0.00)  
LEN2010  19 (0.68)  30 (0.12)  61 (0.20)  136 (0.00)  
LEN2011  19 (0.69)  30 (0.15)  61 (0.16)  136 (0.00)  
LPA2009  50 (0.55)  68 (0.21)  97 (0.09)  123 (0.15)  
LPA2010 4 
LPA2011  50 (0.62)  68 (0.23)  97 (0.08)  123 (0.06)  136 (0.01)  
MAH2009  31 (0.24)  32 (0.21)  88 (0.49)  122 (0.06)  136 (0.00)  
MAH2010  32 (0.49)  88 (0.45)  98 (0.01)  122 (0.05)  136 (0.00)  
MAH2011  19 (0.04)  32 (0.46)  89 (0.45)  122 (0.05)  136 (0.01)  
MJV2009  19 (0.30)  30 (0.37)  32 (0.30)  61 (0.02)  136 (0.01)  
MJV2010  19 (0.33)  30 (0.41)  32 (0.24)  61 (0.02)  136 (0.01)  
MJV2011  19 (0.78)  32 (0.22)  136 (0.01)  
MLN2009  30 (0.24)  31 (0.04)  61 (0.70)  98 (0.01)  123 (0.00)  
MLN2010  30 (0.26)  31 (0.05)  61 (0.69)  98 (0.00)  123 (0.01)  
MLN2011  30 (0.23)  31 (0.05)  61 (0.72)  98 (0.00)  123 (0.00)  
ODB2009 57 
ODB2010  19 (0.00)  30 (0.05)  63 (0.95)  136 (0.00)  
ODB2011 1 
OVD2009  19 (0.22)  30 (0.08)  32 (0.22)  61 (0.46)  123 (0.00)  136 (0.01)  
OVD2010  19 (0.22)  30 (0.05)  32 (0.23)  61 (0.49)  123 (0.00)  136 (0.01)  
OVD2011  19 (0.24)  30 (0.19)  32 (0.23)  61 (0.33)  123 (0.00)  136 (0.01)  
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DMU Benchmarks 
PMI2009  7 (0.00)  15 (0.01)  68 (0.47)  69 (0.51)  112 (0.01)  
PMI2010 7 
PMI2011 3 
PNA2009  19 (0.06)  32 (0.06)  61 (0.57)  89 (0.31)  122 (0.00)  136 (0.00)  
PNA2010  19 (0.19)  32 (0.05)  61 (0.51)  89 (0.25)  122 (0.00)  136 (0.00)  
PNA2011  19 (0.24)  32 (0.04)  61 (0.52)  89 (0.20)  122 (0.00)  136 (0.00)  
REU2009  31 (0.25)  61 (0.15)  88 (0.26)  120 (0.34)  
REU2010  31 (0.21)  61 (0.23)  88 (0.32)  98 (0.01)  120 (0.23)  
REU2011  31 (0.24)  61 (0.31)  88 (0.40)  98 (0.00)  120 (0.05)  
RGS2009  3 (0.06)  19 (0.01)  30 (0.10)  78 (0.83)  
RGS2010  3 (0.02)  19 (0.08)  30 (0.15)  78 (0.76)  123 (0.00)  
RGS2011 9 
RJL2009  61 (0.04)  78 (0.87)  89 (0.10)  136 (0.00)  
RJL2010  20 (0.13)  30 (0.12)  78 (0.75)  136 (0.00)  
RJL2011  20 (0.12)  30 (0.10)  78 (0.77)  
SCQ2009  19 (0.42)  32 (0.32)  61 (0.13)  89 (0.08)  123 (0.04)  136 (0.01)  
SCQ2010  19 (0.46)  30 (0.00)  32 (0.36)  61 (0.13)  123 (0.04)  136 (0.02)  
SCQ2011  19 (0.45)  30 (0.12)  32 (0.35)  61 (0.02)  123 (0.03)  136 (0.03)  
SDR2009  32 (0.18)  61 (0.40)  88 (0.35)  120 (0.08)  
SDR2010  32 (0.18)  61 (0.43)  88 (0.38)  120 (0.00)  
SDR2011  19 (0.07)  32 (0.22)  61 (0.43)  89 (0.27)  
SLM2009 19 
SLM2010 24 
SLM2011 0 
SPC2009  31 (0.14)  61 (0.50)  88 (0.27)  98 (0.07)  120 (0.03)  
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DMU Benchmarks 
SPC2010  31 (0.13)  61 (0.50)  88 (0.28)  98 (0.06)  120 (0.03)  
SPC2011  31 (0.15)  61 (0.49)  88 (0.28)  98 (0.05)  120 (0.03)  
SVQ2009  31 (0.20)  98 (0.34)  120 (0.41)  136 (0.05)  
SVQ2010  31 (0.29)  88 (0.02)  98 (0.31)  120 (0.33)  136 (0.05)  
SVQ2011  31 (0.46)  98 (0.30)  120 (0.19)  136 (0.05)  
TFN2009 5 
TFN2010 27 
TFN2011  30 (0.01)  97 (0.18)  98 (0.73)  113 (0.08)  136 (0.00)  
TFS2009  15 (0.03)  31 (0.83)  105 (0.03)  111 (0.04)  136 (0.07)  
TFS2010  15 (0.03)  31 (0.88)  105 (0.01)  111 (0.01)  136 (0.07)  
TFS2011  11 (0.40)  31 (0.02)  68 (0.14)  105 (0.36)  136 (0.08)  
VDE2009 0 
VDE2010 0 
VDE2011 11 
VGO2009  19 (0.18)  32 (0.17)  61 (0.50)  89 (0.12)  123 (0.01)  136 (0.01)  
VGO2010  19 (0.25)  32 (0.17)  61 (0.51)  89 (0.03)  123 (0.02)  136 (0.01)  
VGO2011  31 (0.14)  61 (0.19)  78 (0.45)  88 (0.19)  123 (0.02)  136 (0.01)  
VIT2009  61 (0.28)  98 (0.02)  111 (0.53)  123 (0.18)  
VIT2010  30 (0.28)  111 (0.50)  123 (0.22)  
VIT2011 8 
VLC2009 1 
VLC2010 5 
VLC2011  30 (0.08)  31 (0.01)  98 (0.11)  105 (0.02)  113 (0.73)  136 (0.04)  
VLL2009  19 (0.48)  32 (0.06)  61 (0.26)  89 (0.19)  122 (0.00)  136 (0.00)  
VLL2010  19 (0.53)  32 (0.06)  61 (0.27)  89 (0.13)  122 (0.00)  136 (0.00)  
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VLL2011  19 (0.57)  32 (0.08)  61 (0.27)  89 (0.08)  123 (0.00)  
XRY2009  105 (0.08)  113 (0.12)  120 (0.80)  
XRY2010  31 (0.03)  61 (0.19)  88 (0.11)  98 (0.00)  120 (0.66)  136 (0.01)  
XRY2011 18 
ZAZ2009  19 (0.01)  89 (0.12)  122 (0.87)  136 (0.00)  
ZAZ2010 22 
ZAZ2011 77 
ADA2009  19 (0.03)  32 (0.49)  61 (0.30)  89 (0.05)  122 (0.13)  
ADA2010  32 (0.50)  61 (0.26)  98 (0.07)  111 (0.04)  123 (0.12)  
ADA2011  32 (0.55)  61 (0.17)  89 (0.06)  98 (0.13)  122 (0.08)  
ADB2009  31 (0.55)  98 (0.12)  123 (0.22)  136 (0.12)  
ADB2010  32 (0.21)  50 (0.08)  122 (0.17)  129 (0.46)  136 (0.08)  
ADB2011 2 
ADF2009 13 
ADF2010  19 (0.03)  32 (0.01)  61 (0.25)  122 (0.00)  130 (0.71)  
ASR2009  19 (0.48)  31 (0.12)  78 (0.39)  123 (0.00)  136 (0.00)  
ASR2010  19 (0.61)  30 (0.20)  32 (0.18)  123 (0.01)  
ASR2011  19 (0.58)  30 (0.17)  32 (0.24)  123 (0.01)  
AYT2009  20 (0.13)  136 (0.87)  
AYT2010 76 
AYT2011 0 
BJV2009  30 (0.14)  78 (0.71)  136 (0.14)  
BJV2010  19 (0.21)  30 (0.42)  61 (0.22)  136 (0.15)  
BJV2011  19 (0.16)  30 (0.51)  61 (0.16)  136 (0.17)  
DIY2009  19 (0.77)  30 (0.01)  32 (0.20)  123 (0.02)  
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DMU Benchmarks 
DIY2010 0 
DIY2011  19 (0.64)  32 (0.34)  123 (0.02)  
DLM2009  19 (0.59)  32 (0.33)  136 (0.08)  
DLM2010  19 (0.38)  32 (0.58)  136 (0.04)  
DLM2011  19 (0.40)  32 (0.56)  136 (0.05)  
DNZ2009  19 (0.70)  30 (0.28)  32 (0.02)  
DNZ2011  19 (0.70)  30 (0.28)  32 (0.02)  123 (0.00)  
ERC2009  19 (0.71)  30 (0.28)  32 (0.01)  123 (0.00)  
ERC2011  19 (0.70)  30 (0.27)  32 (0.03)  123 (0.00)  
ERZ2009  19 (0.89)  32 (0.11)  123 (0.00)  
ERZ2010  19 (0.86)  32 (0.14)  122 (0.00)  
ERZ2011  19 (0.84)  32 (0.15)  123 (0.01)  
ESB2009  32 (0.27)  98 (0.53)  123 (0.08)  136 (0.12)  
ESB2010  32 (0.27)  50 (0.35)  98 (0.01)  122 (0.01)  129 (0.37)  
ESB2011 0 
EZS2009  19 (0.94)  32 (0.06)  122 (0.00)  
EZS2010  19 (0.59)  32 (0.08)  122 (0.00)  130 (0.33)  
EZS2011  19 (0.58)  32 (0.10)  122 (0.00)  130 (0.32)  
GNY2009  19 (1.00)  136 (0.00)  
GNY2010  19 (0.99)  123 (0.00)  136 (0.01)  
GNY2011  19 (0.99)  123 (0.00)  136 (0.01)  
GZT2009  19 (0.83)  32 (0.16)  123 (0.02)  
GZT2010  19 (0.78)  32 (0.20)  123 (0.02)  
GZT2011  19 (0.72)  32 (0.26)  123 (0.02)  
HTY2009  19 (0.69)  30 (0.26)  32 (0.05)  123 (0.00)  
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DMU Benchmarks 
HTY2010  19 (0.65)  30 (0.24)  32 (0.11)  123 (0.00)  
HTY2011  19 (0.65)  30 (0.22)  32 (0.13)  123 (0.00)  
ISE2010  19 (0.62)  61 (0.32)  89 (0.06)  122 (0.00)  
KCM2009  19 (0.00)  30 (0.21)  32 (0.00)  130 (0.79)  
KCM2011  19 (0.29)  32 (0.00)  123 (0.00)  130 (0.70)  
KSY2009  19 (0.87)  30 (0.09)  32 (0.05)  123 (0.00)  
KSY2010  19 (0.84)  32 (0.05)  123 (0.00)  130 (0.11)  
KSY2011  19 (0.86)  30 (0.08)  32 (0.06)  123 (0.00)  
KYA2009  19 (0.95)  32 (0.05)  
KYA2010  19 (0.90)  32 (0.10)  122 (0.00)  
KYA2011  19 (0.89)  32 (0.11)  122 (0.00)  
MLX2009  19 (0.74)  32 (0.08)  123 (0.01)  130 (0.17)  
MLX2010  19 (0.74)  32 (0.09)  123 (0.01)  130 (0.16)  
MLX2011  19 (0.89)  32 (0.10)  123 (0.01)  
MQM2009  19 (0.34)  30 (0.62)  32 (0.04)  
MQM2010  19 (0.80)  30 (0.15)  32 (0.05)  123 (0.00)  
MSR2009  19 (0.90)  30 (0.09)  32 (0.01)  123 (0.00)  
MSR2010  19 (0.90)  30 (0.08)  32 (0.02)  123 (0.00)  
MSR2011  19 (0.89)  30 (0.08)  32 (0.03)  123 (0.00)  
MZH2009  3 (0.35)  19 (0.36)  30 (0.29)  123 (0.00)  
MZH2010  19 (0.69)  30 (0.31)  32 (0.00)  123 (0.00)  
NAV2009  19 (0.62)  32 (0.01)  123 (0.00)  130 (0.37)  
NAV2010  19 (0.62)  32 (0.01)  130 (0.37)  
NAV2011  19 (0.62)  32 (0.02)  130 (0.36)  
SZF2009  19 (0.63)  30 (0.20)  32 (0.17)  123 (0.00)  
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DMU Benchmarks 
SZF2010  19 (0.62)  30 (0.19)  32 (0.19)  
SZF2011  19 (0.59)  30 (0.18)  32 (0.23)  123 (0.01)  
TEQ2009  61 (0.07)  88 (0.47)  120 (0.07)  195 (0.39)  
TEQ2010 1 
TEQ2011 0 
TZX2009  19 (0.37)  30 (0.29)  32 (0.32)  123 (0.03)  
TZX2010  19 (0.31)  30 (0.26)  32 (0.39)  123 (0.04)  
TZX2011  19 (0.24)  30 (0.25)  32 (0.45)  123 (0.06)  
USQ2011  19 (0.49)  61 (0.51)  
VAN2009  19 (0.53)  30 (0.32)  32 (0.14)  123 (0.01)  
VAN2010  19 (0.51)  30 (0.31)  32 (0.17)  123 (0.02)  
VAN2011  19 (0.38)  32 (0.20)  123 (0.03)  130 (0.40)  
VAS2009  19 (0.54)  30 (0.44)  32 (0.01)  123 (0.00)  
VAS2010  19 (0.99)  32 (0.01)  123 (0.00)  
VAS2011  19 (0.97)  32 (0.03)  123 (0.00)  
YEI2009  19 (0.99)  123 (0.01)  
YEI2010  19 (0.99)  32 (0.00)  123 (0.00)  
YEI2011  19 (0.82)  32 (0.01)  89 (0.17)  122 (0.00)  136 (0.00)  
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DEA Results (obtained by EMS Software) (Cont’d) 
DMU {F} StaffC {I} {F} OtherC {I} {F} Rwy {IN} {S} TotRev {O} {S} PAX {ON} {S} ATM {ON} {S} Cargo {ON} 
ABC2009 85% 86% 100% 57108 4685 0 0 
ABC2010 82% 91% 100% 1 6805 104 0 
ABC2011               
ACE2009 80% 67% 100% 0 0 413 0 
ACE2010 82% 77% 100% 68 0 0 0 
ACE2011 87% 80% 100% 0 0 0 0 
AGP2009               
AGP2010               
AGP2011               
ALC2009 100% 93% 100% 0 160744 0 0 
ALC2010               
ALC2011               
BCN2009 89% 96% 94% 82932716 4008363 0 0 
BCN2010               
BCN2011               
BIO2009 94% 82% 65% 0 0 0 2067 
BIO2010 89% 91% 65% 0 0 0 1646 
BIO2011 90% 92% 65% 0 0 0 1421 
BJZ2009               
BJZ2010               
BJZ2011               
EAS2009 64% 51% 100% 0 0 0 0 
EAS2010 64% 56% 100% 0 0 0 0 
114 
 
DMU {F} StaffC {I} {F} OtherC {I} {F} Rwy {IN} {S} TotRev {O} {S} PAX {ON} {S} ATM {ON} {S} Cargo {ON} 
EAS2011 70% 56% 100% 0 0 0 0 
FUE2009 67% 52% 55% 0 0 0 0 
FUE2010 74% 67% 54% 0 0 0 0 
FUE2011 81% 66% 54% 1 0 0 0 
GMZ2009 93% 62% 100% 45602 1355 0 0 
GMZ2010 84% 72% 100% 0 909 1 0 
GMZ2011               
GRO2009               
GRO2010               
GRO2011 68% 61% 100% 0 0 0 26 
GRX2009 56% 50% 100% 0 0 0 0 
GRX2010 49% 50% 100% 0 0 0 13 
GRX2011 50% 48% 100% 0 0 0 2 
IBZ2009 73% 69% 98% 1 0 0 3237 
IBZ2010 77% 94% 100% 4471286 0 0 3239 
IBZ2011 82% 80% 100% 2871155 0 0 1611 
LCG2009 64% 47% 100% 0 0 0 0 
LCG2010 60% 46% 100% 0 0 0 0 
LCG2011 60% 46% 100% 0 0 0 0 
LEI2009 42% 42% 100% 0 0 0 109 
LEI2010 47% 46% 100% 0 0 0 107 
LEI2011 51% 44% 100% 0 0 0 79 
LEN2009 61% 73% 100% 0 0 0 6 
LEN2010 57% 75% 100% 0 3781 0 13 
LEN2011 62% 84% 100% 0 6133 0 7 
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DMU {F} StaffC {I} {F} OtherC {I} {F} Rwy {IN} {S} TotRev {O} {S} PAX {ON} {S} ATM {ON} {S} Cargo {ON} 
LPA2009 100% 86% 97% 6431881 1073302 0 0 
LPA2010               
LPA2011 100% 97% 98% 0 819011 0 0 
MAH2009 45% 41% 68% 0 0 0 0 
MAH2010 48% 58% 66% 0 0 0 0 
MAH2011 48% 49% 68% 0 0 0 0 
MJV2009 73% 97% 100% 0 0 0 61 
MJV2010 62% 75% 100% 0 0 0 78 
MJV2011 57% 65% 91% 0 0 629 72 
MLN2009 64% 41% 100% 808036 0 0 0 
MLN2010 64% 46% 100% 995914 0 0 0 
MLN2011 70% 48% 100% 1003903 0 0 0 
ODB2009               
ODB2010 89% 91% 100% 0 15529 0 6 
ODB2011               
OVD2009 53% 57% 100% 0 0 0 0 
OVD2010 57% 62% 100% 0 0 0 0 
OVD2011 52% 53% 100% 0 0 0 0 
PMI2009 100% 93% 100% 15343105 675775 0 0 
PMI2010               
PMI2011               
PNA2009 56% 45% 100% 0 0 0 0 
PNA2010 52% 46% 100% 0 0 0 0 
PNA2011 53% 42% 100% 0 0 0 0 
REU2009 81% 62% 100% 1395328 0 0 26 
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DMU {F} StaffC {I} {F} OtherC {I} {F} Rwy {IN} {S} TotRev {O} {S} PAX {ON} {S} ATM {ON} {S} Cargo {ON} 
REU2010 77% 80% 100% 718397 0 0 0 
REU2011 66% 59% 100% 590992 0 0 0 
RGS2009 82% 86% 100% 2 6300 0 1 
RGS2010 79% 77% 100% 0 3863 0 0 
RGS2011               
RJL2009 69% 66% 100% 0 14066 0 6 
RJL2010 59% 55% 100% 0 15227 0 1 
RJL2011 71% 54% 100% 0 20500 937 1 
SCQ2009 43% 42% 100% 0 0 0 0 
SCQ2010 41% 53% 100% 0 0 0 0 
SCQ2011 43% 48% 100% 0 0 0 0 
SDR2009 69% 79% 100% 465089 0 0 4 
SDR2010 66% 65% 100% 273644 0 0 10 
SDR2011 71% 81% 100% 895957 0 0 13 
SLM2009               
SLM2010               
SLM2011               
SPC2009 55% 46% 100% 1343255 0 0 0 
SPC2010 52% 47% 100% 617289 0 0 0 
SPC2011 61% 40% 100% 1022343 0 0 0 
SVQ2009 65% 65% 90% 1 0 0 947 
SVQ2010 63% 74% 89% 0 0 0 0 
SVQ2011 66% 79% 89% 24 1 0 90 
TFN2009               
TFN2010               
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DMU {F} StaffC {I} {F} OtherC {I} {F} Rwy {IN} {S} TotRev {O} {S} PAX {ON} {S} ATM {ON} {S} Cargo {ON} 
TFN2011 98% 89% 100% 0 43242 0 0 
TFS2009 52% 67% 100% 0 0 11321 0 
TFS2010 51% 89% 100% 0 0 11218 0 
TFS2011 75% 95% 100% 0 0 10952 0 
VDE2009               
VDE2010               
VDE2011               
VGO2009 60% 48% 100% 0 0 0 0 
VGO2010 55% 44% 100% 0 0 0 0 
VGO2011 46% 32% 100% 0 0 0 0 
VIT2009 70% 67% 100% 404687 176683 0 0 
VIT2010 64% 76% 100% 179944 143686 155 0 
VIT2011               
VLC2009               
VLC2010               
VLC2011 88% 92% 100% 0 0 0 0 
VLL2009 52% 71% 100% 0 0 0 0 
VLL2010 51% 77% 100% 0 0 0 0 
VLL2011 56% 46% 100% 471419 0 0 0 
XRY2009 95% 84% 100% 3731766 370711 0 1352 
XRY2010 78% 73% 100% 0 0 0 0 
XRY2011               
ZAZ2009 88% 99% 94% 0 33768 0 0 
ZAZ2010               
ZAZ2011               
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DMU {F} StaffC {I} {F} OtherC {I} {F} Rwy {IN} {S} TotRev {O} {S} PAX {ON} {S} ATM {ON} {S} Cargo {ON} 
ADA2009 43% 66% 100% 4175962 0 0 0 
ADA2010 46% 91% 100% 5822891 0 0 0 
ADA2011 43% 95% 100% 5568153 0 0 0 
ADB2009 39% 58% 67% 27541867 0 0 0 
ADB2010 76% 100% 91% 22461330 0 0 0 
ADB2011               
ADF2009               
ADF2010 94% 100% 100% 182470 0 2170 0 
ASR2009 61% 37% 100% 1545 0 2570 0 
ASR2010 61% 37% 100% 885567 0 2003 0 
ASR2011 59% 43% 100% 1917653 0 1997 0 
AYT2009 97% 89% 92% 0 729765 2126 852 
AYT2010               
AYT2011               
BJV2009 41% 64% 100% 0 262535 0 981 
BJV2010 45% 69% 100% 0 257677 0 1204 
BJV2011 42% 78% 100% 0 353633 0 1379 
DIY2009 66% 81% 100% 4732453 0 3048 0 
DIY2010               
DIY2011 80% 98% 95% 8859396 0 3601 0 
DLM2009 39% 71% 63% 1 0 4035 196 
DLM2010 44% 79% 54% 0 0 5819 224 
DLM2011 39% 81% 55% 0 0 4455 239 
DNZ2009 42% 29% 100% 529000 0 2170 3 
DNZ2011 32% 24% 100% 680918 0 1849 0 
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DMU {F} StaffC {I} {F} OtherC {I} {F} Rwy {IN} {S} TotRev {O} {S} PAX {ON} {S} ATM {ON} {S} Cargo {ON} 
ERC2009 52% 44% 100% 740693 0 2077 0 
ERC2011 39% 29% 100% 1152370 0 1932 0 
ERZ2009 33% 39% 57% 2130161 0 2875 0 
ERZ2010 32% 52% 57% 3071975 0 2648 0 
ERZ2011 27% 38% 57% 2768256 0 1964 0 
ESB2009 26% 71% 46% 36962702 0 0 0 
ESB2010 45% 100% 60% 30824632 0 0 0 
ESB2011               
EZS2009 36% 61% 73% 2302916 0 3473 0 
EZS2010 41% 72% 100% 2620554 0 1819 0 
EZS2011 37% 73% 100% 2497750 0 2186 0 
GNY2009 29% 14% 96% 1881897 0 2569 16 
GNY2010 29% 15% 96% 2295409 0 2102 0 
GNY2011 26% 16% 96% 2387354 0 2341 0 
GZT2009 31% 31% 70% 1505824 0 1916 0 
GZT2010 32% 34% 69% 2185800 0 1372 0 
GZT2011 33% 40% 67% 2530509 0 964 0 
HTY2009 75% 47% 100% 1760721 0 2313 0 
HTY2010 76% 54% 100% 2471146 0 1944 0 
HTY2011 56% 45% 100% 1328609 0 2141 0 
ISE2010 48% 30% 100% 122299 20931 0 0 
KCM2009 73% 93% 100% 253306 0 0 15 
KCM2011 53% 69% 100% 208763 0 365 0 
KSY2009 50% 53% 100% 1717321 0 3120 0 
KSY2010 47% 57% 100% 1793966 0 2786 0 
120 
 
DMU {F} StaffC {I} {F} OtherC {I} {F} Rwy {IN} {S} TotRev {O} {S} PAX {ON} {S} ATM {ON} {S} Cargo {ON} 
KSY2011 41% 53% 100% 2081626 0 3173 0 
KYA2009 39% 54% 56% 1171183 0 1601 3 
KYA2010 41% 65% 55% 2766526 0 1270 0 
KYA2011 33% 60% 55% 2088455 0 1609 0 
MLX2009 69% 88% 100% 2047281 0 1925 0 
MLX2010 55% 77% 100% 2197821 0 1033 0 
MLX2011 45% 55% 55% 2385107 0 949 0 
MQM2009 96% 64% 100% 1811077 0 1951 7 
MQM2010 82% 46% 100% 1862489 0 2612 0 
MSR2009 79% 67% 100% 614172 0 2864 0 
MSR2010 71% 68% 100% 1035963 0 2753 0 
MSR2011 60% 70% 100% 1069079 0 2851 0 
MZH2009 95% 82% 100% 362528 0 1785 0 
MZH2010 69% 79% 100% 440737 0 2520 0 
NAV2009 29% 31% 100% 560669 0 1547 0 
NAV2010 27% 35% 100% 340096 0 1449 19 
NAV2011 25% 34% 100% 341073 0 1357 11 
SZF2009 33% 40% 100% 2388991 0 2121 0 
SZF2010 33% 41% 100% 2555827 0 1422 13 
SZF2011 35% 46% 100% 3737089 0 1796 0 
TEQ2009 94% 72% 100% 1141360 86908 0 0 
TEQ2010               
TEQ2011               
TZX2009 44% 43% 100% 2421421 0 1043 0 
TZX2010 47% 50% 100% 5511682 0 1234 0 
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DMU {F} StaffC {I} {F} OtherC {I} {F} Rwy {IN} {S} TotRev {O} {S} PAX {ON} {S} ATM {ON} {S} Cargo {ON} 
TZX2011 45% 54% 100% 6765570 0 2157 0 
USQ2011 63% 71% 100% 428622 29371 5573 0 
VAN2009 63% 75% 100% 4315208 0 2094 0 
VAN2010 60% 87% 100% 4648367 0 2129 0 
VAN2011 59% 79% 100% 5091698 0 497 0 
VAS2009 57% 62% 100% 805883 0 2218 0 
VAS2010 43% 36% 100% 342498 0 2803 0 
VAS2011 37% 26% 99% 1064214 0 2669 0 
YEI2009 24% 18% 77% 294083 7203 1620 0 
YEI2010 22% 20% 76% 197503 0 73 0 
YEI2011 21% 20% 75% 0 0 0 0 
 
Scale Efficiency and Returns to Scale at Spanish and Turkish Airports, 2011 
COUNTRY AIRPORT IATA YEAR DMU 
DEA 
Score-VRS 
DEA 
Score-CRS 
DEA Score-
NIRS SCALE 
Returns 
to Scale 
Spain Albacete ABC 2011 ABC2011 1.000 0.419 0.419 0.419 irs 
Spain Lanzarote ACE 2011 ACE2011 0.889 0.841 0.841 0.946 irs 
Spain Málaga AGP 2011 AGP2011 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Spain Alicante ALC 2011 ALC2011 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Spain Barcelona BCN 2011 BCN2011 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Spain Bilbao BIO 2011 BIO2011 0.939 0.926 0.939 0.986 drs 
Spain Badajoz BJZ 2011 BJZ2011 1.000 0.591 0.591 0.591 irs 
Spain San Sebastián EAS 2011 EAS2011 0.753 0.655 0.655 0.870 irs 
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COUNTRY AIRPORT IATA YEAR DMU 
DEA 
Score-VRS 
DEA 
Score-CRS 
DEA Score-
NIRS SCALE 
Returns 
to Scale 
Spain Fuerteventura FUE 2011 FUE2011 0.824 0.822 0.822 0.998 irs 
Spain La Gomera GMZ 2011 GMZ2011 1.000 0.451 0.451 0.451 irs 
Spain Girona GRO 2011 GRO2011 0.765 0.738 0.738 0.965 irs 
Spain Granada GRX 2011 GRX2011 0.662 0.621 0.621 0.939 irs 
Spain Ibiza IBZ 2011 IBZ2011 0.873 0.871 0.873 0.998 drs 
Spain A Coruña LCG 2011 LCG2011 0.688 0.650 0.650 0.944 irs 
Spain Almería LEI 2011 LEI2011 0.647 0.630 0.630 0.973 irs 
Spain León LEN 2011 LEN2011 0.819 0.585 0.585 0.715 irs 
Spain Gran Canaria LPA 2011 LPA2011 0.991 0.914 0.991 0.923 drs 
Spain Menorca MAH 2011 MAH2011 0.658 0.657 0.657 0.998 irs 
Spain Murcia - San Javier MJV 2011 MJV2011 0.740 0.684 0.684 0.923 irs 
Spain Melilla MLN 2011 MLN2011 0.727 0.603 0.603 0.830 irs 
Spain Córdoba ODB 2011 ODB2011 1.000 0.782 0.782 0.782 irs 
Spain Asturias OVD 2011 OVD2011 0.683 0.628 0.628 0.919 irs 
Spain Palma de Mallorca PMI 2011 PMI2011 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Spain Pamplona PNA 2011 PNA2011 0.651 0.581 0.581 0.893 irs 
Spain Reus REU 2011 REU2011 0.752 0.736 0.736 0.979 irs 
Spain Burgos RGS 2011 RGS2011 1.000 0.631 0.631 0.631 irs 
Spain Logroño RJL 2011 RJL2011 0.751 0.469 0.469 0.624 irs 
Spain Santiago SCQ 2011 SCQ2011 0.638 0.616 0.616 0.965 irs 
Spain Santander SDR 2011 SDR2011 0.841 0.804 0.804 0.956 irs 
Spain Salamanca SLM 2011 SLM2011 1.000 0.971 0.971 0.971 irs 
Spain La Palma SPC 2011 SPC2011 0.671 0.646 0.646 0.963 irs 
Spain Sevilla SVQ 2011 SVQ2011 0.815 0.813 0.815 0.997 drs 
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COUNTRY AIRPORT IATA YEAR DMU 
DEA 
Score-VRS 
DEA 
Score-CRS 
DEA Score-
NIRS SCALE 
Returns 
to Scale 
Spain Tenerife-Norte TFN 2011 TFN2011 0.958 0.955 0.955 0.997 irs 
Spain Tenerife-Sur TFS 2011 TFS2011 0.897 0.814 0.814 0.908 irs 
Spain Hierro VDE 2011 VDE2011 1.000 0.524 0.524 0.524 irs 
Spain Vigo VGO 2011 VGO2011 0.592 0.553 0.553 0.934 irs 
Spain Vitoria VIT 2011 VIT2011 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Spain Valencia VLC 2011 VLC2011 0.932 0.924 0.924 0.991 irs 
Spain Valladolid VLL 2011 VLL2011 0.672 0.601 0.601 0.894 irs 
Spain Jerez de la Frontera XRY 2011 XRY2011 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Spain Zaragoza ZAZ 2011 ZAZ2011 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Turkey Adana ADA 2011 ADA2011 0.795 0.790 0.790 0.995 irs 
Turkey 
Izmir-Adnan 
Menderes ADB 2011 ADB2011 1.000 0.811 1.000 0.811 drs 
Turkey Kayseri ASR 2011 ASR2011 0.671 0.585 0.585 0.872 irs 
Turkey Antalya AYT 2011 AYT2011 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 CRS 
Turkey 
Mugla-Milas 
Bodrum BJV 2011 BJV2011 0.733 0.691 0.691 0.942 irs 
Turkey Diyarbakir DIY 2011 DIY2011 0.929 0.845 0.845 0.910 irs 
Turkey Mugla-Dalaman DLM 2011 DLM2011 0.732 0.714 0.714 0.976 irs 
Turkey Denizli-Cardak DNZ 2011 DNZ2011 0.520 0.393 0.393 0.755 irs 
Turkey Erzincan ERC 2011 ERC2011 0.562 0.410 0.410 0.729 irs 
Turkey Erzurum ERZ 2011 ERZ2011 0.549 0.489 0.489 0.891 irs 
Turkey Ankara-Esenboga ESB 2011 ESB2011 1.000 0.716 1.000 0.716 drs 
Turkey Elazig EZS 2011 EZS2011 0.700 0.530 0.530 0.758 irs 
Turkey Sanliurfa-GAP GNY 2011 GNY2011 0.472 0.386 0.386 0.817 irs 
Turkey Gaziantep GZT 2011 GZT2011 0.575 0.541 0.541 0.941 irs 
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COUNTRY AIRPORT IATA YEAR DMU 
DEA 
Score-VRS 
DEA 
Score-CRS 
DEA Score-
NIRS SCALE 
Returns 
to Scale 
Turkey Hatay HTY 2011 HTY2011 0.672 0.534 0.534 0.795 irs 
Turkey Kahramanmaras KCM 2011 KCM2011 0.738 0.410 0.410 0.555 irs 
Turkey Kars KSY 2011 KSY2011 0.646 0.476 0.476 0.737 irs 
Turkey Konya KYA 2011 KYA2011 0.644 0.547 0.547 0.849 irs 
Turkey Malatya MLX 2011 MLX2011 0.666 0.574 0.574 0.861 irs 
Turkey Mus MSR 2011 MSR2011 0.768 0.465 0.465 0.605 irs 
Turkey Nevsehir-Kapadokya NAV 2011 NAV2011 0.533 0.390 0.390 0.732 irs 
Turkey Samsun-Carsamba SZF 2011 SZF2011 0.605 0.537 0.537 0.887 irs 
Turkey Tekirdag-Corlu TEQ 2011 TEQ2011 1.000 0.978 1.000 0.978 drs 
Turkey Trabzon TZX 2011 TZX2011 0.664 0.624 0.624 0.941 irs 
Turkey Usak USQ 2011 USQ2011 0.781 0.368 0.368 0.471 irs 
Turkey Van-Ferit Melen VAN 2011 VAN2011 0.795 0.672 0.672 0.845 irs 
Turkey Sivas-Nuri Demirag VAS 2011 VAS2011 0.542 0.411 0.411 0.759 irs 
Turkey Bursa-Yenisehir YEI 2011 YEI2011 0.470 0.428 0.428 0.912 irs 
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Dependent and independent variables used for the second stage OLS regression 
DMU 
DEA 
Score 
weekly 
opening 
hours 
bot (ppp) 
partnership 
(dummy) 
share of 
commercial 
revenues 
percentage 
of 
international 
traffic 
work load 
unit 
(airport 
size) 
population 
density 
seasonality 
measured 
by gini 
joint 
military-
civil airport 
(dummy) 
ABC2009 0.90 38.5 0 0.19 0.23 15127 26.6 0.188 1 
ABC2010 0.91 38.5 0 0.35 0.14 11293 26.6 0.180 1 
ABC2011 1.00 38.5 0 0.31 0.17 8415 26.6 0.384 1 
ACE2009 0.82 126.0 0 0.39 0.61 4702084 162.4 0.066 1 
ACE2010 0.87 126.0 0 0.39 0.61 4938722 162.5 0.072 1 
ACE2011 0.89 126.0 0 0.34 0.64 5544031 162.5 0.068 1 
AGP2009 1.00 168.0 0 0.39 0.81 11622770 216.4 0.182 1 
AGP2010 1.00 168.0 0 0.38 0.79 12064827 219.0 0.208 1 
AGP2011 1.00 168.0 0 0.33 0.79 12823416 221.3 0.200 1 
ALC2009 0.98 168.0 0 0.39 0.79 9139799 329.0 0.177 0 
ALC2010 1.00 168.0 0 0.40 0.78 9383242 329.9 0.183 0 
ALC2011 1.00 168.0 0 0.34 0.80 9914032 331.5 0.192 0 
BCN2009 0.95 168.0 0 0.34 0.63 27430664 693.1 0.100 0 
BCN2010 1.00 168.0 0 0.35 0.60 29219964 695.1 0.108 0 
BCN2011 1.00 168.0 0 0.30 0.60 34407883 695.4 0.115 0 
BIO2009 0.92 117.3 0 0.33 0.26 3655226 513.8 0.095 0 
BIO2010 0.93 117.3 0 0.34 0.26 3889210 513.7 0.099 0 
BIO2011 0.94 117.3 0 0.31 0.31 4046435 512.2 0.103 0 
BJZ2009 1.00 80.5 0 0.21 0.03 75351 31.8 0.103 1 
BJZ2010 1.00 80.5 0 0.56 0.04 61179 31.8 0.128 1 
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DMU 
DEA 
Score 
weekly 
opening 
hours 
bot (ppp) 
partnership 
(dummy) 
share of 
commercial 
revenues 
percentage 
of 
international 
traffic 
work load 
unit 
(airport 
size) 
population 
density 
seasonality 
measured 
by gini 
joint 
military-
civil airport 
(dummy) 
BJZ2011 1.00 80.5 0 0.40 0.04 56981 31.9 0.108 1 
EAS2009 0.72 98.0 0 0.35 0.01 315297 350.0 0.089 0 
EAS2010 0.74 98.0 0 0.37 0.01 286079 349.9 0.086 0 
EAS2011 0.75 98.0 0 0.42 0.02 248053 349.1 0.084 0 
FUE2009 0.73 108.5 0 0.42 0.67 3738683 56.7 0.062 0 
FUE2010 0.80 108.5 0 0.42 0.71 4173761 56.8 0.084 0 
FUE2011 0.82 108.5 0 0.38 0.75 4948174 56.8 0.073 0 
GMZ2009 0.85 70.0 0 0.79 0.00 34606 61.2 0.061 0 
GMZ2010 0.85 70.0 0 0.82 0.00 32489 61.5 0.121 0 
GMZ2011 1.00 70.0 0 0.78 0.00 32714 61.5 0.110 0 
GRO2009 1.00 168.0 0 0.33 0.87 5286977 123.0 0.158 0 
GRO2010 1.00 168.0 0 0.34 0.83 4863960 123.2 0.208 0 
GRO2011 0.76 168.0 0 0.35 0.93 3007983 123.6 0.202 0 
GRX2009 0.69 113.8 0 0.30 0.17 1187817 71.8 0.071 0 
GRX2010 0.67 113.8 0 0.34 0.11 978258 72.2 0.079 0 
GRX2011 0.66 113.8 0 0.33 0.07 872755 72.4 0.060 0 
IBZ2009 0.81 115.5 0 0.32 0.56 4573133 203.0 0.478 0 
IBZ2010 0.91 115.5 0 0.33 0.57 5041100 207.2 0.488 0 
IBZ2011 0.87 115.5 0 0.28 0.58 5643456 207.2 0.479 0 
LCG2009 0.70 126.0 0 0.28 0.09 1068847 142.6 0.066 0 
LCG2010 0.69 126.0 0 0.30 0.11 1101233 142.7 0.068 0 
LCG2011 0.69 126.0 0 0.39 0.13 1012825 142.7 0.060 0 
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DMU 
DEA 
Score 
weekly 
opening 
hours 
bot (ppp) 
partnership 
(dummy) 
share of 
commercial 
revenues 
percentage 
of 
international 
traffic 
work load 
unit 
(airport 
size) 
population 
density 
seasonality 
measured 
by gini 
joint 
military-
civil airport 
(dummy) 
LEI2009 0.61 115.5 0 0.46 0.49 791839 78.1 0.148 0 
LEI2010 0.64 115.5 0 0.49 0.36 786878 78.7 0.128 0 
LEI2011 0.65 115.5 0 0.46 0.39 780854 78.9 0.156 0 
LEN2009 0.78 80.5 0 0.28 0.07 95189 31.1 0.133 1 
LEN2010 0.77 80.5 0 0.51 0.04 93373 31.0 0.157 1 
LEN2011 0.82 80.5 0 0.57 0.06 85726 30.9 0.164 1 
LPA2009 0.95 168.0 0 0.38 0.55 9158265 539.9 0.073 1 
LPA2010 1.00 168.0 0 0.38 0.55 9488488 542.6 0.067 1 
LPA2011 0.99 168.0 0 0.34 0.57 10541197 542.6 0.066 1 
MAH2009 0.62 105.0 0 0.33 0.45 2433928 131.0 0.440 0 
MAH2010 0.68 105.0 0 0.33 0.45 2511869 131.5 0.456 0 
MAH2011 0.66 105.0 0 0.29 0.47 2576407 131.5 0.467 0 
MJV2009 0.90 105.0 0 0.39 0.93 1630685 128.6 0.232 1 
MJV2010 0.79 105.0 0 0.42 0.92 1349579 129.7 0.310 1 
MJV2011 0.74 105.0 0 0.42 0.92 1262597 130.4 0.347 1 
MLN2009 0.68 73.5 0 0.28 0.00 293730 5316.6 0.050 0 
MLN2010 0.70 73.5 0 0.23 0.00 292642 5466.0 0.046 0 
MLN2011 0.73 73.5 0 0.28 0.00 286728 5611.0 0.054 0 
ODB2009 1.00 42.0 0 0.68 0.02 15474 57.5 0.202 0 
ODB2010 0.94 42.0 0 0.76 0.04 7852 57.6 0.314 0 
ODB2011 1.00 42.0 0 0.59 0.01 8442 57.7 0.166 0 
OVD2009 0.70 113.8 0 0.30 0.13 1316223 100.1 0.099 0 
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DMU 
DEA 
Score 
weekly 
opening 
hours 
bot (ppp) 
partnership 
(dummy) 
share of 
commercial 
revenues 
percentage 
of 
international 
traffic 
work load 
unit 
(airport 
size) 
population 
density 
seasonality 
measured 
by gini 
joint 
military-
civil airport 
(dummy) 
OVD2010 0.73 113.8 0 0.30 0.12 1355375 99.9 0.114 0 
OVD2011 0.68 113.8 0 0.32 0.12 1339024 99.7 0.091 0 
PMI2009 0.98 168.0 0 0.29 0.70 21204750 233.6 0.300 1 
PMI2010 1.00 168.0 0 0.29 0.71 21119146 235.3 0.319 1 
PMI2011 1.00 168.0 0 0.24 0.73 22728285 235.3 0.343 1 
PNA2009 0.67 105.0 0 0.34 0.03 335617 59.6 0.102 0 
PNA2010 0.66 105.0 0 0.35 0.04 291557 60.0 0.105 0 
PNA2011 0.65 105.0 0 0.36 0.04 238514 60.2 0.091 0 
REU2009 0.81 98.0 0 0.27 0.78 1706616 126.8 0.388 0 
REU2010 0.86 98.0 0 0.30 0.85 1419876 127.3 0.427 0 
REU2011 0.75 98.0 0 0.29 0.87 1362687 127.8 0.464 0 
RGS2009 0.89 28.0 0 0.28 0.14 27716 25.6 0.199 0 
RGS2010 0.85 28.0 0 0.30 0.09 33595 25.4 0.274 0 
RGS2011 1.00 28.0 0 0.17 0.16 35447 25.3 0.226 0 
RJL2009 0.78 35.0 0 0.48 0.01 35663 62.6 0.213 0 
RJL2010 0.71 35.0 0 0.46 0.12 24527 62.3 0.233 0 
RJL2011 0.75 35.0 0 0.49 0.04 17877 62.2 0.164 0 
SCQ2009 0.62 168.0 0 0.34 0.13 1944267 142.6 0.104 1 
SCQ2010 0.65 168.0 0 0.36 0.12 2173065 142.7 0.105 1 
SCQ2011 0.64 168.0 0 0.35 0.10 2464509 142.7 0.117 1 
SDR2009 0.83 108.5 0 0.30 0.36 958158 109.7 0.111 0 
SDR2010 0.77 108.5 0 0.31 0.35 919871 109.9 0.131 0 
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DMU 
DEA 
Score 
weekly 
opening 
hours 
bot (ppp) 
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SDR2011 0.84 108.5 0 0.27 0.32 1116398 110.0 0.129 0 
SLM2009 1.00 45.5 0 0.19 0.10 53088 28.3 0.316 1 
SLM2010 1.00 45.5 0 0.30 0.09 43179 28.2 0.353 1 
SLM2011 1.00 45.5 0 0.17 0.08 37257 28.1 0.263 1 
SPC2009 0.67 94.5 0 0.52 0.24 1043382 123.5 0.050 0 
SPC2010 0.66 94.5 0 0.56 0.24 992457 123.8 0.066 0 
SPC2011 0.67 94.5 0 0.55 0.22 1067516 123.8 0.054 0 
SVQ2009 0.77 129.5 0 0.35 0.28 4051890 134.1 0.090 0 
SVQ2010 0.79 129.5 0 0.34 0.31 4225265 135.1 0.070 0 
SVQ2011 0.82 129.5 0 0.28 0.33 4959872 135.9 0.088 0 
TFN2009 1.00 117.3 0 0.36 0.04 4055978 436.5 0.060 0 
TFN2010 1.00 117.3 0 0.38 0.02 4052950 440.0 0.055 0 
TFN2011 0.96 117.3 0 0.34 0.01 4096678 440.0 0.055 0 
TFS2009 0.73 168.0 0 0.42 0.84 7108592 436.5 0.080 0 
TFS2010 0.80 168.0 0 0.42 0.85 7359415 440.0 0.080 0 
TFS2011 0.90 168.0 0 0.35 0.88 8656935 440.0 0.071 0 
VDE2009 1.00 70.0 0 0.64 0.00 183906 38.8 0.067 0 
VDE2010 1.00 70.0 0 0.71 0.00 170983 39.2 0.067 0 
VDE2011 1.00 70.0 0 0.63 0.00 170239 39.2 0.071 0 
VGO2009 0.69 126.0 0 0.30 0.09 1103365 211.8 0.089 0 
VGO2010 0.66 126.0 0 0.30 0.09 1093666 212.3 0.091 0 
VGO2011 0.59 126.0 0 0.32 0.12 976263 212.3 0.076 0 
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VIT2009 0.79 84.0 0 0.30 0.05 42672 513.8 0.181 0 
VIT2010 0.80 84.0 0 0.34 0.07 44869 513.7 0.337 0 
VIT2011 1.00 84.0 0 0.34 0.12 31680 512.2 0.485 0 
VLC2009 1.00 168.0 0 0.34 0.51 4749976 235.1 0.124 0 
VLC2010 1.00 168.0 0 0.35 0.53 4935411 235.2 0.114 0 
VLC2011 0.93 168.0 0 0.34 0.62 4980562 235.2 0.111 0 
VLL2009 0.74 89.3 0 0.34 0.60 365728 65.0 0.171 1 
VLL2010 0.76 89.3 0 0.37 0.52 392692 65.1 0.186 1 
VLL2011 0.67 89.3 0 0.37 0.35 462509 65.2 0.138 1 
XRY2009 0.93 112.0 0 0.44 0.36 1079628 169.0 0.176 0 
XRY2010 0.84 112.0 0 0.46 0.38 1043176 169.9 0.179 0 
XRY2011 1.00 112.0 0 0.46 0.37 1032498 170.7 0.211 0 
ZAZ2009 0.96 113.8 0 0.21 0.58 532002 55.3 0.131 1 
ZAZ2010 1.00 113.8 0 0.21 0.61 610166 55.5 0.173 1 
ZAZ2011 1.00 113.8 0 0.22 0.58 755962 55.7 0.116 1 
ADA2009 0.70 168.0 0 0.49 0.17 2482958 146.9 0.053 0 
ADA2010 0.79 168.0 0 0.48 0.15 2842016 149.0 0.034 0 
ADA2011 0.79 168.0 0 0.49 0.18 3241533 149.0 0.036 0 
ADB2009 0.65 168.0 1 0.37 0.27 6203141 319.0 0.125 0 
ADB2010 0.92 168.0 1 0.45 0.28 7486871 325.4 0.118 0 
ADB2011 1.00 168.0 1 0.41 0.28 8525192 325.4 0.113 0 
ADF2009 1.00 59.5 0 0.67 0.00 85117 83.4 0.055 0 
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ADF2010 0.98 59.5 0 0.53 0.00 108513 83.8 0.048 0 
ASR2009 0.66 168.0 0 0.44 0.27 778667 70.1 0.140 1 
ASR2010 0.66 168.0 0 0.42 0.23 940278 71.6 0.117 1 
ASR2011 0.67 168.0 0 0.42 0.21 1223795 71.6 0.134 1 
AYT2009 0.95 168.0 1 0.54 0.83 18346379 91.2 0.391 0 
AYT2010 1.00 168.0 1 0.58 0.83 22013917 94.1 0.381 0 
AYT2011 1.00 168.0 1 0.53 0.82 25028398 94.1 0.365 0 
BJV2009 0.68 168.0 1 0.45 0.65 2780968 62.0 0.536 0 
BJV2010 0.71 168.0 1 0.64 0.62 3085201 63.0 0.521 0 
BJV2011 0.73 168.0 1 0.63 0.59 3388348 63.0 0.515 0 
DIY2009 0.82 168.0 0 0.46 0.01 1060476 99.9 0.039 1 
DIY2010 1.00 168.0 0 0.53 0.01 1404691 101.1 0.056 1 
DIY2011 0.93 168.0 0 0.47 0.01 1733464 101.1 0.068 1 
DLM2009 0.70 168.0 1 0.23 0.86 3348046 62.0 0.562 1 
DLM2010 0.74 168.0 1 0.26 0.84 3785798 63.0 0.545 1 
DLM2011 0.73 168.0 1 0.17 0.81 3732394 63.0 0.538 1 
DNZ2009 0.57 168.0 0 0.60 0.02 150780 78.9 0.055 1 
DNZ2011 0.52 168.0 0 0.43 0.04 174644 79.5 0.046 1 
ERC2009 0.65 61.5 0 0.71 0.00 127031 18.2 0.118 1 
ERC2011 0.56 61.5 0 0.55 0.00 207077 18.9 0.127 1 
ERZ2009 0.57 168.0 0 0.53 0.03 599020 30.6 0.073 1 
ERZ2010 0.61 168.0 0 0.60 0.02 765085 30.5 0.051 1 
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ERZ2011 0.55 168.0 0 0.54 0.02 805374 30.5 0.052 1 
ESB2009 0.66 168.0 1 0.11 0.18 6085748 187.6 0.059 0 
ESB2010 0.82 168.0 1 0.25 0.17 7765424 192.1 0.075 0 
ESB2011 1.00 168.0 1 0.23 0.17 8486989 192.1 0.042 0 
EZS2009 0.66 168.0 0 0.55 0.00 344855 64.9 0.366 1 
EZS2010 0.71 168.0 0 0.48 0.05 470068 65.2 0.072 1 
EZS2011 0.70 168.0 0 0.32 0.06 549072 65.2 0.111 1 
GNY2009 0.47 126.0 0 0.66 0.02 181158 84.9 0.082 0 
GNY2010 0.48 126.0 0 0.49 0.02 221040 87.3 0.056 0 
GNY2011 0.47 126.0 0 0.35 0.03 231330 87.3 0.071 0 
GZT2009 0.54 168.0 0 0.51 0.15 833083 239.5 0.085 0 
GZT2010 0.56 168.0 0 0.44 0.09 1040064 246.0 0.046 0 
GZT2011 0.57 168.0 0 0.44 0.11 1314615 246.0 0.050 0 
HTY2009 0.74 168.0 0 0.73 0.28 325310 245.5 0.061 0 
HTY2010 0.77 168.0 0 0.40 0.24 574629 251.3 0.094 0 
HTY2011 0.67 168.0 0 0.40 0.20 689592 251.3 0.072 0 
ISE2010 0.59 51.0 0 0.52 0.23 33411 52.5 0.229 0 
KCM2009 0.89 55.0 0 0.86 0.00 81423 72.0 0.090 0 
KCM2011 0.74 55.0 0 0.41 0.00 95746 72.6 0.034 0 
KSY2009 0.68 63.0 0 0.51 0.01 288012 30.5 0.056 0 
KSY2010 0.68 63.0 0 0.40 0.01 332290 30.0 0.070 0 
KSY2011 0.65 63.0 0 0.38 0.00 377588 30.0 0.041 0 
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KYA2009 0.64 168.0 0 0.39 0.11 301724 51.0 0.150 1 
KYA2010 0.68 168.0 0 0.42 0.09 545499 51.5 0.081 1 
KYA2011 0.64 168.0 0 0.34 0.12 600881 51.5 0.077 1 
MLX2009 0.86 168.0 0 0.54 0.05 462925 62.4 0.088 1 
MLX2010 0.78 168.0 0 0.44 0.03 520487 62.7 0.080 1 
MLX2011 0.67 168.0 0 0.47 0.03 570636 62.7 0.082 1 
MQM2009 0.86 122.5 0 0.63 0.00 233288 84.5 0.049 0 
MQM2010 0.76 122.5 0 0.40 0.00 305933 84.2 0.087 0 
MSR2009 0.82 67.0 0 0.31 0.01 115796 50.2 0.096 1 
MSR2010 0.80 67.0 0 0.52 0.01 179811 50.3 0.043 1 
MSR2011 0.77 67.0 0 0.32 0.00 196551 50.3 0.052 1 
MZH2009 0.92 73.5 0 0.52 0.00 39577 56.9 0.169 1 
MZH2010 0.83 73.5 0 0.43 0.01 64393 57.9 0.142 1 
NAV2009 0.53 79.8 0 0.33 0.32 122756 52.6 0.255 0 
NAV2010 0.54 79.8 0 0.15 0.29 137909 52.6 0.199 0 
NAV2011 0.53 79.8 0 0.14 0.19 157793 52.6 0.258 0 
SZF2009 0.58 168.0 0 0.58 0.10 866868 136.7 0.104 0 
SZF2010 0.58 168.0 0 0.51 0.07 957391 137.8 0.047 0 
SZF2011 0.61 168.0 0 0.51 0.08 1155192 137.8 0.055 0 
TEQ2009 0.89 168.0 0 0.35 0.25 40910 123.1 0.326 1 
TEQ2010 1.00 168.0 0 0.16 0.14 74738 125.3 0.178 1 
TEQ2011 1.00 168.0 0 0.13 0.01 43305 125.3 0.113 1 
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TZX2009 0.62 168.0 0 0.54 0.04 1597050 162.3 0.070 0 
TZX2010 0.65 168.0 0 0.58 0.03 1963370 163.9 0.067 0 
TZX2011 0.66 168.0 0 0.55 0.04 2280303 163.9 0.081 0 
USQ2011 0.78 42.5 0 0.41 0.00 15267 63.1 0.361 1 
VAN2009 0.79 168.0 0 0.69 0.00 745542 52.5 0.055 0 
VAN2010 0.82 168.0 0 0.57 0.00 892124 53.3 0.054 0 
VAN2011 0.80 168.0 0 0.54 0.00 1057259 53.3 0.072 0 
VAS2009 0.73 168.0 0 0.69 0.02 124143 22.1 0.061 0 
VAS2010 0.60 168.0 0 0.40 0.04 111463 22.3 0.069 0 
VAS2011 0.54 168.0 0 0.54 0.03 228606 22.3 0.181 0 
YEI2009 0.48 168.0 0 0.46 0.18 73535 242.7 0.137 1 
YEI2010 0.47 168.0 0 0.31 0.35 97546 247.4 0.183 1 
YEI2011 0.47 168.0 0 0.25 0.40 111554 247.4 0.147 1 
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STATA output to the second stage regression 
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
Dependent and independent variables from Norwegian airports used for the spatial regression 
Airport IATA Year costppax wlu subs aerrev noncommatm pso deprppax 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 56.35 8311 1.50 8.17 83% 1 6.09 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 68.67 9258 1.17 7.00 76% 1 142.26 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 116.67 11357 0.93 7.52 12% 1 33.60 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 182.45 8439 0.93 7.68 78% 1 33.39 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 163.47 8863 0.92 6.53 78% 1 95.86 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 46.69 13349 0.92 9.31 11% 0 4.92 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 165.94 8367 0.92 7.52 80% 1 102.70 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 101.99 12901 0.92 6.77 8% 1 27.68 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 119.08 12100 0.92 7.01 8% 1 15.39 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 97.78 14507 0.92 6.50 11% 1 29.98 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 100.12 11026 0.92 7.44 9% 1 34.66 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 124.91 7767 0.91 7.66 14% 1 38.14 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 120.47 13271 0.91 7.04 66% 1 23.78 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 128.64 7963 0.91 7.36 12% 1 39.97 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 110.92 9428 0.91 7.14 13% 1 31.56 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 125.12 9390 0.91 7.56 14% 1 17.07 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 130.05 10590 0.90 10.04 16% 1 21.07 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 97.45 10617 0.90 8.08 12% 1 33.41 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 113.63 10758 0.90 7.33 83% 1 76.40 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 89.61 16075 0.90 7.45 7% 1 21.79 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 98.88 15123 0.89 7.89 6% 1 24.15 
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Airport IATA Year costppax wlu subs aerrev noncommatm pso deprppax 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 116.32 10349 0.89 10.41 80% 1 81.37 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 116.26 10524 0.89 9.88 15% 1 21.09 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 71.88 18223 0.89 7.45 17% 1 20.57 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 80.33 15903 0.88 7.32 8% 1 21.64 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 69.10 26278 0.88 6.53 6% 1 11.49 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 64.41 23574 0.88 6.46 13% 1 12.59 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 83.65 16630 0.88 7.24 7% 1 55.96 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 88.06 15402 0.88 9.47 22% 1 24.63 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 64.46 25735 0.88 6.59 9% 0 8.31 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 95.37 12831 0.88 9.24 7% 1 25.99 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 72.55 21440 0.88 7.91 11% 0 18.96 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 61.65 24363 0.88 6.87 10% 0 18.21 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 62.53 20958 0.88 6.87 14% 1 17.21 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 66.63 21463 0.88 6.85 15% 1 10.32 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 64.58 23182 0.88 6.55 11% 1 12.86 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 70.75 24433 0.87 7.05 12% 0 8.23 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 72.45 22920 0.87 6.25 16% 1 8.03 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 65.59 27227 0.87 6.77 11% 1 10.01 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 101.43 13772 0.86 9.30 35% 1 31.92 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 64.51 25860 0.86 6.70 10% 0 8.98 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 87.64 18395 0.86 11.12 8% 0 21.84 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 95.14 12143 0.86 10.25 6% 1 27.40 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 57.82 26200 0.86 6.74 10% 0 27.53 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 51.41 27931 0.86 6.01 11% 0 6.52 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 79.43 8989 0.85 7.87 10% 1 35.40 
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Airport IATA Year costppax wlu subs aerrev noncommatm pso deprppax 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 53.73 24903 0.85 6.52 9% 0 6.50 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 53.49 24921 0.85 6.43 9% 0 8.57 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 46.92 37598 0.85 6.30 14% 1 8.55 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 114.70 15812 0.85 7.29 69% 1 17.35 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 61.02 44067 0.84 7.76 5% 0 3.44 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 53.49 33986 0.84 7.36 26% 1 9.06 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 55.45 26816 0.84 6.53 10% 0 7.21 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 68.35 24279 0.84 8.18 18% 1 9.45 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 104.94 34977 0.84 8.28 8% 0 4.38 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 49.57 24437 0.84 6.97 11% 0 14.75 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 62.23 25872 0.84 7.84 16% 1 9.84 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 46.53 38705 0.84 6.20 12% 1 6.58 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 60.32 22152 0.84 7.95 14% 0 34.10 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 75.02 48251 0.83 6.59 3% 1 2.23 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 53.45 23867 0.83 8.17 15% 1 15.21 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 46.21 39031 0.83 6.33 22% 1 9.56 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 38.09 43716 0.83 5.99 15% 1 9.65 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 56.49 25790 0.83 7.65 15% 1 10.98 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 64.76 21705 0.83 8.96 12% 0 35.53 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 69.64 19305 0.83 10.64 10% 1 18.86 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 53.25 26618 0.83 7.74 29% 1 19.22 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 39.74 38574 0.83 6.16 10% 1 10.88 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 55.18 33061 0.82 7.45 27% 1 10.67 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 58.86 13508 0.82 9.22 10% 1 19.59 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 42.89 37609 0.82 6.66 30% 1 5.49 
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Airport IATA Year costppax wlu subs aerrev noncommatm pso deprppax 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 47.10 35380 0.82 6.33 15% 1 9.21 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 82.78 43071 0.82 6.97 4% 0 3.61 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 46.84 37650 0.82 6.15 13% 1 7.77 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 43.56 36990 0.82 7.16 18% 1 11.06 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 39.30 40281 0.82 6.50 17% 1 12.64 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 71.86 46804 0.82 6.77 2% 0 1.96 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 68.10 50316 0.82 6.68 3% 1 2.35 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 33.80 20596 0.81 9.13 15% 0 5.54 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 56.31 22037 0.81 9.28 12% 1 16.47 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 39.71 44443 0.81 6.17 19% 1 4.06 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 45.08 34501 0.81 6.80 11% 1 14.83 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 55.60 20704 0.81 8.77 12% 0 17.12 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 61.65 11121 0.81 7.50 17% 1 26.88 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 45.22 23502 0.81 7.14 10% 0 15.45 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 39.70 34497 0.81 7.11 27% 1 13.54 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 35.16 33777 0.81 6.10 7% 1 15.17 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 40.83 44715 0.80 6.24 13% 1 5.35 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 229.56 6450 0.80 14.57 57% 1 49.33 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 42.70 28819 0.80 7.41 8% 1 18.58 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 55.90 44055 0.80 10.45 8% 0 3.41 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 36.38 35258 0.80 6.09 10% 1 7.10 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 51.64 11133 0.79 7.65 18% 1 7.75 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 43.68 33720 0.79 7.51 10% 1 12.59 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 81.64 14322 0.79 12.94 31% 1 33.81 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 36.56 30560 0.79 6.65 8% 1 18.75 
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Airport IATA Year costppax wlu subs aerrev noncommatm pso deprppax 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 61.16 11203 0.78 2.80 16% 0 9.23 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 43.27 20717 0.78 9.47 14% 0 12.15 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 47.18 18126 0.78 7.68 22% 1 18.70 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 29.98 54414 0.77 6.16 24% 1 6.53 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 38.15 17660 0.77 8.04 23% 1 7.62 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 22.91 29035 0.76 7.07 8% 1 3.09 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 247.00 5850 0.76 14.48 57% 1 57.44 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 32.92 77084 0.75 6.45 9% 1 4.93 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 24.39 94661 0.75 5.23 9% 1 3.93 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 25.13 93985 0.75 5.39 7% 1 4.57 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 28.81 49845 0.75 6.43 27% 1 7.18 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 32.99 72426 0.75 6.52 9% 1 3.59 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 30.49 44843 0.75 7.07 26% 1 7.82 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 81.28 56990 0.75 6.78 25% 1 9.22 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 30.31 76324 0.74 6.37 10% 1 8.05 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 82.12 58362 0.74 6.87 24% 1 9.46 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 21.08 95986 0.73 5.08 8% 1 5.81 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 78.44 10904 0.73 19.62 12% 1 29.34 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 24.66 88796 0.73 5.51 9% 1 3.88 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 31.53 73157 0.73 7.41 13% 1 5.18 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 21.15 93248 0.72 5.52 6% 1 5.83 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 74.20 59724 0.72 6.58 26% 1 11.61 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 29.66 75426 0.72 7.23 9% 1 4.86 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 59.59 9363 0.71 5.91 12% 1 30.87 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 206.24 7419 0.71 14.73 46% 1 29.18 
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Airport IATA Year costppax wlu subs aerrev noncommatm pso deprppax 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 65.51 16003 0.71 17.65 22% 1 23.52 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 86.84 15674 0.71 9.21 52% 1 51.47 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 46.39 18271 0.71 7.51 13% 0 13.76 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 109.95 12846 0.71 9.18 53% 1 60.51 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 26.77 88957 0.71 6.47 16% 1 3.53 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 22.54 83290 0.71 6.15 7% 1 6.01 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 75.37 55051 0.71 6.70 22% 1 10.56 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 28.90 70488 0.70 6.90 9% 1 8.94 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 29.17 80047 0.70 6.73 11% 1 5.12 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 24.34 87463 0.70 6.22 12% 1 5.43 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 74.36 56099 0.70 7.14 21% 1 9.71 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 69.39 18861 0.69 19.79 9% 0 17.91 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 27.96 66218 0.69 7.76 8% 1 4.48 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 24.69 99555 0.69 6.53 19% 1 2.70 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 23.92 130894 0.69 6.20 23% 1 4.22 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 25.82 81157 0.68 6.83 38% 0 2.99 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 25.57 93709 0.68 6.50 15% 1 3.04 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 22.95 91830 0.68 6.32 21% 0 3.78 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 60.04 21436 0.68 17.46 12% 0 14.20 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 26.00 123295 0.68 6.73 26% 1 4.44 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 90.31 12267 0.68 25.98 9% 1 24.14 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 25.74 71540 0.68 7.45 8% 1 4.56 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 23.69 78541 0.68 6.26 24% 1 2.58 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 35.13 36775 0.67 10.53 26% 1 9.80 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 25.32 79633 0.67 6.85 43% 0 2.49 
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Airport IATA Year costppax wlu subs aerrev noncommatm pso deprppax 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 25.25 77264 0.67 6.97 16% 1 6.49 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 29.30 31314 0.67 6.44 24% 1 10.41 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 28.50 31058 0.67 7.09 13% 1 11.10 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 119.93 6010 0.67 11.10 66% 1 20.35 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 19.27 39019 0.67 6.16 35% 1 5.58 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 45.85 21168 0.66 12.98 11% 0 14.32 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 27.79 68303 0.66 7.52 12% 1 8.73 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 24.45 99379 0.66 6.65 20% 1 2.96 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 21.41 102042 0.66 6.15 8% 1 5.86 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 73.83 17722 0.66 9.99 53% 1 44.76 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 47.09 22730 0.66 14.21 12% 0 33.33 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 26.16 64025 0.66 8.00 10% 1 5.55 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 25.10 82006 0.65 6.78 44% 0 2.86 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 21.65 98244 0.65 6.28 24% 0 3.56 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 22.78 76287 0.65 6.68 44% 0 6.30 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 21.24 99785 0.65 6.18 7% 1 5.44 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 24.10 66933 0.65 7.65 48% 0 7.66 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 23.13 89042 0.65 6.72 19% 1 2.25 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 22.05 111107 0.64 6.43 15% 1 3.22 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 22.18 106800 0.64 6.51 15% 1 3.25 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 22.31 71050 0.64 7.05 43% 0 7.01 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 21.29 99565 0.64 6.34 8% 1 6.46 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 29.68 14956 0.63 6.71 10% 1 4.49 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 72.22 52999 0.63 7.87 23% 1 7.96 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 22.25 87492 0.63 6.85 18% 1 4.20 
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Airport IATA Year costppax wlu subs aerrev noncommatm pso deprppax 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 19.14 100729 0.62 6.19 9% 1 4.43 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 22.17 105624 0.62 6.41 21% 1 2.72 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 19.72 34829 0.62 6.27 34% 1 1.84 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 20.27 90128 0.62 6.58 17% 1 4.95 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 34.60 24134 0.62 7.45 15% 0 30.07 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 23.71 227883 0.62 6.50 22% 1 8.02 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 25.75 30366 0.62 6.67 33% 1 3.78 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 28.04 29174 0.62 7.39 17% 1 4.18 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 27.82 29840 0.62 6.51 9% 1 15.05 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 20.87 106928 0.61 6.55 16% 1 2.61 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 22.42 108876 0.61 6.47 23% 1 2.58 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 23.70 78046 0.61 7.42 20% 1 6.15 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 25.50 99525 0.61 8.40 31% 0 13.22 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 19.01 104168 0.61 6.36 14% 1 4.92 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 26.68 333632 0.61 6.42 28% 0 6.71 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 40.76 23268 0.60 6.62 28% 1 18.42 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 25.86 31935 0.60 6.91 11% 0 3.37 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 24.60 61557 0.60 8.71 12% 1 5.44 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 20.71 64150 0.60 7.44 48% 0 7.62 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 20.18 91522 0.60 6.83 9% 1 5.19 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 20.86 140118 0.60 7.37 28% 1 2.71 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 20.44 103664 0.59 6.38 20% 1 2.34 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 18.84 83490 0.59 7.37 9% 1 4.75 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 30.45 99754 0.59 9.35 38% 0 10.34 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 19.14 334187 0.59 6.28 27% 0 3.60 
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Anonymised Anonymised 2006 20.52 95208 0.59 6.74 19% 1 5.70 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 27.70 97385 0.59 9.43 34% 0 6.88 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 26.45 43555 0.58 10.13 27% 1 5.93 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 29.11 87771 0.58 6.46 19% 1 2.47 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 34.82 31857 0.58 6.55 11% 0 10.74 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 27.39 25743 0.58 7.67 13% 0 6.62 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 18.50 101371 0.58 6.57 15% 1 4.67 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 21.43 79474 0.58 7.60 20% 1 4.82 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 17.99 148576 0.58 6.61 25% 1 5.18 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 22.74 190585 0.58 6.43 36% 0 1.64 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 39.22 28806 0.58 15.49 10% 1 17.49 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 22.73 181218 0.57 6.21 39% 0 1.77 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 38.89 32033 0.57 14.98 10% 1 12.34 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 25.44 155061 0.57 6.96 75% 1 2.09 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 23.05 175611 0.57 6.30 39% 0 1.75 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 19.70 95642 0.57 7.29 16% 1 5.00 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 24.46 169462 0.57 6.54 68% 1 2.85 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 18.43 102785 0.57 6.28 19% 1 5.20 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 19.67 88058 0.57 7.49 9% 1 5.61 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 20.64 91704 0.56 7.21 20% 1 6.11 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 19.84 239484 0.56 6.30 21% 1 6.38 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 18.98 281545 0.56 6.18 24% 1 4.44 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 18.96 265480 0.56 6.36 21% 1 4.92 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 18.75 60201 0.55 6.83 51% 0 6.98 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 28.60 156235 0.55 9.62 77% 1 1.76 
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Anonymised Anonymised 2007 23.08 174987 0.55 6.33 39% 1 2.63 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 69.82 14550 0.54 12.46 68% 1 53.74 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 17.15 353239 0.53 6.33 26% 0 1.66 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 18.53 277736 0.53 6.35 21% 1 4.95 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 27.59 88317 0.52 10.79 37% 0 10.23 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 24.22 110922 0.51 10.39 31% 1 5.64 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 18.72 143621 0.51 7.83 26% 1 5.55 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 13.21 83490 0.50 5.48 10% 1 4.30 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 14.91 388640 0.50 6.16 24% 0 2.43 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 16.00 82681 0.49 6.87 22% 1 4.17 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 17.65 55635 0.48 7.42 51% 1 2.16 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 23.01 130404 0.47 9.49 42% 0 7.75 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 17.52 220913 0.47 6.97 22% 1 5.07 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 21.61 42345 0.46 7.14 26% 1 3.61 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 21.63 65481 0.45 10.13 13% 1 8.42 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 22.38 118195 0.45 10.63 32% 1 5.76 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 13.51 416332 0.45 6.28 24% 0 2.59 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 26.72 89071 0.44 11.94 39% 0 10.39 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 47.68 125858 0.44 7.93 38% 0 12.21 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 122.61 10493 0.43 8.51 72% 1 60.06 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 20.19 112044 0.43 10.36 31% 1 10.34 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 17.79 90669 0.42 8.63 25% 1 5.07 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 16.82 62489 0.42 8.64 10% 1 6.12 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 42.00 129412 0.42 7.71 37% 0 12.15 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 13.02 70255 0.42 6.89 9% 1 2.37 
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Anonymised Anonymised 2008 16.55 337089 0.41 6.60 22% 0 2.56 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 17.60 352506 0.41 6.84 22% 0 2.48 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 17.70 135836 0.40 9.13 30% 1 5.71 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 66.81 58615 0.40 24.16 22% 1 2.53 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 19.73 77752 0.39 10.36 18% 1 5.59 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 19.81 104283 0.39 11.07 29% 1 11.29 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 16.31 498572 0.38 6.27 14% 1 4.36 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 14.21 96891 0.38 7.82 15% 1 4.52 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 16.15 159148 0.37 8.64 37% 0 3.89 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 13.06 358575 0.37 6.86 27% 0 2.98 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 15.38 79928 0.36 6.08 22% 1 3.23 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 13.21 406795 0.36 6.34 18% 0 3.11 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 11.07 84821 0.35 5.88 21% 1 1.17 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 16.10 136795 0.35 9.36 23% 1 4.49 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 16.23 393120 0.34 6.92 23% 0 2.26 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 15.00 308849 0.32 9.21 29% 0 4.11 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 14.62 73211 0.32 7.12 19% 1 1.95 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 14.26 118999 0.32 6.31 24% 1 3.92 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 18.45 111793 0.32 11.65 29% 1 10.12 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 16.30 70734 0.32 6.64 10% 1 6.74 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 16.85 214837 0.32 9.45 23% 1 4.43 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 15.74 89267 0.32 9.74 10% 1 5.45 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 10.35 71787 0.31 6.33 8% 1 1.02 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 14.73 93321 0.30 6.30 25% 1 3.89 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 13.74 64425 0.30 6.83 10% 1 4.24 
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Anonymised Anonymised 2008 41.23 139018 0.30 8.06 27% 0 10.52 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 15.56 82414 0.29 6.14 17% 1 2.91 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 14.27 486580 0.29 6.50 13% 1 4.83 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 15.69 506551 0.29 6.60 16% 1 2.07 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 14.65 514102 0.28 6.42 16% 1 2.22 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 14.86 78803 0.28 6.57 16% 1 4.67 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 11.74 91799 0.28 6.54 23% 1 2.10 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 12.76 106091 0.27 6.61 26% 1 6.73 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 11.60 89316 0.27 6.77 10% 1 4.32 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 38.61 129403 0.26 7.96 32% 0 8.30 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 11.10 83827 0.26 6.21 18% 1 1.32 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 10.17 85627 0.25 6.66 11% 1 1.73 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 14.56 551616 0.23 6.66 13% 1 1.97 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 20.71 79361 0.23 13.11 33% 0 11.64 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 13.24 469877 0.22 6.82 15% 1 4.54 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 11.98 79016 0.22 6.05 7% 1 1.51 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 35.18 128185 0.22 7.90 33% 0 8.40 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 18.34 108047 0.21 13.63 29% 1 10.39 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 14.94 514983 0.21 7.11 21% 1 2.76 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 10.75 357192 0.20 6.87 23% 0 2.82 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 10.02 1606553 0.18 5.89 20% 0 1.91 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 16.66 73792 0.17 11.53 34% 0 4.39 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 16.14 347572 0.16 10.93 57% 1 1.80 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 13.80 446016 0.15 8.67 18% 1 4.58 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 10.03 1647826 0.15 5.93 21% 0 0.82 
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Anonymised Anonymised 2003 18.43 77807 0.15 11.25 37% 0 10.33 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 40.75 95331 0.15 10.26 32% 0 9.17 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 17.40 558964 0.13 7.61 25% 1 1.92 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 20.70 270551 0.13 14.34 55% 1 2.55 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 9.99 1630279 0.13 5.99 22% 0 0.93 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 15.12 531762 0.12 7.08 26% 1 1.78 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 13.16 774338 0.12 6.52 23% 1 0.97 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 20.43 273314 0.09 15.07 58% 1 2.33 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 9.78 1649848 0.09 6.13 21% 0 1.07 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 11.50 321569 0.09 8.91 25% 1 2.97 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 34.90 93197 0.08 11.00 36% 0 9.34 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 9.10 444819 0.08 6.34 19% 0 2.48 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 15.45 532382 0.07 7.54 26% 1 1.94 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 20.18 257642 0.05 15.33 51% 1 4.64 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 12.57 490739 0.05 7.08 23% 1 2.92 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 20.68 216221 0.04 17.54 44% 1 5.07 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 18.73 279178 0.03 14.59 53% 1 4.14 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 8.48 1557775 0.02 6.00 21% 0 1.98 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 4.23 635005 0.00 5.71 23% 1 2.58 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 7.40 251385 0.00 5.82 32% 0 2.69 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 43.01 43873 0.00 6.74 10% 0 2.72 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 11.23 161223 0.00 5.75 80% 1 2.02 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 3.83 1275529 0.00 6.76 15% 0 1.87 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 7.71 397631 0.00 5.63 21% 0 1.65 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 10.81 91571 0.00 11.52 35% 1 2.74 
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Anonymised Anonymised 2002 5.02 345455 0.00 7.12 21% 1 1.33 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 8.68 202303 0.00 5.69 24% 1 6.43 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 4.56 737292 0.00 7.59 22% 1 1.06 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 11.61 207804 0.00 14.52 53% 1 2.63 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 25.42 71220 0.00 6.57 25% 0 1.36 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 30.03 86391 0.00 9.45 31% 0 9.36 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 8.39 275488 0.00 5.74 30% 1 2.24 
Anonymised Anonymised 2002 3.42 1378285 0.00 5.46 24% 0 1.94 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 5.46 636201 0.00 5.87 22% 1 1.92 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 8.96 261669 0.00 5.92 32% 0 4.25 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 41.68 42348 0.00 8.04 7% 0 2.48 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 9.51 151316 0.00 6.01 81% 1 2.06 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 6.58 1243170 0.00 7.47 16% 0 1.55 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 13.18 393310 0.00 5.56 20% 0 3.59 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 15.86 96887 0.00 10.86 30% 1 9.19 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 7.01 376889 0.00 7.14 21% 1 2.21 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 9.32 204779 0.00 6.19 24% 1 3.82 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 6.27 695101 0.00 7.43 22% 1 2.10 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 14.59 200324 0.00 15.23 49% 1 4.26 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 33.63 47540 0.00 7.51 29% 1 8.63 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 31.78 86475 0.00 9.54 33% 0 9.27 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 8.85 298662 0.00 6.08 25% 1 2.57 
Anonymised Anonymised 2003 5.66 1349485 0.00 5.86 23% 0 1.77 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 7.71 706288 0.00 7.08 20% 1 2.16 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 8.79 1308080 0.00 8.62 15% 1 1.83 
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Anonymised Anonymised 2004 9.67 413657 0.00 9.47 22% 1 3.18 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 8.28 769402 0.00 7.91 17% 1 2.82 
Anonymised Anonymised 2004 6.96 1447176 0.00 6.64 24% 0 2.18 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 7.93 684366 0.00 6.84 19% 1 2.02 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 8.74 1330302 0.00 7.92 15% 1 1.67 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 11.47 438002 0.00 7.77 22% 1 3.14 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 8.38 761884 0.00 8.32 19% 1 2.90 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 18.80 239927 0.00 15.84 51% 1 4.99 
Anonymised Anonymised 2005 7.42 1460227 0.00 6.40 23% 0 2.17 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 8.70 732835 0.00 6.39 19% 1 1.83 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 8.91 1430721 0.00 7.22 15% 1 1.50 
Anonymised Anonymised 2006 10.00 820243 0.00 7.89 18% 1 2.85 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 9.32 770680 0.00 6.22 18% 1 1.71 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 9.18 1520126 0.00 6.73 14% 1 1.42 
Anonymised Anonymised 2007 10.47 877972 0.00 7.47 17% 1 2.64 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 10.06 811317 0.00 6.56 21% 1 0.87 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 9.83 1500394 0.00 7.02 15% 1 0.79 
Anonymised Anonymised 2008 10.08 915147 0.00 7.63 18% 1 1.52 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 8.97 1554690 0.00 6.79 14% 1 1.00 
Anonymised Anonymised 2009 10.34 845713 0.00 7.79 16% 1 1.59 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 10.64 833633 0.00 6.50 26% 1 1.19 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 8.80 1612075 0.00 6.64 16% 1 1.10 
Anonymised Anonymised 2010 10.30 839949 0.00 7.68 18% 1 1.72 
  
min 3.42 5850 0.00 2.80 0.02 0.00 0.79 
  
max 247.00 1649847 1.50 25.98 0.83 1.00 142.26 
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avg. 38.62 206035 0.52 7.91 0.23 0.74 10.50 
  
std.dev. 35.45 342347 0.31 2.69 0.16 0.44 15.01 
 
Dependent and independent variables from French airports used for the spatial regression 
Airport IATA Year costppax wlu subs aerrev noncommatm pso deprppax 
Ajaccio AJA 2002 8.66 1067769.70 0.02 7.09 62% 1.00 1.69 
Aurillac AUR 2002 43.84 17685.00 0.33 7.61 92% 1.00 0.89 
Brest BES 2002 12.62 740046.60 0.05 6.77 64% 1.00 1.86 
Bastia BIA 2002 8.25 832644.50 0.02 8.03 50% 0.00 2.71 
Biarritz BIQ 2002 9.90 778799.10 0.00 10.05 68% 0.00 3.20 
Beauvais BVA 2002 12.24 681378.50 0.01 8.52 81% 1.00 2.27 
Beziers-Vias BZR 2002 21.58 67935.00 0.27 6.42 91% 1.00 4.20 
CAEN-CARPIQUET  CFR 2002 15.44 138532.60 0.21 9.73 90% 0.00 5.28 
CALVI-SAINTE-CATHERINE  CLY 2002 8.72 261528.80 0.50 7.06 58% 1.00 3.48 
DINARD-PLEURTUIT-SAINT-MALO  DNR 2002 12.02 96873.50 0.10 8.62 89% 0.00 3.80 
BERGERAC-ROUMANIERE  EGC 2002 32.07 63002.00 0.25 9.72 93% 0.00 4.15 
NIMES-GARONS  FNI 2002 16.61 230586.00 0.02 7.64 73% 0.00 2.68 
FIGARI,SUD-CORSE  FSC 2002 8.46 296056.00 0.22 5.58 66% 0.00 1.63 
Grenoble-Isère Airport  GNB 2002 20.57 264578.10 0.20 9.38 90% 0.00 0.00 
Tarbes-Lourdes-Pyrénés LDE 2002 13.69 444284.50 0.03 7.62 80% 1.00 4.64 
LIMOGES-BELLEGARDE  LIG 2002 15.72 214371.10 0.20 6.96 82% 1.00 0.12 
Lille LIL 2002 12.28 923189.20 0.02 7.65 50% 0.00 5.20 
LA-ROCHELLE-ILE DE RE  LRH 2002 17.31 91854.00 0.25 8.87 91% 1.00 3.38 
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LORIENT-LANN-BIHOUE  LRT 2002 11.44 214371.40 0.05 6.12 0% 1.00 2.77 
Montpellier MPL 2002 9.60 1566494.50 0.02 7.22 71% 0.00 3.15 
Marseille MRS 2002 9.01 5784226.50 0.00 6.39 28% 1.00 4.21 
Nantes NTE 2002 9.22 1876982.20 0.04 8.49 47% 0.00 3.89 
Perpignan-Rivesaltes PGF 2002 9.16 647562.20 0.00 4.50 82% 1.00 1.96 
Pau-Pyrénées PUF 2002 13.43 585452.60 0.06 6.65 82% 1.00 2.30 
Rennes RNS 2002 11.18 377648.10 0.03 10.21 65% 1.00 11.58 
Toulon-Hyères TLN 2002 10.50 739561.90 0.00 6.85 0% 1.00 1.83 
Ajaccio AJA 2003 11.90 1067400.50 0.01 8.64 67% 1.00 1.87 
Aurillac AUR 2003 43.60 17605.00 0.36 7.64 90% 1.00 1.15 
Brest BES 2003 13.78 704431.10 0.07 7.26 65% 1.00 2.12 
Bastia BIA 2003 9.65 845387.40 0.04 8.16 62% 0.00 2.64 
Biarritz BIQ 2003 10.77 799960.10 0.00 9.99 69% 0.00 2.77 
Beauvais BVA 2003 12.74 969452.00 0.00 5.63 69% 0.00 2.07 
Beziers-Vias BZR 2003 26.20 61129.10 0.16 12.82 92% 1.00 8.17 
CAEN-CARPIQUET  CFR 2003 22.13 100022.00 0.23 9.47 88% 0.00 5.62 
CALVI-SAINTE-CATHERINE  CLY 2003 12.52 254556.50 0.32 6.77 58% 1.00 3.71 
DINARD-PLEURTUIT-SAINT-MALO  DNR 2003 13.39 112791.60 0.23 8.74 87% 0.00 5.18 
BERGERAC-ROUMANIERE  EGC 2003 23.53 116137.00 0.15 9.12 90% 0.00 2.94 
NIMES-GARONS  FNI 2003 30.75 134606.00 0.11 10.68 82% 0.00 7.69 
FIGARI,SUD-CORSE  FSC 2003 10.83 298348.00 0.36 5.21 64% 0.00 3.00 
Grenoble-Isère Airport  GNB 2003 30.41 178516.90 0.40 9.26 91% 0.00 0.00 
Tarbes-Lourdes-Pyrénés LDE 2003 15.93 378923.00 0.10 10.23 83% 1.00 5.84 
LIMOGES-BELLEGARDE  LIG 2003 18.91 207445.80 0.25 7.90 83% 1.00 0.03 
Lille LIL 2003 13.35 867560.00 0.01 8.57 50% 0.00 5.98 
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LA-ROCHELLE-ILE DE RE  LRH 2003 21.18 93802.00 0.46 9.53 92% 1.00 4.21 
LORIENT-LANN-BIHOUE  LRT 2003 14.81 207445.70 0.12 6.89 3% 1.00 2.21 
Montpellier MPL 2003 11.19 1568975.00 0.01 7.55 73% 0.00 18.66 
Marseille MRS 2003 9.11 5945237.40 0.00 6.21 27% 1.00 4.16 
Nantes NTE 2003 11.18 1916454.40 0.01 8.91 50% 0.00 4.29 
Perpignan-Rivesaltes PGF 2003 13.23 470073.00 0.09 7.42 82% 1.00 3.21 
Pau-Pyrénées PUF 2003 12.54 682778.40 0.00 8.30 84% 1.00 2.03 
Rennes RNS 2003 14.39 379858.70 0.10 10.02 68% 1.00 6.82 
Toulon-Hyères TLN 2003 15.16 554760.00 0.01 9.02 0% 1.00 4.13 
Ajaccio AJA 2004 12.78 977440.70 0.23 9.04 63% 1.00 2.21 
Aurillac AUR 2004 54.05 14441.00 0.32 7.56 89% 1.00 6.48 
Brest BES 2004 14.18 700352.70 0.03 7.86 65% 1.00 1.95 
Bastia BIA 2004 10.33 835661.00 0.10 8.20 58% 0.00 2.76 
Biarritz BIQ 2004 10.96 786387.10 0.00 11.17 73% 0.00 3.62 
Beauvais BVA 2004 11.01 1427612.00 0.00 5.29 63% 0.00 4.92 
Beziers-Vias BZR 2004 48.86 34590.00 0.40 8.68 93% 1.00 9.35 
CAEN-CARPIQUET  CFR 2004 22.00 102065.60 0.39 9.28 91% 1.00 5.11 
CALVI-SAINTE-CATHERINE  CLY 2004 15.68 228101.80 0.52 8.62 61% 0.00 3.89 
DINARD-PLEURTUIT-SAINT-MALO  DNR 2004 11.95 144017.00 0.10 7.66 87% 0.00 7.09 
BERGERAC-ROUMANIERE  EGC 2004 16.68 204691.00 0.03 8.53 86% 0.00 1.48 
NIMES-GARONS  FNI 2004 22.15 156582.20 0.01 8.47 87% 0.00 6.17 
FIGARI,SUD-CORSE  FSC 2004 15.36 254833.00 0.54 9.32 69% 0.00 2.14 
Grenoble-Isère Airport  GNB 2004 25.44 204114.00 0.15 8.78 92% 0.00 0.19 
Tarbes-Lourdes-Pyrénés LDE 2004 15.18 411097.00 0.07 9.76 82% 1.00 4.46 
LIMOGES-BELLEGARDE  LIG 2004 20.20 223843.60 0.31 7.96 83% 1.00 0.07 
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Lille LIL 2004 14.37 838314.10 0.10 8.46 41% 0.00 6.32 
LA-ROCHELLE-ILE DE RE  LRH 2004 23.19 100404.00 0.40 7.86 95% 1.00 2.14 
LORIENT-LANN-BIHOUE  LRT 2004 15.91 198465.40 0.10 7.62 3% 1.00 1.56 
Montpellier MPL 2004 11.20 1327849.50 0.02 7.86 82% 0.00 1.09 
Marseille MRS 2004 8.77 6233812.70 0.00 6.30 26% 1.00 4.04 
Nantes NTE 2004 10.65 1898874.30 0.01 7.74 51% 0.00 3.51 
Perpignan-Rivesaltes PGF 2004 15.25 446129.00 0.30 7.56 84% 1.00 0.45 
Pau-Pyrénées PUF 2004 12.27 721234.80 0.00 8.11 83% 1.00 2.13 
Rennes RNS 2004 12.82 377127.10 0.14 9.75 72% 1.00 1.28 
Toulon-Hyères TLN 2004 17.57 527904.10 0.01 9.31 0% 1.00 3.39 
Ajaccio AJA 2005 12.84 979227.30 0.40 8.93 68% 1.00 2.51 
Aurillac AUR 2005 48.92 16878.00 0.33 8.33 89% 1.00 0.73 
Brest BES 2005 13.56 775258.30 0.00 7.70 0% 1.00 4.78 
Bastia BIA 2005 8.92 817892.40 0.36 8.45 63% 0.00 2.79 
Biarritz BIQ 2005 10.91 817090.20 0.00 10.75 75% 0.00 2.62 
Beauvais BVA 2005 12.59 1848503.60 0.00 5.49 58% 0.00 1.49 
Beziers-Vias BZR 2005 22.89 43278.00 0.70 8.41 92% 1.00 7.51 
CAEN-CARPIQUET  CFR 2005 23.63 100339.00 0.61 8.97 90% 1.00 10.84 
CALVI-SAINTE-CATHERINE  CLY 2005 14.62 246688.30 0.60 8.34 59% 0.00 3.32 
DINARD-PLEURTUIT-SAINT-MALO  DNR 2005 11.93 179971.90 0.19 6.90 92% 0.00 3.22 
BERGERAC-ROUMANIERE  EGC 2005 18.37 233760.00 0.06 8.42 89% 0.00 1.39 
NIMES-GARONS  FNI 2005 18.88 206129.10 0.36 8.37 60% 0.00 4.16 
FIGARI,SUD-CORSE  FSC 2005 15.00 266230.00 0.54 8.48 71% 0.00 2.08 
Grenoble-Isère Airport  GNB 2005 20.77 271407.00 0.42 7.03 93% 0.00 1.05 
Tarbes-Lourdes-Pyrénés LDE 2005 15.26 462148.00 0.15 9.50 79% 1.00 3.70 
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LIMOGES-BELLEGARDE  LIG 2005 19.28 283850.30 0.35 7.12 82% 1.00 0.20 
Lille LIL 2005 15.55 842739.20 0.08 8.86 35% 0.00 6.16 
LA-ROCHELLE-ILE DE RE  LRH 2005 22.03 127563.00 0.26 9.54 93% 1.00 4.10 
LORIENT-LANN-BIHOUE  LRT 2005 14.51 214412.80 0.09 7.18 5% 1.00 2.27 
Montpellier MPL 2005 11.80 1311497.60 0.00 7.98 82% 1.00 4.51 
Marseille MRS 2005 8.33 6566471.80 0.00 6.15 24% 1.00 3.88 
Nantes NTE 2005 10.47 2129663.40 0.02 8.04 39% 0.00 3.15 
Perpignan-Rivesaltes PGF 2005 13.27 428987.00 0.25 8.32 83% 1.00 2.34 
Pau-Pyrénées PUF 2005 12.44 729445.80 0.00 7.92 83% 1.00 1.53 
Rennes RNS 2005 20.65 406615.80 0.10 9.56 73% 1.00 7.55 
Toulon-Hyères TLN 2005 14.34 536234.00 0.01 8.55 0% 1.00 3.38 
Ajaccio AJA 2006 12.92 985298.40 0.23 8.80 66% 1.00 5.48 
Aurillac AUR 2006 38.99 19148.00 0.36 7.18 91% 1.00 0.36 
Brest BES 2006 13.28 817620.50 0.01 7.14 66% 0.00 1.20 
Bastia BIA 2006 10.72 821560.00 0.23 8.45 63% 0.00 1.90 
Biarritz BIQ 2006 10.34 864792.00 0.00 7.53 72% 0.00 2.23 
Beauvais BVA 2006 12.68 1884992.50 0.00 5.08 63% 0.00 1.87 
Beziers-Vias BZR 2006 47.46 41987.10 0.38 9.16 50% 1.00 6.27 
CAEN-CARPIQUET  CFR 2006 22.42 107006.80 0.39 8.85 90% 1.00 14.69 
CALVI-SAINTE-CATHERINE  CLY 2006 13.57 270891.80 0.55 8.37 55% 0.00 1.55 
DINARD-PLEURTUIT-SAINT-MALO  DNR 2006 12.99 163965.00 0.24 6.94 93% 0.00 3.94 
BERGERAC-ROUMANIERE  EGC 2006 17.61 269630.00 0.07 8.31 88% 0.00 1.01 
NIMES-GARONS  FNI 2006 19.39 226887.10 0.36 9.45 82% 0.00 0.81 
FIGARI,SUD-CORSE  FSC 2006 13.56 302374.00 0.57 8.47 74% 0.00 7.58 
Grenoble-Isère Airport  GNB 2006 17.74 432933.00 0.21 12.58 90% 0.00 0.72 
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Tarbes-Lourdes-Pyrénés LDE 2006 14.61 450547.00 0.15 9.80 79% 1.00 3.50 
LIMOGES-BELLEGARDE  LIG 2006 16.70 378294.90 0.32 7.20 78% 1.00 0.00 
Lille LIL 2006 13.59 925508.80 0.05 9.14 43% 0.00 5.51 
LA-ROCHELLE-ILE DE RE  LRH 2006 17.68 180980.00 0.44 8.86 92% 1.00 7.62 
LORIENT-LANN-BIHOUE  LRT 2006 13.92 225174.10 0.03 7.76 0% 1.00 0.94 
Montpellier MPL 2006 10.85 1323572.30 0.00 8.34 84% 1.00 4.54 
Marseille MRS 2006 8.78 6757288.60 0.00 6.58 22% 0.00 3.55 
Nantes NTE 2006 8.80 2333522.70 0.02 7.98 42% 0.00 1.62 
Perpignan-Rivesaltes PGF 2006 12.44 448963.00 0.08 7.79 85% 1.00 1.90 
Pau-Pyrénées PUF 2006 12.33 763977.00 0.04 7.71 82% 1.00 1.77 
Rennes RNS 2006 13.46 464215.90 0.25 9.33 73% 1.00 6.05 
Toulon-Hyères TLN 2006 13.88 638810.80 0.01 8.27 0% 0.00 2.18 
Ajaccio AJA 2007 13.22 1025102.10 0.22 8.80 67% 1.00 1.59 
Aurillac AUR 2007 37.10 18620.00 0.35 7.76 93% 1.00 0.26 
Brest BES 2007 13.89 850596.10 0.01 7.26 64% 0.00 1.52 
Bastia BIA 2007 10.78 860727.30 0.25 7.80 64% 0.00 1.83 
Biarritz BIQ 2007 10.62 930880.00 0.00 7.21 72% 0.00 2.11 
Beauvais BVA 2007 11.48 2155639.50 0.00 5.08 52% 0.00 1.15 
Beziers-Vias BZR 2007 66.46 31824.00 0.44 9.33 37% 1.00 13.87 
CAEN-CARPIQUET  CFR 2007 22.56 112091.80 0.41 9.36 90% 1.00 9.11 
CALVI-SAINTE-CATHERINE  CLY 2007 14.04 273574.30 0.54 8.75 53% 0.00 1.68 
DINARD-PLEURTUIT-SAINT-MALO  DNR 2007 11.72 178616.40 0.22 7.25 91% 0.00 4.23 
BERGERAC-ROUMANIERE  EGC 2007 27.13 254429.00 0.11 8.61 86% 0.00 1.01 
NIMES-GARONS  FNI 2007 24.96 225702.00 0.24 10.27 84% 0.00 0.31 
FIGARI,SUD-CORSE  FSC 2007 13.54 341008.00 0.33 8.69 63% 0.00 0.00 
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Grenoble-Isère Airport  GNB 2007 18.10 469658.00 0.22 7.50 89% 0.00 2.00 
Tarbes-Lourdes-Pyrénés LDE 2007 15.05 444258.00 0.01 10.04 79% 1.00 4.28 
LIMOGES-BELLEGARDE  LIG 2007 17.14 391220.30 0.27 7.68 78% 1.00 0.02 
Lille LIL 2007 13.46 1051789.90 0.05 8.57 47% 0.00 3.65 
LA-ROCHELLE-ILE DE RE  LRH 2007 15.54 220577.00 0.27 8.74 90% 1.00 3.77 
LORIENT-LANN-BIHOUE  LRT 2007 16.74 214622.00 0.08 8.22 9% 1.00 1.32 
Montpellier MPL 2007 11.37 1287449.80 0.00 9.04 84% 1.00 6.84 
Marseille MRS 2007 8.95 6809269.80 0.00 6.69 20% 0.00 0.00 
Nantes NTE 2007 9.93 2579193.30 0.02 7.72 36% 1.00 2.50 
Perpignan-Rivesaltes PGF 2007 13.67 422798.00 0.09 8.22 86% 1.00 2.30 
Pau-Pyrénées PUF 2007 13.15 763307.50 0.03 8.45 82% 1.00 1.64 
Rennes RNS 2007 12.05 536067.50 0.20 9.21 73% 1.00 4.95 
Toulon-Hyères TLN 2007 13.65 646053.00 0.01 8.25 0% 0.00 2.89 
Ajaccio AJA 2008 12.07 1078415.70 0.22 8.64 63% 1.00 1.51 
Aurillac AUR 2008 40.51 19059.00 0.33 7.36 92% 1.00 0.39 
Brest BES 2008 15.95 874899.70 0.08 6.93 58% 0.00 2.56 
Bastia BIA 2008 10.32 934348.00 0.00 11.11 63% 0.00 1.68 
Biarritz BIQ 2008 10.89 1027911.00 0.00 7.70 70% 0.00 1.82 
Beauvais BVA 2008 11.23 2484635.60 0.00 4.85 47% 0.00 0.44 
Beziers-Vias BZR 2008 47.87 75178.00 0.10 22.15 93% 1.00 8.52 
CAEN-CARPIQUET  CFR 2008 23.64 107899.80 0.48 9.24 90% 1.00 9.18 
CALVI-SAINTE-CATHERINE  CLY 2008 14.73 275860.20 0.00 16.92 53% 0.00 1.95 
DINARD-PLEURTUIT-SAINT-MALO  DNR 2008 10.97 201175.20 0.04 8.54 82% 0.00 3.39 
BERGERAC-ROUMANIERE  EGC 2008 19.89 294700.00 0.14 8.58 84% 0.00 1.90 
NIMES-GARONS  FNI 2008 23.55 224459.00 0.30 9.80 87% 0.00 0.51 
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FIGARI,SUD-CORSE  FSC 2008 10.92 370929.00 0.33 8.72 68% 0.00 0.55 
Grenoble-Isère Airport  GNB 2008 17.47 469777.00 0.01 10.15 88% 0.00 2.08 
Tarbes-Lourdes-Pyrénés LDE 2008 11.87 678897.00 0.00 9.60 68% 1.00 3.59 
LIMOGES-BELLEGARDE  LIG 2008 18.67 382398.10 0.27 7.97 72% 1.00 0.07 
Lille LIL 2008 14.29 1014721.00 0.06 8.50 48% 0.00 6.01 
LA-ROCHELLE-ILE DE RE  LRH 2008 16.76 215145.00 0.29 8.56 90% 1.00 3.56 
LORIENT-LANN-BIHOUE  LRT 2008 16.87 217603.00 0.08 8.56 16% 1.00 0.94 
Montpellier MPL 2008 11.20 1256912.50 0.00 8.50 82% 1.00 1.88 
Marseille MRS 2008 9.78 6971334.20 0.00 6.84 21% 0.00 3.85 
Nantes NTE 2008 9.01 2732469.50 0.02 7.39 31% 1.00 3.29 
Perpignan-Rivesaltes PGF 2008 12.40 522765.00 0.01 6.79 88% 1.00 1.33 
Pau-Pyrénées PUF 2008 12.92 817769.40 0.00 8.16 78% 1.00 1.42 
Rennes RNS 2008 14.67 497534.10 0.23 8.94 76% 1.00 4.72 
Toulon-Hyères TLN 2008 13.98 629596.30 0.00 8.07 0% 0.00 2.47 
Ajaccio AJA 2009 12.83 1090343.50 0.23 8.85 60% 1.00 1.79 
Aurillac AUR 2009 39.40 20501.00 0.23 13.79 91% 1.00 0.14 
Brest BES 2009 14.88 881639.30 0.01 8.14 71% 0.00 2.38 
Bastia BIA 2009 10.09 1012455.40 0.00 10.96 63% 0.00 1.42 
Biarritz BIQ 2009 11.68 1011589.00 0.01 7.65 72% 0.00 2.09 
Beauvais BVA 2009 11.29 2591864.00 0.00 4.94 43% 0.00 0.55 
Beziers-Vias BZR 2009 22.58 86816.00 0.04 4.76 96% 1.00 7.23 
CAEN-CARPIQUET  CFR 2009 29.07 90033.60 0.45 9.74 86% 1.00 5.43 
CALVI-SAINTE-CATHERINE  CLY 2009 14.87 286274.30 0.00 17.02 55% 0.00 1.48 
DINARD-PLEURTUIT-SAINT-MALO  DNR 2009 15.80 136943.10 0.03 12.52 84% 0.00 5.20 
BERGERAC-ROUMANIERE  EGC 2009 19.15 274658.00 0.19 7.79 85% 0.00 0.83 
159 
 
Airport IATA Year costppax wlu subs aerrev noncommatm pso deprppax 
NIMES-GARONS  FNI 2009 24.88 182867.00 0.09 11.10 88% 0.00 0.73 
FIGARI,SUD-CORSE  FSC 2009 10.36 401611.00 0.24 8.71 61% 0.00 0.58 
Grenoble-Isère Airport  GNB 2009 20.04 456062.00 0.31 8.02 89% 1.00 1.29 
Tarbes-Lourdes-Pyrénés LDE 2009 14.74 481004.00 0.05 9.27 68% 1.00 0.96 
LIMOGES-BELLEGARDE  LIG 2009 20.16 356353.10 0.36 8.37 80% 1.00 0.08 
Lille LIL 2009 12.12 1147925.40 0.00 8.41 38% 0.00 0.80 
LA-ROCHELLE-ILE DE RE  LRH 2009 19.12 168969.00 0.22 9.15 91% 1.00 4.58 
LORIENT-LANN-BIHOUE  LRT 2009 18.49 187754.00 0.07 9.59 12% 1.00 1.61 
Montpellier MPL 2009 12.13 1225690.20 0.00 9.63 84% 1.00 3.78 
Marseille MRS 2009 8.82 7295964.10 0.00 6.88 22% 0.00 3.78 
Nantes NTE 2009 9.62 2668437.30 0.01 7.88 31% 1.00 2.89 
Perpignan-Rivesaltes PGF 2009 14.99 393275.00 0.07 8.70 89% 1.00 1.53 
Pau-Pyrénées PUF 2009 19.20 691187.80 0.00 9.55 81% 1.00 2.50 
Rennes RNS 2009 15.62 431968.80 0.25 9.89 77% 1.00 5.20 
Toulon-Hyères TLN 2009 17.76 576739.60 0.00 8.53 0% 0.00 3.58 
  
min 8.25 14441 0.00 4.50 0% 0.00 0.00 
  
max 66.46 7295964 0.70 22.15 96% 1.00 18.66 
  
avg. 16.67 826325 0.15 8.45 66% 0.53 3.21 
  
std.dev. 8.89 1274584 0.16 1.90 26% 0.50 2.70 
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Geographic coordinates of Norwegian and French airports 
Country Airport IATA Latitude Longitude 
France Ajaccio AJA 41.916667 8.8 
France Aurillac AUR 44.891667 -2.416667 
France Brest BES 48.45 -4.416667 
France Bastia BIA 42.7 9.45 
France Biarritz BIQ 43.466667 -1.533333 
France Beauvais BVA 49.45 2.116667 
France Beziers-Vias BZR 43.323333 3.353333 
France CAEN-CARPIQUET  CFR 49.183333 -0.45 
France CALVI-SAINTE-CATHERINE  CLY 42.533333 8.8 
France DINARD-PLEURTUIT-SAINT-MALO  DNR 48.583333 -2.083333 
France BERGERAC-ROUMANIERE  EGC 44.833333 0.516667 
France NIMES-GARONS  FNI 43.85 4.416667 
France FIGARI,SUD-CORSE  FSC 41.583333 9.25 
France Grenoble-Isère Airport  GNB 45.363056 5.332778 
France Tarbes-Lourdes-Pyrénés LDE 43.181944 0.000278 
France LIMOGES-BELLEGARDE  LIG 45.860833 1.180278 
France Lille LIL 50.566667 3.1 
France LA-ROCHELLE-ILE DE RE  LRH 46.5 -1.5 
France LORIENT-LANN-BIHOUE  LRT 47.766667 -3.45 
France Montpellier MPL 43.583333 3.966667 
France Marseille MRS 43.436667 5.215 
France Nantes NTE 47.15 -1.6 
France Perpignan-Rivesaltes PGF 42.740833 2.869722 
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France Pau-Pyrénées PUF 43.38 -0.418611 
France Rennes RNS 48.066667 -1.733333 
France Toulon-Hyères TLN 43.097222 6.146111 
Norway  Ålesund AES 62.560278 6.1 
Norway  Alta ALF 69.983333 23.366667 
Norway  Andøya ANX 69.316667 16.116667 
Norway  Bardufoss BDU 69.055833 18.540278 
Norway  Båtsfjord BJF 70.633333 29.5 
Norway  Brønnøysund BNN 65.483333 12.216667 
Norway  Bodø BOO 67.266667 14.366667 
Norway  Berlevåg BVG 70.866667 29 
Norway  Evenes (Harstad-Narvik) EVE 68.5 16.683333 
Norway  Førde FDE 61.391111 5.756944 
Norway  Florø FRO 61.5 5.083333 
Norway  Hasvik HAA 70.483333 22.033333 
Norway  Haugesund HAU 59.416667 5.3 
Norway  Hammerfest HFT 70.7 23.666667 
Norway  Ørsta-Volda HOV 62.2 6.15 
Norway  Honningsvåg HVG 70.983333 25.833333 
Norway  Kirkenes KKN 69.716667 29.9 
Norway  Kristiansand KRS 58.2 8.1 
Norway  Kristiansund KSU 63.116667 7.85 
Norway  Banak (Lakselv) LKL 70.05 24.983333 
Norway  Leknes LKN 68.15 13.016667 
Norway  Svalbard LYR 78.191667 15.9 
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Norway  Mehamn MEH 71.033333 27.833333 
Norway  Mosjøen MJF 65.783333 13.216667 
Norway  Molde MOL 62.744722 7.2625 
Norway  Mo i Rana MQN 66.316667 14 
Norway  Narvik NVK 68.425 17.425 
Norway  Namsos OSY 64.466667 11.6 
Norway  Røst RET 67.483333 12.083333 
Norway  Røros RRS 62.583333 11.35 
Norway  Rørvik RVK 64.85 11.233333 
Norway  Sandane SDN 61.766667 6.216667 
Norway  Stokmarknes SKN 68.583333 15.016667 
Norway  Sogndal SOG 61.166667 7.133333 
Norway  Sørkjosen SOJ 69.783333 20.933333 
Norway  Sandnessjøen SSJ 65.95 12.466667 
Norway  Svolvær SVJ 68.233333 14.55 
Norway  Tromsø TOS 69.681389 18.917778 
Norway  Vardø VAW 70.355278 31.045 
Norway  Fagernes VDB 61.083333 9.333333 
Norway  Vadsø VDS 70.066667 29.75 
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